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A b s t r a c t
The topic of this study is the judicial enforcement of so-called social and 
economic rights, in particular the right to health care, education, 
housing, food etc, expressly recognised in international treaties and in 
many domestic constitutions (often referred to as social rights’ 
justiciability).
Many believe that courts should refrain from enforcing those 
rights because they are neither legitimised nor institutionally competent 
to deal with the issues involved (i.e. matters of policy and resource 
allocation). Partisans of social rights’ justiciability, on the other hand, 
insist that it is within the appropriate role of courts to adjudicate social 
rights and that no special expertise is required in that task that courts do 
not have or cannot develop.
I review this debate and conclude that neither side is correct. The 
main problem, I submit, is that both sides of the debate have been taking 
for granted a conception of social rights that I argue is flawed. Indeed, it 
is commonly thought that social rights are entitlements to a certain basic 
level of social goods (e.g. health care, food, housing), which are 
necessary for the individual to lead a decent life. I call this the “basic 
needs conception”. I claim, however, that social rights are in fact 
entitlements to a fair share of society’s resources not necessarily related 
to the capacity for the enjoyment of basic needs.
I propose, then, that the debate on legitimacy and competence has 
to be recast in the following terms: are courts legitimised or competent 
to deal with the intractable question of distributive justice posed by 
social rights? I claim that they are and propose an insurance model, 
inspired by the work of Ronald Dworkin, which they could follow to 
reach an acceptable answer to that question.
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In t r o d u c t io n
The subject of this study is the judicial enforcement of so-called social 
and economic rights (I will call this “social rights’ justiciability”). My 
main interest is on the justiciability of those rights in national legal 
systems, especially those that have expressly recognised them in a 
written constitution. The general issues I discuss, however, are also 
relevant to the international system of human rights protection and 
national systems where those rights have not been expressly recognised.
The problem of social rights’ justiciability has occupied legal 
academics across the world at least since the late 1960s. Most of the 
attention then has been focused on the international arena, following the 
adoption by the United Nations and regional international bodies such as 
the European Council of multilateral treaties on human rights.1 The 
usual adoption of separate instruments for so-called civil and political 
rights on one side and social and economic rights on the other, combined 
with the establishment of different mechanisms of supervision (usually 
complaints procedures to judicial or quasi-judicial bodies in the former 
and periodical reports in the latter), spurred a heated debate on the nature 
of those two categories of rights and their suitability for judicial, or 
judicial-like enforcement. But the debate has also taken place in 
national systems, not only where the International Covenant was ratified,
1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights -  “ICCPR”; The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights -  “ICESCR”; The European Convention 
on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and the European Social Charter (“ESC”).
‘ The classic texts on this debate in the international arena are E. W. Vierdag, “The Legal 
Nature o f the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights”, 1978, pp 69-105, GJH van Hoof, “The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Rebuttal o f Some Traditional Views”, in The Right to Food, P. Alston and 
K. Tomasevski (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (1982), Maurice Cranston, “Human 
Rights, Real and Supposed”, in Political Theory and the Rights o f  Man, DD Raphael (ed), 
Macmillan, London, 1967, pp 43-53.
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but also where it wasn’t, such as in the United States of America. In 
those latter countries it usually revolved around the issue of whether 
broadly drafted constitutional provisions, such as the American 
Constitution’s equal protection clause (the 14th Amendment), could be 
read as recognising social and economic rights.
Almost four decades later, the debate goes on, but the scenario 
has changed a great deal. In those early years, the defence of 
justiciability was almost indistinguishable from the defence of the 
existence of social and economic rights in the first place. This is because 
most arguments against justiciability were actually arguments denying 
social and economic rights the very status of rights. There seems to be 
now a larger and growing consensus that those rights are indeed genuine 
rights. No less than 142 countries have ratified the ICESCR to this date. 
The so-called “indivisibility” of human rights, i.e. the thesis that human 
rights are totally interdependent and therefore meaningless when taken 
separately, has been repeatedly acknowledged by international 
institutions, and has become almost a truism in human rights discourse.4 
In the domestic arena, moreover, social and economic rights have been 
expressly recognised in a host of recently adopted national constitutions.
It would be wrong to conclude, however, that this more receptive 
general climate towards the existence of social rights has entailed a 
similar attitude to the question of justiciability. Many would be ready to 
recognise that those rights exist and yet be wary of entmsting courts with 
the power to enforce them even in those countries where they are 
constitutionally recognised with no express restrictions in terms of
3 See Frank I. Michaelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 83 Harvard Law Review 7, (1969)
4 Especially after the adoption by the UN of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
that states: “5. All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.” 
(A/CONF. 157/23
12 July 1993)
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justiciability, as is the case in both jurisdictions the appendix to this 
study focuses upon (Brazil and South Africa).5 There are concerns that 
such a power might entail an undue interference of the judiciary on 
matters which are the preserve of the political branches of the state.
When social rights are expressly recognised as legal rights in the 
constitution, thus, a certain dilemma seems to arise concerning their 
justiciability. As eloquently described by a commentator:
“By constitutionalizing social rights, the argument often has run, you 
force the judiciary to a hapless choice between usurpation and 
abdication, from which there is no escape without embarrassment or 
discredit. One way, it is said, lies the judicial choice to issue positive 
enforcement orders in a pretentious, inexpert, probably vain but 
nevertheless resented attempt to reshuffle the most basic resource- 
management priorities of the public house-hold against prevailing 
political will. The other way lies the judicial choice to debase 
dangerously the entire currency of rights and the rule of law by openly 
ceding to executive and parliamentary bodies an unreviewable 
privilege of indefinite postponement of a declared constitutional 
right.’
Now, that the fears expressed in both options of the dilemma are 
not overstated there is enough evidence. Recent social rights’ cases in 
the two jurisdictions which I deal with in the appendix provide clear 
proof of this fact. Indeed, as I discuss in that chapter, whereas the 
Brazilian courts (including the Supreme Federal Tribunal -  the highest 
court in the country) have taken an approach to the enforcement of social
5In other constitutions, however, there are express provisions barring the judiciary from 
adjudicating social and economic rights. See, for instance, the Constitution o f India, which 
recognizes social and economic rights as “directives o f state policy”, and expressly prevent the 
judiciary from enforcing them: PART IV - DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY 
37. Application o f the principles contained in this Part.- The provisions contained in this Part 
shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless 
fundamental in the governance o f the country and it shall be the duty o f the State to apply 
these principles in making laws.”
6 see Frank I. Michelman, “The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political 
Justification”, International Journal o f  Constitutional Law, vol 1, number 1, pp 13-34, 2003,
p. 16.
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rights such as the right to health care, for instance, which is arguably 
quite representative of the concern manifested in the former option of 
the dilemma (“usurpation”), the South African Constitutional Court’s 
decisions on social rights so far could be seen as representing the latter 
(“abdication”).7
But the dilemma itself, as I shall argue in this thesis, is somewhat 
overstated. Judicial enforcement of social rights does not have 
necessarily to entail either usurpation of political power by the judiciary 
or total abdication. We must surely take adequate heed of this risk, 
which is not as easily dispelled as most partisans of social rights’ 
justiciability seem to believe. Within an adequate adjudicative model,
i.e. one which is based on an adequate conception of social and 
economic rights, courts might well be able enforce social rights in a 
manner which is not only competent, but also respectful of democratic 
values and the principle of separation of powers. My aim in this thesis is 
to make a contribution to the effort of building such a model.
One of my maim contentions is that the conception of social and 
economic rights largely assumed in the debate on justiciability rests on 
shaky ground, namely the theory of basic needs as absolute and 
universal entitlements. I have to discuss at some length, therefore, 
philosophical ideas related to this problem, such as distributive justice, 
solidarity, needs etc.
It is not the aim of my thesis, however, to make any contribution 
in the realm of political or moral philosophy. It is rather to shed some 
light at the practical matter of social rights' justiciability with theoretical 
ideas widely discussed in this field. I do not engage, as a consequence, 
in a comprehensive review of the extensive literature produced on those
7 1 develop this point in chapter 4.
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topics. I rather invoke some classical works which I find illuminating 
and discuss them in the depth which I deem necessary to clarify the 
advantages of the conception I defend over the one I criticise.
Last but not least, I should mention that my approach to the 
problem of justiciability is normative, not descriptive. I do not attempt 
to give any systematic or comprehensive account or interpretation of 
how courts of any specific jurisdiction have dealt with social and 
economic rights. I am rather interested in how courts ought to deal with 
the problems of legitimacy and capacity raised in almost all jurisdictions 
where social and economic rights have been recognised in the 
constitution. I use some individual cases in some of the chapters, thus, 
simply as examples to clarify the arguments I discuss from this 
normative perspective. Only in the appendix I focus on some cases 
adjudicated in two specific jurisdictions, yet still as a means to 
illuminate and consolidate the normative points I develop in the thesis.
The study is organised as follows. In Chapter 1, The Justiciability 
Debate, I review the current debate on social rights’ justiciability and 
claim that it has been unduly confined to a discussion about the nature of 
social rights. Opponents of justiciability often claim that those rights 
should be unjusticiable because they are significantly different in nature 
from more traditional civil and political rights. Unlike traditional rights, 
they say, social rights are “positive” (i.e. generate duties of action rather 
than simple abstention), dependent thus on scarce resources, and 
exceedingly vague. Partisans of social rights justiciability, in their turn, 
maintain that those differences are fallacious, or at least not as 
pronounced as they are made out to be. Civil and political rights, they 
claim, are also “positive”, dependent on resources and quite vague. In 
short, there is no significant difference, they claim, between both
12
categories of rights (I call this the “equal nature thesis”), and social 
rights should therefore be also justiciable. But “the equal nature thesis”, 
I argue, though correct in its main premise (i.e. that social rights are not 
significantly different in nature from civil and political rights), 
overstates its conclusion. That is, it falls short of making a strong case 
for the justiciability of social rights. It certainly shows that the argument 
against justiciability is inconsistent if solely based on the alleged 
differences in nature between social and civil rights. It does not provide 
a positive argument, however, for the justiciability of the former. One 
might well accept the equal nature thesis, that is, and still reject the 
justiciability of both types of rights when all or some of those aspects 
(i.e. positiveness, vagueness and resource dependence) are present. 
Despite being important in dispelling popular misconceptions about the 
different nature of social and civil rights, thus, the equal nature thesis is 
not in itself sufficient (as it seems to be often assumed) to make the case 
for justiciability. Difficult issues concerning the legitimacy and the 
institutional competence of courts to enforce positive rights in general 
remain to be faced.
Each of those dimensions (i.e. legitimacy and institutional 
competence), therefore, will deserve a separate chapter in my thesis. 
Before I tackle those issues, however, I deal in Chapter 2, What are 
social rights? with another point which has not received as much 
attention in the justiciability debate, namely the problem of definition 
and justification of the content of social rights. It is usually assumed in 
the debate that social rights are rights to the satisfaction of certain 
material needs to health, education, food etc, commonly denominated 
“basic needs”. But this conception (I call it the “equality of basic needs 
conception” of social rights, or simply “basic needs conception”), I 
argue, is inadequate. Given that the interests guaranteed by social rights
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(and by all positive rights) are directly dependent on scarce resources, 
the content of those rights must be determined by a just distribution of 
those resources, i.e. through what an adequate theory of distributive 
justice would entail individuals to enjoy in terms of health, education, 
food etc. But basic needs satisfaction, I claim, is neither a sufficient, nor 
a necessary requisite of a just distribution of resources. A just 
distribution of resources might well entail, as I try to demonstrate, that 
some individuals enjoy less basic needs than others, or even that some 
can satisfy more than their basic needs whilst others cannot satisfy even 
those. I reject, therefore, the basic needs conception of social rights, and 
propose an alternate conception which I call “equality of resources 
conception” of social rights. Under my alternate conception, which 
draws on Ronald Dworkin’s well-known theory of distributive justice, 
individuals’ abilities in the enjoyment of health, education, food and 
housing needs will vary to a certain extent without being unjust. Social 
rights are thus not necessarily rights to an equal level of satisfaction of 
those needs.
In chapter 3, Legitimacy: Social Rights, Democracy and 
Separation o f  Powers, I discuss in depth and reject the argument that 
judicial enforcement of social rights would necessarily infringe 
principles of democracy and separation of powers. In chapter 4, Social 
Rights and Institutional Competence, I discuss the claim that courts are 
not institutionally capable of dealing with the issues involved in the 
adjudication of those rights, and conclude that the problem of 
institutional competence, though real, is less related to an inherent 
characteristic of the judiciary (and the judicial process), than to the 
complexity of defining the content of social rights. In chapter 5, thus, I 
consider the position that denies the possibility of conceiving social 
rights as immediately claimable, individual rights (“subjective rights”),
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claiming that those rights give rise only to generic goals of state policy. I 
conclude, however, that such conception would suffer from the same 
problem identified in chapter 4, i.e. the lack of a clear standard to define 
the content of the state’s duty to promote social rights, even if only as 
generic goals of state policy.
In the last two chapters, therefore, I discuss ways of giving some 
content to social rights. I argue that the adequate way to do so is through 
what I call a “minimum level strategy”. That is, through the 
determination of minimum levels of health care, education, food and 
housing that one could safely presume would be part of a social right 
determined by the equality of resources conception defended in chapter
2. In chapter 6, The Minimum Core Approach, I discuss and reject an 
apparently similar yet fundamentally different strategy, highly popular in 
the legal literature: the so-called “minimum core approach”. The 
problem with this approach, I argue, is the same as that of the basic 
needs conception I discussed in chapter 2, since it is, in fact, a mere 
strategy to apply that conception when resources are not sufficient to 
guarantee that everyone in society enjoys basic needs. So, if the equality 
of resources conception I defended is correct, we need to follow a 
different strategy in the adjudication of social rights. I develop and 
defend such a model in chapter 7, Social Rights as Insurance, where I 
draw again on Dworkin’s distributive justice theory. I maintain, there, 
that the minimum levels of health care, education, food, housing etc that 
we could safely presume everyone in society would be able to enjoy if 
resources were justly distributed can be determined by what Dworkin 
calls the “hypothetical insurance scheme”. I claim that this strategy 
could in principle be competently and legitimately applied by courts. In 
the appendix, I discuss recent cases involving social rights in South 
Africa, Brazil and other South American countries to illustrate two
15
opposite approaches to justiciability which I find inappropriate and 
submit could be replaced by the approach I suggest in this thesis.
Explanatory Note
The phrase “social and economic rights” can have different meanings, so 
it is necessary for me to explain what meaning I am attributing to it in 
this study. One common usage of the phrase, which we might call broad, 
employs it to refer to all those rights listed in the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Another more restricted usage 
of that phrase, which we might call narrow, refers to only those rights 
related to social goods that are directly connected to our welfare 
(sometimes called “welfare rights”).8 It includes, therefore, the rights to 
health care, education, food, housing and work, but excludes other rights 
recognised in the Covenant such as the right to strike, to form labour 
associations, or any of the rights which are usually collectively referred 
to as workers’ rights. In this study I am interested only in those rights 
encompassed in the narrow usage. Not, of course, because I find them 
more important, but rather because they pose more problems of 
justiciability than these other so-called social rights included in the 
Covenant.9
8 It is important to stress directly here because all rights are somehow connected to our 
welfare. The distinction is merely heuristic, thus, as most, if not all, distinctions in law.
9 See, for instance, Matthew Craven, The Justiciability o f Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, in R Burchill, D Harris and A. Owers (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
their implementation in the United Kingdom, 1999.
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C h a p t e r  1 
T h e  J u st ic ia b il it y  D e b a te
The Nature of Social and Economic Rights
Arguments against the judicial enforcement of social and economic 
rights are traditionally made, as we saw in the Introduction, under two 
separate (though overlapping) headings: legitimacy and institutional 
capacity (or institutional competence). I will deal with each of those 
issues separately in chapters 3 and 4. Before that, however, I must 
discuss the characteristics of social and economic rights which are 
supposed to entail the problems of legitimacy and institutional capacity 
we shall analyse in those later chapters. In this first chapter, thus, I deal 
with what we might call the “nature” of social and economic rights. That 
is, what type of right the so-called social and economic rights are. As we 
shall see, much of the opposition to their justiciability rests on the fact 
that those rights have what is called a “positive” nature, i.e. they are 
“positive rights”. We must therefore look carefully into the issue of the 
nature of social and economic rights. The discussion here is normative. 
That is, I am not concerned with how specific courts have actually dealt 
with social and economic rights. That is, if they have regarded them as 
“positive rights” in opposition to “negative” civil and political rights or 
not. I am rather interested in the moral and conceptual arguments about 
the nature of rights in general and social and economic rights in
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particular. I cite only two cases, therefore, and merely as an illustration 
of the normative issue discussed.10
Another related and important issue to the justiciability debate is 
the content of social and economic rights. Many critics claim that they 
are too vague to be justiciable. This discussion will be carried out in 
chapter 2.
Positive and Negative Rights
According to a well-known classification, rights can be divided into 
positive and negative, depending on the type of duty they entail. Some 
rights, it is said, give rise to duties that involve no more than restraint 
from action (i.e. an omission), and therefore receive the denomination of 
negative rights. Other rights give rise to duties that require others to act, 
i.e. to do something for the right holder, being thus called positive rights. 
One of the main implications of the positive/negative rights distinction 
to the justiciability debate has to do with the issue of resource scarcity. 
Positive rights, it is claimed, are necessarily dependent on resources, 
whilst negative rights are not. Charles Fried provided a classic statement 
of the distinction between positive and negative rights in his famous 
book Right and Wrong:
“A positive right is a claim to something- a share of material goods, or 
some particular good like the attentions of a lawyer or a doctor, or 
perhaps the claim to a result like health or enlightenment- while a 
negative right is the right that something not be done to one, that some 
particular imposition be withheld. Positive rights are inevitably 
asserted to scarce goods, and consequently scarcity implies a limit to 
the claim. Negative rights, however, the right not to be interfered with
10 As a matter o f fact, I engage more thoroughly with case law only in the Appendix, where I 
discuss some South African and South American cases that deal with social and economic 
rights.
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in forbidden ways, do not appear to have such natural, such inevitable
limitations.”11
Opponents of justiciability often claim that social rights fall into 
the category of positive rights, whilst civil and political rights are merely 
negative. This is supposed to impose a great hurdle to the judicial 
enforcement of the former, for a reason which I only mention here but 
discuss at length in later chapters.12 Given the positive nature of social 
rights, their judicial enforcement places the judiciary in a position to tell 
the political branches what to do in areas which are traditionally 
considered the preserve of the latter: namely, social and economic policy 
and resource allocation. As I said, those important issues will be 
discussed in later chapters. Here my concern is with the nature of social 
and economic rights in the light of the positive/negative classification. Is 
the positive/negative distinction accurate or helpful?
The distinction is not devoid of intuitive appeal. When we think 
of violations of civil and political rights, such as freedom of religion or 
expression, or the right to vote, we imagine the state interfering with 
some of those rights, i.e. preventing, through some kind of coercion, 
their exercise by individuals. If the state were to comply with its duties, 
all it had to do would be to stop that interference, that is, abstain from  
acting (a negative duty). Now, when we think of infringements of social 
and economic rights, it is just the opposite. We think of a state failing to 
provide all its citizens with a certain level of social goods like education, 
health care, housing etc. Compliance with those duties would therefore 
require action from the state (a positive duty).
11 Right and Wrong, Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 110.
12 See Chapters 3 and 4.
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These are certainly the stereotypical examples (“textbook 
examples”) of violations of both types of rights. But are they more than 
that, that is, do they accurately reflect the real nature of those rights? Or, 
to put it simply, do civil and political rights entail only negative duties 
and social rights only positive ones?
It has been exhaustively contented in the literature that this is not 
the case. All rights, it is claimed, entail positive and negative duties. 
Take, for instance, a classic example of a negative right: the right to 
physical security (or security o f the person), a right that has been 
recognised in a number of international human rights treaties 
(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9, European 
Convention on Human Rights, art. 5, American Convention on Human 
Rights, art. 7) and in most, if not all, domestic legal systems, as a 
fundamental human right. That others refrain from harming us is 
certainly one of the duties this right must entail. But is it the only one? 
Imagine, for instance, that some individuals in our community are not 
prepared voluntarily to comply with that duty (as it is bound to be the 
case in any community). Suppose that, given the chance, they will harm 
others in order to take their property or for any other reason one might 
think of (e.g. out of pure pleasure, because, say, others support a 
different football team than theirs). So, does the right to physical 
security not also entail positive duties aimed at preventing people from 
harming others? It seems difficult to argue otherwise. What else, if not 
the right of individuals to physical security would justify the existence of 
the criminal system, i.e. the criminal courts, the police etc?
The purpose of the right to physical security is to protect people
1 ' Xagainst unjustified attacks to their physical integrity. This protection
13 Someone might claim that what justifies the existence o f the criminal system is the “public 
interest” in having a safe community, where trade and other activities can be carried out
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can be achieved in different ways. Most people will respect others’ 
physical integrity most of the time, out of a mere sense of duty. Others, 
however, will do it only out of a fear of the sanctions attached to the 
infringement of that duty. Others still will never do it. Now, if the world 
was made up exclusively of the first type of people, then the negative 
duty of non-interference might perhaps be coherently argued to be the 
only duty arising out of the right to physical security.14 But given that 
this is unfortunately not the case15, any community that takes physical 
integrity seriously needs to set up preventive mechanisms so as to reduce 
the instances in which people will attack others. As properly put by Mill, 
to have a right is “to have something which society ought to defend me 
in the possession o f ” 16
Now, whatever preventive mechanisms are chosen they will 
certainly involve the implementation of positive measures by the 
community, which shows that the right to physical security does entail 
positive duties as well. The most common way of doing this is by 
threatening to punish whoever breaches that duty or tries to do so (i.e. 
through deterrence), which involves at least the establishment of a
1 7criminal system with courts and police I have just mentioned.
without encumbrance etc. I would not deny that this is certainly a positive consequence o f an 
efficient criminal system, and also one o f the reasons for its existence. It seems to me, 
however, that the individuals’ right to bodily integrity is surely also a reason, if not the 
strongest, for having a criminal system in place.
14 I say perhaps here because even those people might exceptionally breach that duty, and then 
what I explain in the text would also apply.
15 See Henry Shue, (1996), Basic Rights Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy, 
Princeton University Press, 2nd ed.(Hereinafter “Basic Rights”), at 162, quoting Thomas W. 
Pogge, “How should human rights be conceived?”, Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethick, 3 (1995), 
pp 103-120.
1 See Utilitarianism, chapter V, p. 309, in Utilitarianism, edited by Mary Wamock, Fontana 
Press, 1962.
17 It should not be forgotten that the best deterrents against violence are probably education 
and equality, which underlies the thesis o f the indivisibility of human rights. See Pogge, op cit, 
115, and Shue, 163. Here I just want to make the point that civil and political rights also entail 
positive duties.
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The same argument, as it should be clear, applies to all other civil 
and political rights. The values protected by those rights (e.g. freedom of 
expression, freedom of religion etc) are under constant threat of attack 
by individuals and groups. It would be totally inconsistent, thus, to 
recognise those rights yet not the positive duties on which the real
| Q
protection of their underlying values are strongly dependent.
Let us briefly see now the other side of the question, i.e. that 
social and economic rights entail not only positive duties, but also 
negative ones. Take the right to food. According to the negative/positive 
dichotomy this is a purely positive right, and that is indeed how we 
usually think of it. We imagine people starving and think of the 
community, or the state, as bearing a duty to provide food to them, i.e. a 
positive duty. Yet this is not necessarily the only way in which the 
interest underlying the right to food should, or could be protected. 
Imagine, for instance, that someone is currently able to provide himself 
and his family with sufficient food, through practising subsistence 
agriculture in his own small piece of land. Imagine, now, just for the 
sake of the argument, that the political authorities of his community 
decide to pass a piece of legislation or regulation forbidding people from 
using their land for anything else other than leisure. Now, irrespective of 
any arguments he might raise based on his right to property, could he not 
also claim that such a decision violates his right to food? If there is a 
right to food, thus, it must generate not only positive duties on others to 
provide food, but also negative ones protecting those able to provide
18 Henry Shue is acknowledged as being the first to make this now run of the mill claim in the 
context o f human rights. See his “Rights in the Light o f Duties”, in Brown and Maclean 
(1979), and Basic Rights, chapter 2 and afterword p. 155 see also Jeremy Waldron, Liberal 
Rights, p 25: “Each right is best thought o f not as correlative to one particular duty (which 
might then be classified as a duty o f omission or as a positive duty o f action or assistance), but 
as generating successive waves o f duty, some of them duties o f omission, some of them duties 
of commission, some o f them too complicated to fit easily under either heading.” See also 
Pogge, op. cit. pp 103-120.
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food for themselves not to be interfered with in that endeavour. The 
principle, thus, is the same we mentioned above. There is nothing 
inherent in the nature of certain rights that make them purely negative or 
positive. The point of rights is to enable their holders to fully enjoy 
certain important interests.19 In order to achieve this, it will often be 
necessary to impose negative and positive duties on others. There are no 
purely negative or positive rights.
If this is correct, it is clear that civil and political rights are also 
dependent on positive public policies and scarce resources, the main 
obstacles, as we saw, raised against the justiciability of social and 
economic rights. Let us take again the right to physical security to
illustrate this point. If this right generated mere negative duties of non-
20interference, it might perhaps be claimed that it was costless. But an 
adequate conception of the right to physical security, as I claimed, would 
entail that it also generates positive duties on the state to prevent people 
from being harmed in the first place. It would be inconsistent to claim 
that the interest of physical integrity gives rise to a negative duty of non­
interference but not to positive ones aimed at the effective protection of 
that interest.
Now, compliance with those positive duties is obviously 
dependent on resources. The example of positive duties I mentioned 
above which are usually taken as necessary for the effective protection
19 I should make clear here that, as it will become evident later, I do not hold the so-called 
interest-based theory of rights. I do not deny, however, that the function of rights is to protect 
certain important interests.
20 As Fried himself admits, even a pure negative right o f non-interference is not costless in the 
“economist’s sense”. “By asserting a negative right, one person makes it more expensive to 
respond to the claim of a positive right o f another.” Op cit at 112-3. Along the examples he 
cites in his book, we could mention the case o f aids drugs. The negative element o f the right of 
property o f the drug companies makes it infinitely more expensive to patients to get their 
positive right to health care. It is surprising, thus, how Fried promptly dismisses this element 
o f cost as not challenging to his argument. Since the other element, i.e. direct costs of 
respecting negative rights is strong enough to refute his position, I don’t need to go in more 
depth into this issue.
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of physical integrity (i.e. the establishment and maintenance of a
criminal system) certainly requires a significant amount of resources to
21
be properly discharged. It seems clear, thus, that civil and political 
rights are also dependent on public policies and scarce resources and 
therefore are not significantly different, in this respect, from social and 
economic rights.22
21 A whole book was dedicated by Holmes and Sunstein to prove this point. The Cost o f  Rights 
-  Why Liberty Depends on Taxes, Norton (New York: 1999). The situation in the big cities of 
Brazil is shockingly supportive o f this claim. Greater Sao Paulo, the world’s third largest 
metropolis with 17 million people, has a homicide rate o f 54 per 100.000 inhabitants, which 
puts it amongst the most dangerous places in the world, behind only other disturbed cities like 
Cali, in Colombia (91/100.000) and Johannesburg in South Africa (115/100.000). To make the 
picture clearer, it can be noted that roughly the same amount o f people lost their lives through 
assassination in Sao Paulo in 1999 as in the Kosovo war. Now, the most important information 
for our purposes is that both homicide victims and killers have little or no formal schooling. 
Only 2% o f homicide victims and 10% of the killers ever reached high school. Unlike what is 
popularly believed, in part due to the biased attention o f the media, only 5% of Sao Paulo’s 
homicides happen during a robbery. See “Homicides: Why so many executions in Sao Paulo’s 
Periphery?”, Bruno Paes Manso, in Braudel Papers, number 25, 2000,
http://www.braudel.org.br/paping25c.htr. This could be explained, in part, by the enormous 
amount spent on the security o f the rich by government (it is well known that the rich areas are 
better lighted, patrolled, and that efforts and resources in homicide’s investigation are 
proportional to the victim’s social and economic status) and by the rich themselves. Some 
USS9.5 billion (1,70% of GDP) are being privately spent annually by individuals to protect 
themselves against their fellow citizens. Sao Paulo has become the city with more armoured 
cars in the world. See The Economist, August 16th, 2001, p.45. It is interesting to note that on 
the very same issue where it denounces this “wall o f security” that has been built in Sao Paulo 
to separate the rich from the poor, The Economist brings a special report where it endorses, or 
at least fails to dispel, the belief that civil and political rights are relatively cheaper to protect, 
“The Politics o f Human Rights”, August 16th, 2001. See also Alexy, op. cit. pp 440-441.
"2 Some people might concede this point and yet claim that social and economic rights are 
nevertheless much more costly than civil and political rights. See, for instance, The 
Economist, “The Politics o f Human Rights”, 2001,... Now, even if that was clearly the case, it 
would be irrelevant to the issue in question, since, once it is proven that civil and political 
rights are also dependent on resources (no matter how much) the resource distinction 
collapses. It is rather puzzling, though, how one might determine if such a claim is plausible, 
let alone accurate. How, for instance, does one calculate how much it costs, say, to respect the 
right to education in comparison with the right to physical security? Rights are not discrete 
entities that don’t interact, but rather strongly interdependent. It has been plausibly claimed, 
for instance, that societies with higher levels o f education are less violent. Any serious attempt 
compare the real costs o f rights, thus, would have to discount from the costs o f the right to 
education those costs saved in the right to physical security. And so on with the numerous 
interactions among rights.
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The tripartite typology of duties
Once we dispense with the positive/negative rights’ classification and 
accept that all rights generate a multiplicity of duties which can be 
positive or negative in nature, our concern should be to identify what 
specific duties a particular right generates. The purpose of a right, as I 
claimed, is to afford individuals or groups effective enjoyment of certain 
interests as a matter of priority over other competing interests. What 
those interests are will depend on the substantive theory held, but once 
they are defined, they are to receive the kind of protection needed so as 
they can be effectively enjoyed by the beneficiaries of rights. Now, the 
way in which we try to guarantee that effective enjoyment is by 
imposing duties on others. Those duties are thus dictated by the interests 
whose enjoyment they are meant to guarantee. That is, when we need to 
determine what duties are generated by a certain right, we must ask what 
kinds of behaviour it is necessary to impose on people so as the interests 
protected by a right can be effectively enjoyed. Now, given the 
complexity of the real world, it is rather unlikely that an interest will 
achieve effective protection by the imposition of only one specific duty, 
which can then be classified as negative or positive. Rather, it will 
usually take many different duties to guarantee the effective enjoyment 
of an interest, and those will certainly be of positive and negative 
character.
Let me illustrate this point with our now familiar example of the 
right to physical security. Once this right has been recognised, it will 
generate duties whose aim is to enable people effectively to enjoy the 
interests protected by that right. What are those duties, therefore, is 
whatever it takes to effectively achieve that aim (i.e. enjoyment of 
physical integrity). Now, as we saw above, this will be hardly achieved
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through the mere declaration in the constitution, or the criminal laws of 
the country, that “no-one shall harm anyone else”, that is, with the mere 
imposition of negative duties on individuals and the state. Given that 
some people, including state’s officials, will not comply spontaneously 
with this negative duty, we must create other duties that make sure that 
people do comply with that negative duty. Those will necessarily be of a 
positive character. The right to physical security, therefore, will 
necessarily generate negative duties of non-interference and positive 
duties of action.
But the point of this structural conception of rights is not simply 
to show that rights generate positive and negative duties alike, though 
this is in itself an important point. It is also, and perhaps more 
importantly, to clarify the relationship between rights and duties and, as 
a consequence, help us to identify the duties generated by rights.
The relationship between rights and duties is a means-end one. 
The end, as we saw, is the guarantee the effective enjoyment of a certain 
interest protected by a right. Duties are the means employed in the 
attempt to achieve that end. Now, bearing this in mind helps us to 
identify what duties specific rights generate, that is, whatever it takes to
23enable people effectively to enjoy those rights. Now, it is obviously 
impossible to specify in advance and with any detail what those duties 
are. This will depend on many different factors (economic, social, 
cultural etc), which are highly variable from community to community. 
To give just one very simple example, it might be the case that the right 
to physical security in a certain community requires from the state 
simply that a single policeman walk around its streets from time to time 
during the day. In a more violent community, it might be necessary to
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maintain a bigger police force, perform more frequent patrols, set up 
cameras in public places etc. But we can be fairly certain that, in most 
communities, those duties are likely to be not only of positive and 
negative character, but also much more complex than the 
positive/negative distinction leads one to believe.
To make that clearer, new typologies of duties have been 
proposed. Instead of the simple negative/positive distinction, they 
usually divide duties into more specific categories according to the 
content of the duty. One of the most popular such typologies was 
presented by Henry Shue, who has developed one of the first and 
strongest attacks on the positive/negative distinction.24 After rejecting 
the positive/negative rights distinction with arguments along the same 
lines I exposed above, Shue recommended a new, tripartite typology of 
duties. Most duties could be roughly classified, he claimed, in one of 
three general categories: duties o f respect, duties ofprotection and duties 
o f aid. The first encompassed all those duties which are usually called 
negative, in that all it takes to comply with them is an omission. Respect 
is thus used on a purely negative connotation. The last two are duties of 
a positive nature. Duties of protection require that an individual be 
protected in the enjoyment of his right against the interference of others. 
Duties of aid, finally, demand that the person is provided with the object 
of the right in question. Similar typologies have been presented by other 
scholars with minor alterations. Asbjom Eide, for instance, refers to four
25types of duties: duties to respect, to protect, to fulfil and to promote. 
The German scholar Robert Alexy, whose theory of constitutional rights
23 See Shue, Basic Rights, at 160, claiming that duties are “what it actually takes [i.e. what 
duties are necessary] to enable people to be secure against the standard, predictable threats to 
their rights.”
24 See his “Rights in the light o f duties” cited above.
25 See “Realization of Social and Economic Rights and the Minimum Core Approach”, Human 
Rights Law Journal, vol. 10, n. 1-2, 1989, pp 35-51.
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is highly influential in the Civil Law world, speaks of defence rights,
'yzr
protection rights, and rights to a service.
These typologies might be quite helpful in the handling of human 
rights issues. Yet one should be careful not to overestimate their 
importance. As Shue himself was eager to emphasise in the second 
edition of his famous book, “the very simple tripartite typology o f duties 
was not supposed to become a new frozen abstraction to occupy the 
same rigid conceptual space previously held by “negative rights” and 
“positive rights”. As I have already said, its point is simply to make 
clear how complex the duties generated by human rights are likely to be, 
and provide us with a structural framework with which to pursue the 
more fundamental task of identifying the substantive content of those 
duties. This important job, therefore, is helped, but not finished by the 
typology.
Shue’s concern with this potential misuse of his theory is not 
without reason. One should never underestimate the propensity of 
lawyers to embrace neat dogmatic classifications as if they were the first 
and last word to be said on a subject. It is hardly surprising, thus, that 
after Shue’s influential work, it became difficult to come across an 
argument in favour of social and economic rights that doesn’t repeat his 
classification or a similar variant. What is rather rare to find are efforts 
to justify the specific content of the duties generated by social rights. I 
will deal with this point more thoroughly in the next chapter. Now I 
must turn my attention to some arguments that might be raised in favour 
of the negative/positive classification.
26 See A Theory o f  Constitutional Rights, Oxford University Press, 2003.
27 Op. cit., at 160.
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Some contend that the argument just presented, i.e. that all rights 
entail both negative and positive duties, is maintainable only through an 
artificial and misleading amalgamation of what are in fact separate 
rights. So, for instance, when one claims that the right to physical 
security entails not only a negative duty of non-interference but also 
positive duties of protection, one is mistaking the right to physical 
security for what are actually two, or possibly more different rights. The 
right to physical security, it is said, is just a right not to be harmed, i.e. a 
purely negative right that generates a purely negative duty. The duty of 
protection is generated by another separate right, e.g. the right to be 
protected against attacks, which is a purely positive right. And the same 
allegedly holds to every other right.
Now, this might appear to be an academic conceptual point on 
how adequately to describe the same situation. The important thing, one 
could claim, is that physical integrity be effectively enjoyed by 
individuals, and this is achieved by the positive and negative duties 
mentioned above. It shouldn’t matter much if we consider that those 
duties are generated by a single, more general right to physical security, 
or by two or more separate specific rights. Classifications and 
distinctions are not valuable in themselves, but rather valuable insofar as 
they bring some light into the subject of our analysis.
But some who maintain the positive/negative rights dichotomy do 
claim that there are practical relevant differences between both 
approaches.29Charles Fried, for instance, claims that the sharp
28 As often pointed out by Professor Fabio Konder Comparato, from the University of Sao 
Paulo Law School, there are only two types o f classifications in Law, the useful and the 
useless.
29 This is not the case of Cecile Fabre, Social Rights under the Constitution, Oxford, 2000, 
whose defence of the distinction seems to me based on purely academic conceptual issues. She 
argues, for instance, that Shue’s theory does not “explain why we cannot argue [as she does] 
that we can make two demands [in the case of the right of physical security], each 
encapsulated by a different right: a demand that we not be assaulted, encapsulated by a
29
distinction between negative and positive rights is essential for the 
following reason. It helps us to discriminate properly between different 
kinds of wrongdoing, which in turn enables us to adequately attribute 
responsibility for the commission of different wrongs. Now, if this were 
correct, it would certainly provide a strong argument for the usefulness 
of the sharp distinction between positive and negative rights. This would 
be the very sort of argument I claimed is needed to justify such 
classifications. Let us consider, then, Fried’s argument in more detail.
He takes again the right to physical security to illustrate the 
point. To claim that this right is not a purely negative right, he says, is to 
ignore the “distinction between what is done to a person and what is
%C\allowed to happen”. When someone is attacked by an assailant, for 
instance, it is absolutely correct to say that he or she violated the right to 
physical security. It would be wrong to claim, however, that the state 
also violated this right for failing to provide the victim with police 
protection. According to him, the state might well have violated a 
separate, positive right to receive protection, but “it does not violate the 
right to bodily security. It is not the government which commits the
T 1assault. That right is violated by the assailant himself. ”
The importance of keeping those two rights separate, thus, seems 
to be the need to distinguish clearly between the wrong done in each 
case. Whereas the assailant has himself done harm to the victim, the 
state has allowed it to happen by failing to protect her. Two very 
different kinds of wrongdoing, therefore, are in question. Now, the
negative right not to be assaulted, and a demand that we be protected against assaults, 
encapsulated by a positive right that the state take steps to protect us from potential attackers.” 
P. 52 She then concludes that Shue’s theory “cannot account for the conceptual possibility of 
talking of more specific rights” like these, p. 53. The point she seems to miss is that Shue 
should not, and actually is not interested in denying the “ conceptual possibility” of separating 
between two or more different rights. His proposal is substantive, as I try to explain in the text, 
not merely conceptual.
30 Charles Fried, Right and Wrong, p i l l .
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importance of differentiating between them is in the regime of liability 
we apply to each case. Many people hold the belief, for instance, that it 
is usually worse from a moral perspective to cause harm directly through 
an action than it is to allow it to happen through an omission. But this 
controversial issue need not concern us here.32 Fried’s point is 
independent of it. His claim is rather that whilst duties dealing with the 
first type of wrongdoing (i.e. causing harm) can be the formulated in 
categorical terms, those concerning the second (i.e. allowing harm to 
happen) cannot. Let me explain this. The norm stating that what the 
assailant in the example did was wrong is usually formulated in the 
following categorical way: “You shall not intentionally harm!”. There 
needs to be no exception to that norm based on the material
•5 -5  • • •impossibility of not complying with it. It is always possible, Fried 
says, not to harm other people intentionally. But this is not the case in 
the second type of wrongdoing mentioned above. It is not always 
possible for the state to prevent harm from occurring, i.e. to protect 
individuals from being harmed by others. This is because this protection 
demands resources (i.e. police officers, teachers etc) which are scarce, 
and might thus not be available in sufficient amounts to effectively 
protect everyone at all times. The norm stating the duty of the state to 
protect individuals from being harmed by others, therefore, cannot be 
categorical like that forbidding people to cause harm intentionally. It has 
to be formulated along the following lines: “The state shall protect 
individuals from harm to the extent that it is possible within available
31 Id., p. 112.
32 For interesting discussions on this so-called acts/omissions distinction see Philippa Foot, 
"The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect." In Bonnie Steinbock, ed., 
Killing and Letting D ie , pp. 156-165. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980.
33 There is obviously the exception of self-defence, but it is not based on the material 
impossibility o f not harming, but rather on the moral justification that self-defence provides 
for breaching the norm.
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resources.”34 This will clearly entail different regimes of liability. In the 
first case, liability emerges in a more straightforward way through the 
proof of causation and intention, whereas in the second a complex 
determination of possibility involving resource allocation decisions will 
be required.35
Now, that we are talking of two different types of wrongdoing, 
and that each entails a different regime of liability, seems to me 
absolutely correct. It is not at all clear, however, why we need to 
distinguish sharply between specific positive and negative rights to keep 
that in focus. This seems to emerge clearly also when one dispenses with 
the sharp positive/negative rights distinction and regards the right to 
physical security as a more general right giving rise to different types of 
duties (i.e. positive and negative). Its negative duties will be often 
categorical, whereas the positive ones will not. It is far from clear, thus, 
why to regard these duties as flowing from the same right to physical 
security fails to capture the distinction between what is done to a person 
and what it is allowed to happen. We would gain no particular insight, 
therefore, from breaking the right to physical security down into two 
more specific rights, some purely positive, and others purely negative. 
One might well conclude, as a consequence, that this is after all an 
academic conceptual matter as we had suspected. So long as we can see 
that the interests protected by rights can only be effectively enjoyed 
through a combination of different and varied duties applying to 
different individuals and institutions, it does not matter if we regard 
them as flowing from the same, more generically formulated right, or 
from separate rights formulated in more specific terms.
34 We will see later that this is how social and economic rights are usually worded.
35 This is at the heart of social rights justiciability difficulties, as I shall discuss later in the text.
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I must say a word or two, however, about why I think we should 
dispense with the positive/negative rights classification. For one thing, it 
has been traditionally used not simply to highlight the existence of 
different types of wrongdoing and regimes of liability, but also, as I 
pointed out above, as a criterion for distinguishing civil and political 
rights from social and economic rights. Now, as we saw, this latter claim 
is inadequate. So, even though it would no doubt be possible to dismiss 
this claim and still hold the positive/negative rights distinction 
(maintaining that there are positive and negative social rights and 
positive and negative civil and political rights ), the strongly rooted 
misconception that social and economic rights are purely positive and 
civil and political rights are purely negative recommend, I believe, that 
we stop using that classification.
A clear example of this is to be found in the famous case 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department o f Social Services , 
judged by the Supreme Court of the United States. In that case, a 4 year- 
old boy who maintained life-long brain injuries from his father
36 See, for instance, Cecile Fabre, op cit, at 40 ff.
37 A strong defence o f this point was made by Henry Shue in his Basic Rights. After claiming 
that “a right provides the rational basis for a justified demand” (at 13), he appropriately ads 
that “a right has been guaranteed only when arrangements have been made for people with the 
right to enjoy it.” (at 16). These arrangements are translated into duties, and for a right to be 
effectively guaranteed, those duties have to be of three different types: duties to avoid 
depriving; duties to protect from deprivation, and duties to aid the deprived, (at 52) For Shue, 
thus, “It is duties, not rights, that can be divided among avoidance and aid, and protection.” (at 
53), and since the guarantee of a right depends on the co-existence o f these three types o f  
duties, there makes no sense to talk o f pure negative or pure positive rights. Now, as I said in 
the main text, there are no set criteria for describing rights. One could even claim, thus, that a 
better description would separate each right corresponding to each of those duties and call 
them rights to non-interference, rights to protection and rights to aid. Whether we describe a 
right more generally, encompassing all three elements, or more specifically, separating them, 
is not the most important question. What really matters is how we allocate their importance. I 
agree with Shue, as it is obvious from the text, that his way of describing is more useful, since 
the specification can be so extreme as to render the concept empty of meaning. Another good 
reason to separate duties and not rights into these categories is that the right is enjoyed by a 
single individual, whilst the duties might be ascribed to different people. See also Alexy, op. 
cit. p 429 and 441-2.
38 109 S. Ct. 998(1989).
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demanded compensation from the State claiming that the local social 
services failed to protect him. According to the majority of the judges:
"nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the 
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against 
invasion by private actors." ... "[i]ts purpose was to protect the people 
from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each 
other." ... "the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative 
right to [provide] governmental aid, even where such aid may be 
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the 
government itself may not deprive the individual."39
It should be clear by now why this interpretation of the Due 
Process Clause of the American constitution is inadequate.40 If there are 
rights to life, liberty and property, there must be duties on others which 
effectively guarantee the enjoyment of those interests. This, as we saw, 
will certainly not be achieved by negative duties of non-interference 
alone. It is inconsistent, thus, to restrict to that type the duties generated 
by those rights. To claim the contrary, as I tried to show above, would 
mean to say that there is no duty on the State to maintain a police force, 
a judicial criminal system etc. If those institutions are not there in order 
to protect individuals’ rights to life, liberty and property, then they might 
well be legitimately scrapped by a political decision of Parliament. I 
doubt anyone apart from true anarchists, not even the most radical 
libertarians, would want to concede that point.
This seems to show, I believe, the advantage of dispensing with 
the positive/negative rights classification. Whenever rights are at issue, 
the important thing is to look at what it takes to guarantee the effective
39 id., at 1003.
40 See, for a good discussion of this point, Dinah L. Shelton, “Private Violence, Public 
Wrongs, and the Responsibility o f States”, 1 Fordham International Law Journal 
(1989/1990), at 27-8.
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enjoyment of the interests in question. If we break down rights into their 
specific components so that they can fit neatly into the positive/negative 
divide, we run the risk of losing sight of the broad picture, as seems to 
have been the case with the American Supreme Court in De Shaney and 
other cases.
A good example of the benefits of taking the approach I am 
recommending here can be found in the Inter-American system of 
human rights’ protection. In its very first article, the American 
Convention on Human Rights helpfully spells out the duties of States 
Parties in relation to the rights recognised in the Convention:
“Article 1(1) - The States Parties to this Convention undertake to 
respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all 
persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those 
rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, 
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.” 
(my emphasis)
This article makes clear that the rights recognised in the 
American Convention (which are basically the civil and political rights 
recognised in the American Constitution) impose on the State not only 
negative duties (“to respect” those rights) but also positive ones (“to 
ensure the free and full exercise o f those rights”). There is no scope, 
thus, for an interpretation of the right to physical security (or any other 
right for that matter) as being a purely negative right, such as was the 
case in De Shaney. All rights recognised in the Convention, the right to 
life, liberty, security etc generate multiple and different duties, negative 
and positive in nature.
This has been repeatedly affirmed since the classic case
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Velasquez Rodrigues, brought to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights against Honduras.41 It concerned the disappearance of a 
Honduran citizen, Mr. Velasquez Rodrigues. There was no definite 
proof that he had been abducted and killed by agents of the Honduran 
army for political reasons, as it was strongly suspected. Even so, 
however, the Court decided that the Honduran state had violated the 
rights established in articles 7 (right to personal liberty), 5 (right to 
personal integrity) and 4 (right to life). This was because the duties of 
the Honduran state entailed by those rights are not only negative duties 
of non-interference, but also positive duties of protection and 
promotion.42As the Court clearly stated:
“An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not 
directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a 
private person or because the person responsible has not been 
identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not 
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to 
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the 
Convention.”43
As it became clear during the court proceedings, the Honduran 
state had not made any serious efforts to investigate the disappearance, 
find and punish the culprits. That, for the court, was a breach of its 
duties to ensure the free and full enjoyment of physical security, life and 
liberty by its citizens.
Now, as I said above, it would be perfectly possible to describe 
the situation in Velasquez Rodriguez in the vein proposed by Fried. The 
Inter-American Court could well have divided his rights into specific
41 Series C No. 4. I/A Court H.R., Velasquez Rodriguez Case. Judgment of July 29.
42 These positive duties are what Alexy calls the positive protection of liberty, op. cit. p 226. 
But he maintains that the duty to protect can be assimilated by the duty to respect seeing the 
state as a co-responsible if he doesn’t protect, at 442-3.
43 Id., at 172.
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rights, purely positive or negative: a purely negative right to physical 
security, held against other individuals and the State, and purely positive 
rights against the State to ensure his physical integrity, e.g. a right to 
police protection, a right to a criminal system that investigates murders 
seriously etc, and still reach the same result. But we have to be wary of 
interpretations like that of the American Supreme Court in De Shaney^ 
and those seem to be more easily arrived at when the positive/negative 
rights classification is adopted.
Justiciability  R evisited
I tried to demonstrate that the traditional contention that social and 
economic rights are positive whilst civil and political rights are negative 
is flawed. All rights, as has been convincingly maintained by many 
authors for a long time, generate positive and negative duties, which can 
be helpfully classified, following Shue and others, into three different 
categories: duties o f respect (which are negative), and duties o f 
protection and duties o f promotion (which are positive). There is no 
significant difference in nature, therefore, between civil and political 
rights and social and economic rights, unlike what is usually claimed by 
those opposed to justiciability. The features claimed to represent 
obstacles to justiciability (i.e. dependence on positive state measures and 
resource dependence) are actually shared by both categories of rights.
But this is not a definitive argument for the justiciability of social 
rights, contrary to what has been so often assumed in the debate. It 
simply shows that there is an inconsistency in the argument of those who 
oppose the judicial enforcement of the latter and not of the former based
44 See Alexy, op. cit. at 446.
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on characteristics which, we saw, are shared by both of them. What 
needs to be shown, however, is that those aspects are not obstacles to 
justiciability, not simply that they are also present in civil and political 
rights. Overlooking this point has been the greatest flaw, I believe, in the 
argument of those in favour of social rights’ justiciability. They focused 
too much on rebutting the fallacy of the positive/negative rights 
distinction as if this was the only obstacle to be overcome. The strategy 
was understandable. Given that the main arguments against justiciability 
have been traditionally grounded on the “positive” nature of social and 
economic rights, and that no objections are usually raised against the 
judicial enforcement of civil and political rights, it seemed enough to 
show that those rights are not different in this “positive nature”.
It would be surely relevant, though not decisive, if it were the 
case that those positive aspects had not traditionally been obstacles for 
courts to enforce civil and political rights as well. Then the 
inconsistency mentioned above would be found not only in academic 
argument, but also in the practice of courts, which would represent an 
unfair discrimination between victims of social rights and civil rights 
violations. Moreover, it might also show that it is not necessarily 
unfeasible to adjudicate those “positive” elements of rights. But is it the 
case that courts implement the positive duties generated by civil and 
political rights as a matter of routine?
I do not think so. It is very rare, for instance, for a plaintiff to 
claim that his right to physical integrity has been violated through the 
omission of the state to provide him with protection, or to create the 
conditions for him to enjoy that right. It is much more common for a 
plaintiff to go to court against the state when he has been directly 
harmed by a state’s official, i.e. when the state fails to comply with its 
negative duty of non-interference. This does not mean, of course, that
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plaintiffs should not bring such claims to courts, or that courts should 
not enforce positive duties generated by civil and political rights. It does 
show, however, that we cannot avail ourselves of the argument we are 
now considering, that is, that courts have been enforcing positive duties 
related to civil and political rights as a matter of routine and should not, 
as a consequence, refrain in principle to do the same as regards social 
and economic rights.
That seems to show, I believe, the need to consider with more 
attention the arguments from legitimacy and institutional capacity 
usually raised against the judicial enforcement of social rights. It was 
certainly important to lay bare how inconsistent it is to simply reject that 
those rights are justiciable whilst maintaining that civil and political 
rights are not, based solely on the “positive” nature of the former. But 
too much reliance has been placed on the mistaken assumption that civil 
and political rights are (or should be) themselves justiciable in all their 
aspects (i.e. positive and negative duties). This is certainly not 
observable in practice. Moreover, one might well admit that both types 
of rights are not relevantly different and claim consistently that neither 
should be justiciable when positive duties are involved. To put it another 
way, one might claim that only negative duties generated by both types 
of rights should be justiciable.
It is this kind of argument that those in favour of social rights’ 
justiciability seem to have overlooked. I shall take it up in chapters 3 and 
4. But first I must turn to another issue which is fundamental for the 
debate on justiciability, namely, the content of social rights.
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C h a p t e r  2 
W h a t  A r e  So c ia l  R ig h t s?
In the previous chapter I discussed the nature of social and economic 
rights. I rejected the contention that social rights are positive whereas 
civil and political rights are negative, and maintained that all rights give 
rise to multiple duties that are usually positive and negative in character. 
I also analysed popular typologies that divide the duties generated by 
human rights into at least three different generic kinds: duties of respect, 
duties of protection and duties of promotion or fulfilment. I have not yet 
discussed, however, another important issue to the question of 
justiciability, namely the precise content of social and economic rights. 
What exactly is the content of the rights to health care, education, 
housing etc, that is, what level of those goods should be respected, 
protected and promoted by others and the state? In this chapter, I try to 
shed some light on this question by analysing different possible 
approaches in the definition of the content of social and economic rights.
Social R ights in the C onstitution
Constitutional provisions on social rights are usually drafted in very 
abstract terms. They recognise rights to health care, education, housing, 
food etc without much specification of what those rights precisely entail. 
They do not specify, that is, what level or standard of those goods 
individuals are actually entitled to. There are of course good reasons of 
constitutional law technique (which we don’t have to discuss here) why 
this is so. What concerns us here is how to determine what those 
provisions require in concrete cases.
To guide our discussion in this chapter I will use examples related
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to the right to health care in two countries that have recognised such 
right in a similar manner in their constitutions as a fundamental right of 
their citizens: South Africa and Brazil.45 Now, if we accept the argument 
put forward in the previous chapter, this right entails all those duties 
which are necessary to guarantee its effective enjoyment by the citizens 
of those countries46, and those duties are likely to be of at least three 
different kinds: duties of respect, of protection and of promotion. But 
what exactly are those duties? Does it entail, for instance, a duty on the 
South African state to provide renal dialysis in the public health system 
for everybody who cannot afford it?47 Does it entail a duty on the 
Brazilian state to provide free AIDS drugs for everyone infected with 
HIV?48 The answers to those questions are obviously dependent on what 
is the content of those rights.
Let us analyse, then, different theories (or conceptions) that might 
be followed in the determination of the content of social rights.
45 The Constitution o f South Africa recognises the right to health care in section 27:
“S 27. Health care, food, water and social security
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to -
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
( - )
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realization o f each o f these rights.” The Constitution o f  
Brazil recognises the right to health care in articles 6 and 196: “Art. 6 -  Education, health, 
work, housing, leisure, safety, social security, protection o f motherhood and childhood, 
assistance to the destitute, are social rights in the form of this Constitution.” “ Art. 196 -  
Health is a right of everyone and a duty of the State, guaranteed by social and economic 
policies aimed at reducing the risk o f illnesses and other hazards and at universal and equal 
access to the actions and services for its promotion, protection and recovery.”
46 It might be worth clarifying now a point which will become clear in the text below: when I 
say that a social right entails all those duties necessary to guarantee its effective enjoyment I 
do not incur in the error of imposing on the state duties it might not be able to discharge due to 
lack o f resources. As it will become clear when I defend the distributive conception o f social 
rights, rights are themselves determined in light of the resources available in society and, 
therefore, do not ever give rise to impossible duties.
47 This was the issue, o f course, in the famous case of Soobramoney, which I discuss in detail 
in later chapters.
48 This was the issue on a number of cases judged by the Brazilian Courts which I discuss in 
the Appendix.
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The Traditional Conception: 
Social Rights as Basic Needs
The most common approach to the definition of social rights 
draws on the idea of basic needs. Everyone, it is claimed, is entitled to 
an “adequate standard of living”, and that is usually defined in terms of 
basic needs satisfaction. This conception has been clearly adopted, for 
instance, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, whose articles 11 and 12 are worth quoting:
“Article 11. 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize 
the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and 
his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will 
take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing 
to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation 
based on free consent.”
“Article 12. 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health.”
Now, the notion of basic needs, or even needs alone, is by no 
means uncontroversial. Some claim, for instance, that it is impossible to 
distinguish needs from preferences or desires.49 But I don’t intend to go 
into this debate here. For my purposes, it is enough for us to use the 
intuitive idea that there are some things which are essential, or basic, in 
the following way. If we don’t possess them in a certain quantity or 
form, we cannot pursue any of our goals in life.50 Or, to follow David 
Braybrooke’s formulation: basic needs are things that are “essential to
49 For this discussion see David Baybrooke, Meeting Needs, (1987).
50 For a well-known and influential defence of restricted rights to basic needs see Henry Shue, 
Basic Rights.
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living or to functioning normally”, (p. 31)
The concept of normality is also not free of difficulties. Yet, 
however one interprets this generic formulation, one is bound to include 
in a list of basic needs things such as nutrition, health, education etc. 
That is, those things that social and economic rights are meant to protect. 
Social and economic rights, therefore, are seen as a means of 
guaranteeing to everyone the satisfaction of those needs which are 
essential for people to have an adequate standard of living, that is, to live 
and function normally. Now, there are surely many difficult issues 
involved in those statements that merit further discussion. For now we 
shall concentrate on the following problem, which is the main topic of 
this chapter. What level of food, health care, education everyone should 
possess so as their basic needs to nutrition, health and education can be 
considered satisfied?51 In other words, what is the content of the social 
rights to food, health care, education etc?
As it is apparent, the answers to those questions are extremely 
difficult. It might be fairly simple for a nutritionist, for instance, to 
determine how much food a person needs in order to be kept alive. But 
how much food is necessary for a person to “function normally”? As to 
education, the problem is even more complex. It seems clear that an 
adequate standard of living in our modem societies requires at least the 
capacity to read and write, but how much more than that it requires? In a 
recent American case dealing with the right of education the judge tried 
to define adequate education as that enabling a person to read, write, and 
possess mathematical skills to the necessary level to participate in the
51 Note here that there is a distinction between basic needs (nutrition, health, education) and 
forms of provision (food, health care, education). See Braybook, op. cit., at 197 and David 
Copp, “The right to an adequate standard of living: Justice, Autonomy, and the Basic Needs”, 
Ethical Investigations, Rights and Duties, vol 5 (Welfare Rights and Duties o f Charity), Carl 
Wellman (ed). 
at 251.
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political life of the community. Now, does this include a university 
degree?
A clear difficulty for the basic needs approach, thus, is this 
complexity involved in the specification of the concept of an “adequate 
standard of living”. But we should not make too much of this hurdle. As 
it is often pointed out, our laws are ripe with concepts like this, whose 
precise specification is difficult and controversial, especially in the field 
of human rights. To stay in this field, it is by no means uncontroversial, 
for instance, what exactly the right to freedom of expression entail in 
every context. To cite just the most common examples, does it entitle an 
individual to practice hate speech, that is, speech which is highly 
offensive to a particular race or particular group? Should it protect the 
individual who bums his own country’s flag? But also in more 
traditional fields of law imprecision is not a fatal problem. Think, for 
instance, of the field of negligence and the concept of reasonableness. 
What the “reasonable man” would have done in the place of the 
defendant is often highly debatable and controversial. The controversy 
(or imprecision) of the concept of an “adequate standard of living” is 
not, thus, a fatal problem to the basic needs conception.
But we must consider another, more important problem faced by 
the basic needs conception of social rights. Suppose we have somehow 
reached a fairly precise specification of what an adequate standard of 
living requires in terms of nutrition, health care, education, housing etc. 
Given that those goods are dependent on resources, for everyone in a
52 SUPREME COURT : STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK : I.A.S. PART 
25 X CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY, et al. : Index No.:l 11070/93 “The Supreme Court 
has long recognized that public education is meant to assist students to become "self-reliant 
and self-sufficient participants in society." (Wisconsin v Yoder. 406 US 205, 221 [1971].) 
Most state courts that have examined the substantive right to education under the education 
clauses of their constitutions have recognized both civic participation and preparation for 
employment as the basic purposes of public education.”
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certain community to be able to have their basic needs satisfied two 
conditions must obtain. Firstly, total resources in that community must 
be sufficient to fund basic needs to everyone (by total resources I mean 
the sum of resources held in a given community by all members, 
individually and collectively). Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, 
the distribution of total resources must be such that every person has 
enough to satisfy his or her basic needs. We must consider, then, two 
different scenarios that pose complex problems for the basic needs 
conception. In the first one, a community’s total resources are not 
sufficient to guarantee social rights to all its citizens. In the second, a 
community’s total resources are sufficient to guarantee social rights to 
everyone but are distributed in a way among its citizens so as some are 
able to satisfy basic needs (and more) whilst others are not.
We have here the well-known problem of resource allocation, 
traditionally raised in discussions about social and economic rights. If 
social rights are entitlements to an adequate standard of living, that is, 
for individuals to be able to have their basic needs satisfied, then it is 
possible, and rather likely, that some countries will not have enough 
resources to guarantee social rights to everyone, and others, despite 
having them, will not guarantee those rights to everyone due to an 
unequal resource distribution. That raises three different issues to the 
basic needs conception: a conceptual, a practical, and a normative one. 
The conceptual problem is this. It seems odd to say that someone has a 
right to something which is impossible to guarantee fully due to the 
circumstances of the real world. Rights generate duties, and those have 
to be capable of being fulfilled by the duty-holders. There cannot be 
duties, that is, to do that which is impossible (“ought implies can”). So, 
whenever it is impossible to guarantee basic needs due to scarcity of 
resources, the basic needs conception entails the odd situation of having
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recognised rights which, in some situations (i.e. countries without 
enough resources) will not generate corresponding duties on States and 
others to guarantee them fully and immediately. Proponents of the basic 
needs approach have attempted to deal with this conceptual problem by 
claiming that social and economic rights are “progressive rights”, i.e. 
rights to be realised progressively, not immediately.
I will maintain below why this concept of “progressive rights” or 
“progressive realisation” is inadequate. But let us just accept it, for now, 
and move on to the practical problem I mentioned. How are we to 
distribute available resources when they are insufficient to fully 
guarantee everyone’s social rights to an adequate standard of living? 
That is, under a situation of resource insufficiency, what does 
“progressive realisation” entail in terms of duties?
The most common answer here is that we should apply principles 
of priority and equality to solve the problem. That is, we should allocate 
resources first to what is more urgent and then go up the urgency scale 
as long as we can provide everyone with the same level of provisions of 
basic needs. So, to take education as an example, resources should be 
concentrated first on primary education until everyone has access to it. 
Only once this is achieved we can start to provide secondary education 
and so on up the scale of priority.54
Now, there are clear difficulties in defining priorities, especially 
when we look at the broader picture. Our allocative decisions will not be 
confined, of course, to one single field as in the example just mentioned. 
That is, we will have to decide not simply if primary education should 
have priority over secondary education, but rather how to distribute our
53 This same claim is often grounded on the assertion that no right is absolute. As I argue 
below in the text, this is a conceptual matter which is not the most important here. The 
relevant point is how do you determine what the extent of a relative right is in a given case?
54 For this kind of argument see Cecile Fabre, op. cit.
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resources among all areas of needs (education, health, housing etc). Yet 
again, though certainly an utterly complex problem, we should not 
overestimate its magnitude. It should not be impossible to establish a 
rough scale of priorities within and among all areas of basic needs that 
could be used to determine the order of progressive realisation in 
situations of insufficient resources.55
But the real problem for the basic needs conception posed by 
resource allocation is normative: why should basic needs receive total 
priority over society's resources?56 This question has been rarely 
tackled in the literature, and is especially rare amongst human rights 
legal scholars.57 Most people seem to rely on the strong intuition that a 
decent society should make sure that all its citizens are able to satisfy at 
least basic needs. Most of us are deeply disturbed to know that some 
people don’t have enough means to satisfy their basic needs (however 
one defines it). It is an easy step, thus, to move on to a claim that 
everyone should have a right guaranteeing an “adequate standard of 
living”. It seems also rather natural to interpret social rights provisions 
as guaranteeing precisely that. The resource issues highlighted in our 
two scenarios, however, raise questions that impose a re-appraisal of 
those strong intuitions. I must explain that now in further detail.
As we saw above, the basic needs conception of social rights
55 Most of the recent work of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 
been in this direction. Yet they attempt only to establish a scale of priority within each social 
right, not among them, through what they call minimum core. I discuss this in detail in 
Chapter 6.
56 Missing this important point has diverted the debate from the real important question of 
distributive justice. Indeed, given the predominance of the basic needs approach, it became 
simple for opponents of social rights on moral grounds to disguise their objection as a practical 
issue of possibility. On this point, see Shue, Basic Rights, at 109-110. A classic opponent who 
uses this strategy is Maurice Cranston, op. cit.
57 In the moral and political philosophy there have been attempts to justify rights to basic 
needs on various grounds, as I shall discuss below in the text.
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requires that a community guarantees the satisfaction of the basic needs 
of its citizens as a matter of absolute priority. This is a corollary of the 
recognition of basic needs’ satisfaction as a right. Indeed, the most 
important formal implication of rights (whatever material conception 
one follows) is that they establish priorities over other goals individuals
f O
or a society might wish to pursue. Given that basic needs’ satisfaction 
is dependent on resources, as we have been discussing, it follows from 
the basic needs approach to social rights that a society should allocate its 
available resources to basic needs’ satisfaction and other rights as the 
absolute priority. We must test, then, the adequacy of this main 
implication of the basic needs conception of social rights. Is it morally 
justified that basic needs’ satisfaction receives such a strong priority? In 
other words, should a society be constrained to allocate its resources 
having basic needs as an absolute priority? At first sight, it might appear 
that the answer to those questions is clearly yes, and thus the strong 
intuitive appeal of the basic needs conception. We are often outraged 
when we hear that governments of poor countries spend lots of resources 
in military equipment, sumptuous buildings, expensive marketing 
campaigns etc whilst part, or most of the population haven’t got decent 
housing, health care, food etc. Let us reflect more deeply, though, on our 
intuitions, to see if they stand unchanged. Our two examples are meant 
to help us in this task.
In our first scenario (resource insufficiency), the basic needs 
conception would necessarily demand the following: until everyone’s 
basic needs are satisfied, no one can have more resources than anyone 
else and no other common goals of society can be furthered with the
58 This is often portrayed by the phrase “rights as trumps”, made famous by Ronald Dworkin. 
See, among other works, Taking Rights Seriously, London, 1977 and “Rights as Trumps”, in 
Waldron J., Theories o f Rights, Oxford, 1984. See also, specifically on needs-based rights,
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available resources of the community. Given the priority established by 
rights, all resources of society have to be first directed at the guarantee 
of social rights to basic needs’ satisfaction. The community cannot 
invest in, say, arts, culture, environmental projects and other goals 
aiming at the improvement of the common good until everyone has 
achieved the threshold of basic needs satisfaction.59 Moreover, no one 
should be able to satisfy more needs than anyone else until everyone has 
achieved that threshold. Only when everyone in that community is able 
to satisfy basic needs it can allow any investment on collective goals, or 
any of its citizens to go above others in basic needs’ satisfaction.60
Take now our second scenario, where resources are sufficient for 
everyone to satisfy basic needs but the distribution of resources among 
them leaves some above the threshold of basic needs satisfaction and 
others below. Here the basic needs conception would demand that 
resources be transferred from the better-off to the worst-off until 
everyone is capable of satisfying basic needs. Indeed, as clearly stated 
by one of its proponents, .. the better o ff have a duty to pay their share 
until the point is reached that the worst off are enabled to meet their 
basic needs.”61
But are those implications of the basic needs conception 
defensible? We are surely right in criticising communities that spend 
resources with things which are clearly superfluous such as sumptuous 
official buildings, excessive military equipment, luxurious official trips 
etc whilst most of the population don’t have enough to survive. Yet the 
case is not as clear when the expenditure is done in areas of genuine
Shue, Basic Rights, pp 114-118: “the fulfilment of basic rights takes priority over all other 
activity, including the fulfilment of one’s own non-basic rights”, at 118.
59 Or, for that matter, any other right.
60 For the sake of simplicity, I am leaving aside problems like people who have handicaps who 
might be unable, however much resources they have, to reach the level of basic needs 
satisfaction. I discuss this in more detail below, in Chapter 6.
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public interest. Should we necessarily condemn the decision of a 
community to spend some of its available resources in a project that will 
make the life of everyone more agreeable (say the construction of a 
public park in a polluted city without many green areas) when some of 
its citizens are not able to satisfy other more urgent needs? Is a 
community to live without arts, a reasonable military capacity, 
environmental projects and other common interest goods until each and 
every of its citizens have an adequate standard of nutrition, health, 
education and housing?
The same questions should be raised about differences in peoples’ 
abilities to satisfy their basic needs. Is there anything inherently unjust in 
the fact that some are better off than others in regard to basic needs 
satisfaction, or even that some have gone far beyond the capacity to 
satisfy basic needs whilst others have not reached it?
Now, for the basic needs conception to hold, the answer to those 
questions should be yes. That is, it should be necessarily (or inherently) 
unjust for some to have more than others, or for a community to spend in 
others things than basic needs, until every individual in that community 
has reached an “adequate standard of living”. By necessarily (or 
inherently) unjust I mean that the reasons why some people aren’t able 
to satisfy basic needs are not morally relevant. What matters is simply 
that some people are below the level of basic needs satisfaction, 
whatever caused that situation.
But this, I believe, is not tenable. It is surely morally relevant 
what made some people unable to satisfy basic needs so as to determine
61 See Copp, op. cit., at 206.
62 See J Waldron, “John Rawls and the Social Minimum”, Journal o f Applied Philosophy 3 
(1986), pp. 21-33, making a policy argument for the basic needs: “The least that this requires, 
then, is the calculation of the minimum level of material well-being required before people are 
plunged into the despair and impulsion of abject need, and a determination to secure that level
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if that situation is unjust. Let me try and illustrate this with a simple 
example. Imagine two members of the community of our first scenario 
(where resources are not sufficient to guarantee everyone’s basic needs). 
Let us call them Carlos and Ana. Carlos is able to satisfy 50% of his 
basic needs, whilst Ana can satisfy only 40% (say that Carlos can buy an 
extra loaf of bread per month than Ana). Now, can we tell, without any 
further information that it is unjust that Carlos is able to buy an extra 
loaf of bread than Ana, and should therefore transfer resources to Ana so 
that both can then satisfy 45% of their basic needs? Does it not matter 
why this is so, for instance, if Carlos works harder than Ana, or spends 
his money more prudently etc? I think that most people would think that 
it does, and that it would be unjust to Carlos, for instance, if he had to 
transfer resources to Ana earned through harder work, or more prudent 
spending. My point, thus, is simply that the mere existence of a 
difference in ability to satisfy basic needs is not a sufficient reason to 
justify a claim on others or the community for the transfer of resources.
Now, one might argue that my objection works only for cases 
such as that illustrated by my first imagined scenario, that is, where 
resources are not sufficient for everyone to be able to have their basic 
needs satisfied. In those cases, it might be argued, it is obviously better 
that some, at least, move closer to the basic needs threshold rather than 
no-one.64 It might be claimed that the intuition underlying the basic
as far as possible for every citizen as a first charge on the resources and services of the 
society.”, at 30-1.
63 I follow here the so-called “micro-model”, or two-person model, since it makes it easier to 
understand the underlying nature of redistributions. See, on this point, Jonathan Wolff, 
“Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 27, n.o 2 
(Spring 1998), pp 97-122, at 99.
64 In an article defending the importance of basic needs, for instance, H. Frankfurt states that: 
“It is a mistake, therefore, to maintain that “where some people have less than enough, no one 
should have more than anyone else.’'’ It is also a mistake to maintain that “where some people 
have less than enough, no one should have more than enough” (italics of the original), 
“Equality as a Moral Ideal”, Ethics, 98 (1987), pp. 21-43, at 31. Derek Parfit made a similar
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needs conception is stronger when a society does have enough resources 
to enable everyone to have their basic needs satisfied yet some people 
fall short of that threshold due to the unequal distribution of those 
resources.65 At least in those cases, it might be said, basic needs should 
receive absolute priority, since redistribution from the better-off to the 
worse-off will not prevent the better-off from satisfying any of their 
basic needs.66 But this argument, though it might seem quite appealing 
at first, turns out to be incoherent. Let us use our imaginary characters 
again and adapt our example to the second type of scenario. Imagine that 
our community has developed and that Carlos can now satisfy all his 
basic needs and still have resources to satisfy some of his non-basic 
needs, that is his preferences and desires. He has enough to feed, clothe, 
and house himself adequately, and to look after his basic health care 
needs, but also to go to the theatre once a month, attend a course to learn 
a second language and travel abroad once a year to satisfy his non-basic 
need (or call it preference if you will) to observe and experience 
different cultures. Ana, however, has got enough resources only to 
satisfy 80% of her basic needs. Again, we must ask, can we justify 
transferring resources from Carlos to Ana without knowing anything 
about the causes that led both to possess the resources they now dol I 
believe, again, that most people would agree that we cannot. Let us 
assume, again, that Carlos is a very hard working person, and that he 
spends his earnings very prudently, being able thus to save enough to 
satisfy those non-basic needs I mentioned. Ana, on the contrary, is rather 
lazy and, on the top of that, quite imprudent with the little money she
point in his famous “Equality or Priority”, in The Ideal o f Equality, Matthew Clayton and 
Andrew Williams (eds), Macmillan 2000. PP. 81-125 (“the levelling down objection”).
65 People are particularly outraged, for instance, with the fact that in some rich societies such 
as the United States there are still a large number of poor people. See, for instance, “Long 
queue at drive-in soup kitchen”, The Guardian, 3.11.2003, on the rising levels of poverty in 
the richest country on earth.
52
manages to earn. It would be clearly unfair to impose on Carlos the 
sacrifice of his non-basic needs so as to enable Ana to satisfy her basic 
needs.
Let us imagine now, to finish, that in either of the cases just 
discussed, what explains the inequalities between Carlos and Ana is not 
differences in hard work and financial prudence. Let us assume, instead, 
that the reason why Carlos has more than Ana in terms of basic needs 
satisfaction is simply the fact that he is a male. Imagine that both are 
equally hardworking and financially prudent, but that, in their 
community, men get much better remuneration than women for the same 
work and the same level of effort. Now, in this case, most of us would 
agree that to impose a duty on Carlos to transfer resources to Ana so as 
to equalise both in resources would not be unjust, but rather the contrary.
These examples show a fundamental flaw in the basic needs 
conception, i.e. its failure to take causal considerations into account 
when dealing with the justice of certain inequalities. Inequalities in the 
absolute levels of basic needs satisfaction among people, though 
certainly morally relevant in different ways, are not sufficient, or even 
decisive, in themselves, to ground the imposition of duties on the 
community and its members to transfer resources to the worse off. The 
causes of those inequalities are fundamental in the assessment of the
67moral appropriateness of imposing such redistributive duties.
I will come back later to the issue of how the basic needs 
conception, though theoretically inadequate, has nonetheless got such
66 See Shue, Basic Rights, p 110.
67 The basic needs approach is a form of what in moral philosophy and economic is called 
“welfarism”. See Amartya Sen, “The right not to be hungry”, The Right to Food, P Alston and 
K Tomasevski (eds), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers “under welfarism a person’s claim to an 
adequate diet and other means of living is based on the influence that this things have on his 
welfare level.”, at 77 “No other characteristics of those alternative states should influence our 
moral judgements.” At 76 But note Sen’s points on the inadequacy of welfarist metrics 
(utilitarian or not), since unable to distinguish between different sources of welfare deficits.
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strong intuitive appeal. For many it might seem the only alternative to 
Libertarianism. As we shall see shortly, though, it is not. The 
conception I will defend, despite sharing with libertarianism of the sort 
defended by Nozick, sometimes called right-libertarianism69, the idea 
that the justice of resource distribution cannot be based solely on a “end-
70state principle” such as differences in the ability to satisfy basic needs , 
differs strongly from libertarianism in fundamental respects.
To site one major point of difference, Nozick and other 
libertarians claim that welfare inequalities resulting from differences in 
peoples' natural talents and abilities are not to be condemned. People 
are entitled, they claim, to their natural talents and abilities and, as a 
consequence, to the fruits of those natural assets. Taxing them and 
transferring resources from them to the less endowed would be therefore
71unjustified. The distributive justice theory I will defend below claims 
precisely the opposite, that is, that those differences are morally 
arbitrary and, therefore, justify redistribution of resources from the
77better to the worse endowed with natural talents and abilities .
Now, I mentioned only a couple of basic, straightforward factors 
which are usually regarded as morally relevant in our assessments of 
resource inequalities: hard work, financial prudence and gender 
discrimination. But situations in the real world are bound to be infinitely
68 Ibid. at 77.
69 It is important to notice that there are many different conceptions of libertarianism, some of 
which, often called left-libertarianism, radically different to the more conventional forms such 
as the one I briefly discuss in the text. See, for instance, Michael Otsuka's Libertarianism 
without Inequality, Oxford, 2003. For the most influential account of right-libertarianism, see 
Robert Natick’s classical Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell, 1974, For an influential 
critique, see Thomas Nagel, Libertarianism without foundations, 85 Yale Law Journal 136 
(1975).
70 Id., at 232.
71 Ibid. chapters 7 and 8, especially from page 213 onwards.
72 In fact, in Nozick's theory there is no space for the idea of equality, whilst the theory I 
defend in this thesis, though critical of strict egalitarianism of the welfarist sort, is nonetheless 
still egalitarian.
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more complicated than my examples. In the real world, differences in 
people’s ability to satisfy their basic needs will seldom be explainable (if 
ever), through such simple factors. Many other issues will often be 
involved in the explanation of those inequalities, such as individuals’ 
natural abilities to perform certain activities (i.e. their talents), their 
physical conditions, their social background, the economic conditions of 
the relevant community etc.
We need some criteria, therefore, to classify the relevance of 
those factors in our appraisals of inequalities, that is, if they are relevant 
in the first place, and how relevant they are. Why, for instance, should 
we accept, to a certain extent at least, inequalities derived from 
differences in the effort people make as regards work, but not those 
resulting from other factors such as gender?
This issue has been often debated in the literature of political 
philosophy. I do not intend to discuss it here in any great detail. For my 
purposes, it suffices to give a rough account of the main topic of the 
debate. As I said, once we realise that, despite our initial intuitions, 
inequalities in basic needs satisfaction are not in themselves a justified 
ground for resource redistribution duties, and that we must look into the 
causes that generated those inequalities to make an adequate appraisal of 
their justice, we need criteria to distinguish and evaluate different 
possible causes. The most debated criterion in the literature was first 
mentioned by Rawls in A Theory o f Justice and developed by Dworkin
73in various articles on the question of equality. It is based on the 
distinction between choice and circumstance.74 Individuals’ inequalities
73 See his Sovereign Virtue, especially chapters 1 and 2. Dworkin’s criterion has been adopted 
in different versions by different philosophers who are commonly referred to, collectively, as 
“luck egalitarians”. See, for discussions of this topic, Sheffler, “What is egalitarianism?”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, n.l, 2003, pp 5-39. But see Dworkin rejecting the label in 
“Equality, Luck and Hierarchy”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, n.2, 2003, pp 190-198.
74 Id., at 192.
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are a result of the choices they freely make in their lives, or the 
circumstances they find themselves in (i.e. in the creation of which they 
have not participated). Now, this is obviously a great oversimplification. 
States of affairs are usually a result of a complex confluence of factors 
that involve choices and circumstances, and it is often impossible to 
determine the exact measure of each in that equation. The theoretical 
principle, however, is intuitive enough: inequalities caused by the free 
choices made by individuals in their lives are on the whole morally 
justified, whereas inequalities derived from circumstances are not. This 
captures well our basic intuition that individuals should be responsible 
for the consequences of their free acts (i.e. choices) but not for those 
which were completely out of their control (i.e. circumstance). Our 
examples, moreover, confirm the adequacy of the distinction in the field 
of distributive justice. The reason why we think that it would be unfair 
to transfer resources from hard working Carlos to lazy Ana in the first 
two examples is strongly connected to the fact that the differences 
between them regarding their ability to satisfy needs clearly result from 
choices they were both free to make rather than circumstances they did 
not choose. In our third example, however, where inequality is a result 
of gender discrimination, and thus not a result of choices, but 
circumstance, some form of compensation involving the transfer of
75resources from Carlos to Ana would not be unfair.
The distinction between choice and circumstance can serve as 
generic criteria, thus, for the evaluation of fundamental causal factors in 
distributive justice issues in the way I have just mentioned. Inequalities 
derived from choices are justified to a certain extent, whilst those 
resulting from mere circumstances are not. This can be applied to all
75 The magnitude of that compensation is a matter of debate which I deal with in chapter 7.
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other factors beyond those featuring in our examples. Disabilities, for 
instance, should be generally regarded as circumstances (with the 
possible exception of self-inflicted disabilities), as should family 
background, social and economic conditions and all those factors over 
which the individual has no control. On the other hand, people’s free 
decisions on what profession to follow and how hard to work, life style, 
spending priorities etc should generally fall within the category of 
choice. A more difficult and controversial factor to qualify are 
individuals’ talents. Some people have an innate talent to perform tasks 
which are highly rewarded in economic terms in certain communities. 
Given that they did not choose those abilities, but just happened to have 
them, many philosophers tend to qualify those “wealth-talents” under 
the category of circumstances and thus maintain that part of the higher 
economic benefits resulting from those talents should be used to 
compensate those who happen not to possess them. Others, however, 
point out that talents often demand some measure of effort and hard 
work to bring economic rewards and should therefore qualify under 
choice.76
As I said above, I do not intend to go into this controversial 
debate here. There are certainly borderline cases that will be difficult to 
classify under one of those categories, and reasonable disagreement is 
bound to happen in many occasions. For my present purposes it suffices 
to establish that the distinction is morally relevant and should therefore 
play some role in any adequate principle of distributive justice. Now, the 
examples I have examined seem to provide us with a clear illustration 
that the distinction is indeed morally relevant. Our basic intuitions those 
examples arouse are well captured by the distinction. I want to show
76 See Dworkin, passim , and Fried, Distributive Justice, claiming that talents are like organs 
and limbs, that is, part of a person. I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 7.
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now, to strengthen my case, how those intuitions (and thus the criteria 
based on the distinction) are connected to some of our most basic moral
77principles.
Underlying those intuitions I claimed are brought out by the 
examples I mentioned are two basic principles of morality, which I shall 
call the principle of equal value (or equal importance), and the principle
78of autonomy. (They are both specific dimensions of what is often 
generically called, especially in human rights talk, dignity). The former 
insists that everyone’s life is equally important and entails, as a 
consequence, that everyone should be treated with equal concern. The 
latter states that each individual should be free to make decisions
70concerning his or her own life. Its most direct implications are that we 
should respect those decisions. Both these principles are at play in the 
criteria I suggested should guide our moral evaluation of inequalities. 
When we accept some inequality derived from choice and reject 
inequalities resulting from circumstances, we treat people as 
autonomous beings whose lives are of equal importance. Indeed, to take 
our examples again, if we forced Carlos to transfer all his surplus of 
resources acquired through hard work to Ana, we would be violating
77 I loosely follow here the method of moral reasoning that John Rawls called “reflective 
equilibrium”, which recommends that we go from intuitions to general principle and vice- 
versa as a way of adapting and refining our moral beliefs. See also, on types of moral 
reasoning, Amartya Sen, 1982, Equality of What?, 353-4 He identifies three different ways of 
evaluating the soundness of moral principles: i. Appealing directly to intuitions; ii. Case- 
implication critique -  taking a few particular cases where the principle applies and checking 
the results against our intuitions -  from the particular to the general; iii. Prior-principle critique 
-  from the general to the more general -  checking if the principle is consistent with a more 
fundamental principle. I am using all those techniques here.
78 There is a debate about whether the duty of equal concern applies only to governments or 
also to individuals. Dworkin seems to maintain the former position, which I conclude from the 
discussion in the Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy, at the Centre for Law, Politics 
and Society, School of Public Policy, University College London, during the years of 2001- 
2003.
79 I am still following Dworkin here, but with some terminological differences. He calls the 
principle o f autonomy the principle of special responsibility. I think that autonomy is a more 
adequate term to capture the implications of the principle (i.e. responsibility in a wide sense).
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both principles just mentioned. To be a fully autonomous person we 
must bear some responsibility for the positive and negative 
consequences of the choices we make in our lives. If, whatever choices a 
person makes, all their consequences, bad and good, are bome 
collectively by everyone, there is a clear curtailment of autonomy. It 
would be disrespectful of Carlos and Ana’s autonomy, therefore, to 
make them share equally the consequences of their freely made choices. 
In the specific case of Ana, it would be paternalistic (i.e. the opposite to 
autonomy) to relieve her from the bad consequences of her choices. An 
autonomy-conscious person will actually feel offended if we try to do 
so. To bear the bad consequences of one’s choices is an important
OA
dimension of one’s autonomy. One of the reasons why we feel it would 
be inadequate to impose a transfer of resources from Carlos to Ana, thus, 
is because it would violate the fundamental principle of autonomy. But it 
would also be contrary to the principle of equal value. In fact, if we 
simply equalised Carlos and Ana’s resources, we would not be treating 
them both with equal concern, as popular but misconceived ideas of 
equality might seem to suggest. Equal concern would be actually harmed 
if we simply ignored all the sacrifices made by Carlos which led to his 
higher possession of resources in comparison to Ana. To say that his 
efforts count for nothing is to deny his life the equal importance it 
deserves.
The Distributive Conception
I claimed above that the basic needs’ conception of social rights is
80 This important connection is highlighted by this quite frequent implication of accepting that 
others bear the bad consequences of our choices: they often claim a role in our future 
decisions. Think, for instance, of someone writing off some of our debts. They will often feel
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inadequate because it might require, at times, transfers of resources 
among individuals which cannot be morally justified. Those transfers 
would violate, I maintained, the fundamental principles of equal value 
and autonomy. This is because a just criterion of resource distribution 
cannot focus exclusively, as I tried to show, on the outcome of people’s 
conditions (i.e. basic needs’ deprivation), disregarding the causal factors 
which led to that outcome. Not all inequalities in the enjoyment of basic 
needs are unjust.
Now, if this is correct, we must conclude that there can be no 
entitlement to the enjoyment of certain, fixed standard of basic needs as 
maintained in the basic needs’ conception, unless we qualify the basic 
needs conception and incorporate in it what I call a “presumption of 
injustice” (I will discuss this in greater detail below). Given that basic 
needs are dependent on resources, and that a just distribution of 
resources has to take into account people’s choices, it follows that 
different people, who are bound to make different choices in life, will 
therefore be entitled to different shares of resources and thus be able to 
satisfy different standards of basic and no-basic needs. If, through their 
own free choices, individuals end up with a different share of resources 
that enable them to satisfy different standards of basic needs, there 
seems to be no justification to force those with the higher share to 
transfer resources to those with the lower one.
This creates a further complication in the complex issue of 
defining the content of social rights. Indeed, when we talk of specific 
social rights to health care, education, food, housing etc, we instinctively 
think of a certain level of those basic needs as entitlements that 
individuals could claim against the state. If what I said is correct,
morally entitled (if not legally) to interfere in our future decisions that might have the same 
bad implications of the one they helped us out with.
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however, we must shift the focus from the outcome of resource 
distribution (i.e. ability to satisfy basic needs) to resource distribution 
itself. Instead of simply verifying if individuals are able to enjoy a 
certain standard of basic needs, we must check if resource distribution is 
just according to the principles of equal value and autonomy. That 
would entail, contrary to what is popularly thought, that there are no 
such things as specific rights to health care, education, housing etc 
which are held by everyone without distinction, but rather a generic 
right to a just share o f society’s resources, which will vary from person 
to person depending on their choices in life. Popular claims such as 
“everyone has a right to adequate health care” would have to be 
displaced by “everyone has a right to a just share of society’s resources”, 
which, for some, will be sufficient to enable them to enjoy adequate 
health care, but for others won’t.
If we want to keep the language of rights to health care, 
education, housing etc, we must find a way to translate the generic right 
to a just distribution of society’s resources into specific rights to those 
goods. For many, as we will see later, this is either an impossible 
enterprise (and thus the usual contention that social rights are too vague) 
or a political one (and thus the usual claim that social rights are 
unjusticiable). I will maintain in later chapters that both these claims are 
mistaken. For now I just want to emphasise that, if there are specific 
rights to health care, education etc, they are not definable, as maintained 
in the basic needs’ conception, through the idea of needs and 
independently of causal factors in resource distribution. We cannot 
know what standard of basic needs an individual is entitled to enjoy as a 
matter of right, thus, until we identify what share of society’s resources 
he should possess as a matter of justice. It is impossible, therefore, to try 
and define what social rights are and then figure out how to distribute
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limited available resources in a way to guarantee as best as we can those 
rights. If there are specific social rights, they are determined by a just 
distribution of society’s resources (i.e. one that respects the fundamental 
principles of equal value and autonomy), and not independent of it, as in 
the basic needs’ conception. I shall call this the “distributive conception” 
of social rights.
I shall go back now to an issue I mentioned earlier on and must 
now discuss in greater detail. As I have admitted, the basic-needs 
conception of social rights has got a strong intuitive appeal to many, 
which is confirmed by its overwhelming predominance in the literature 
and judicial practice. It captures well (one might claim) the intuitions of 
many that there is something wrong in situations where some people 
cannot satisfy their basic needs whilst others have more, and sometimes
O 1
a lot more than is necessary to enjoy them. Many of us believe that we 
have a duty to help the needy person if we can, even when we are 
unaware o f the causes that brought that situation about. It is that duty, 
therefore, that underlies the basic needs conception of social rights.
There would seem to be a conflict, thus, between our intuitions. 
On one hand, we feel that those in dire need ought to be helped 
irrespectively of the causes that brought their situation about. On the 
other hand, when we know, as in the example of Carlos and Ana that I 
discussed above, that inequalities in the ability to satisfy basic needs 
resulted exclusively from different choices ffeely made by individuals, 
we think it would be unfair to force those who are better off to sacrifice 
their other needs and preferences so as to “subsidise” the bad choices 
made by the worse off. I believe, however, that this conflict is apparent,
62
not real. It emerges from the confusion we often make between two 
different types of duties related to resource redistribution. We must 
avoid such confusion, however, because only one of those types of 
duties correspond to social and economic rights.
Let me try and distinguish these two different types of duties with 
an example. Imagine that I come across two people who are in dire need, 
i.e. unable to satisfy their most basic needs. I do not know yet what led 
those two people to that situation of need. But I have so many available 
resources that I can easily help them both out of their situation without 
sacrificing any of my basic and non-basic needs. I believe it would be 
quite correct, in this situation, to say that I am under a duty to transfer 
some of my resources to those people. Imagine, now, that I happen to 
learn the causes of those individuals’ deprivation. I know that one of 
them is in need because, say, being female in my sexist community, she 
earns much less than I do even though she has the same job as mine. The 
other one, who is male (and thus hasn’t got this obstacle to overcome), is 
in need because he doesn’t like to work. Now, it might still be the case 
that I am under a duty to transfer some of my resources to both of them. 
It would be quite wrong, however, to maintain that both situations are 
morally equivalent, that is, that my duty would be the same in both 
cases.
It seems clear that, in the latter case, my duty would be based on 
something like solidarity to a fellow human being in need. It wouldn’t 
matter, therefore, if he got into that situation out of pure laziness. The 
mere fact that he is suffering and that I can stop that suffering without 
much sacrifice is a sufficient reason to place me under a duty to help, 
which we might call a duty o f beneficence, or solidarity. In the former
81 See, for instance, in the recent literature on social rights, David Bilchitz, “Giving Socio- 
Economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and its Importance”, (2002) 118 The South
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case, however, the reason why that person is in dire need (namely 
gender discrimination) is of fundamental importance. My duty here is 
not grounded on the mere fact that that person is suffering. Rather, it is 
grounded on the fact that, if not for the gender discrimination (i.e. an 
injustice), that person would be earning as much as I am and, as a 
consequence, would not be in dire need. It is out of justice, thus, and not
out of solidarity, that I must transfer some of my resources to that
82person.
It is important to realise that this difference is not academic. 
Those duties are not only grounded on different ideas (i.e. solidarity and 
justice), but are also clearly different in scope and strength. In fact, 
whilst the duty of solidarity emerges whenever we can help someone 
who is in dire need without much sacrifice of our own needs, the duty of 
justice appears only when someone has less resources than they should 
have due to circumstance (not choice). On the other hand, whilst our 
duty of solidarity is conditioned on our ability to help without 
unreasonable sacrifice of our needs (basic and non-basic), the duty of 
justice is not. As a matter of fact, if someone is in need due to their own 
free choices, it would not be appropriate to force me to sacrifice some of 
my needs, even if non-basic, to help them, as I have already tried to 
show above with the examples of Carlos and Ana. But if the inequality 
in resources is a result of circumstance, not choice, it is not unfair to
African Law Journal, 484, Cecile Fabre, op. cit.
82 These twin-reasons can be observed in the 1977 policy statement “Human Rights Policy” of 
the then US Secretary of State, quoted by Henry Sue in the introduction of his Basic Rights, p. 
5. He divides human rights into three different categories: “the right to be free from 
governmental violation of the integrity of the person”; “the right to the fulfilment of such vital 
needs as food, shelter, health care, and education”; and “the right to enjoy civil and political 
liberties”. He then explains that the second type of rights “can be violated by a Government’s 
action or inaction -  for example, through corrupt official processes which divert resources to 
an elite at the expense of the needy, or through indifference to the plight of the poor.” The 
former example seems to me clearly based on the principle of distributive justice, since the 
resources diverted through corruption belonged to the needy. The latter is based on the 
principle o f compassion, or humanity.
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force the better off to transfer resources to the worse off.
This explains, I think, that the conflict of intuitions I mentioned 
above is only apparent. When we claim that there is a duty on the better 
off to transfer resources to the worse off irrespective of the causes that 
led to that situation of inequality, the latent idea is that of solidarity. But 
few would go as far as claiming that such duty is unconditional, that is, 
that the better off should transfer as much resources as it takes to raise 
the worse off to the basic needs’ threshold, even if they have to sacrifice 
all their non-basic needs. On the other hand, when we claim that there is 
a duty on the better off to transfer resources to the worse off even if that 
would entail some sacrifice of their needs (basic or non-basic), the cause 
of the resource inequality must be some sort of injustice. Our intuitions, 
thus, do not conflict. When we dissect them we see that they apply to 
different situations.
My argument here follows a distinction between justice and 
morality in general which has been advocated, among others, by John 
Stuart Mill. According to this distinction, obligations of justice always 
correspond with moral rights. But this is not the case with any moral 
obligation. As it has been put in a well known paper:
“Mill says that obligations of justice in particular, but not all 
moral obligations, correspond with moral rights. An unjust act 
is the is the violation of another’s right; but an act can be wrong 
without being unjust -  without violating any person’s right. 
Mill believes that we can act wrongly by failing to be generous 
or charitable or beneficent, and he treats the corresponding 
“virtues” as imposing “obligations”; but these do not
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0*2correspond with anyone’s rights.”
It should be clear, then, that I am not defending that solidarity 
imposes no moral duty to help others in need when we can do so at little 
or no cost to our own needs. I am arguing, rather, that this moral duty is 
not correspondent with a moral right. Justice, on the other hand, does
84give rise to duties which do correspond to rights.
It does not necessarily entail, however, rights to a minimum level 
of basic goods, since justice is plainly compatible with inequalities of 
wealth and basic needs’ satisfaction.
Basic Needs as Presumption of Injustice
It should be clear by now that the basic needs conception of social 
rights, i.e. the claim that everyone has a right to an adequate standard of 
living measured in terms of basic needs satisfaction cannot stand. Even 
if we accept the existence of a duty of beneficence, or solidarity as I 
called it above, this duty wouldn’t be strong enough so as to demand that 
those able to satisfy basic needs transfer all their exceeding resources to 
those unable to do so until they reach the basic needs threshold. That 
could be justified only by the idea of justice, but justice, as I have 
claimed, will be often compatible with inequalities in basic needs, 
because some of these inequalities at least will often be a result of 
choice, not circumstance. The crucial point in the issue of resource 
distribution, thus, is the identification of the causes that lead people to
83 See Lyons, “Human Rights and the General Welfare”, 6 Philosophy and Public Affairs 113, 
(1977), at 123.
84 I should also emphasize that I am not claiming that justice is superior to solidarity, or that 
solidarity is irrelevant when we think of basic needs. They simply work in different 
dimensions of morality and, as I tried to maintain, only the former is material when we are in
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end up with different shares. When they are matters of pure choice, no 
redistribution is demanded by justice (though it might be, upon 
conditions, by a duty of solidarity). When they are matters of pure 
circumstance, redistribution is required.
An obvious difficulty is the identification of the causes that led 
some people to be deprived of the resources required to satisfy basic 
needs. It is often hard, if not impossible, to tell if someone’s current 
inability to acquire the resources which are necessary to afford basic 
needs is a result of his past choices or a matter of circumstance. 
Moreover, it might well be a mixture of both, and the precise 
identification of each share is just as difficult. This might lead one to 
conclude that an outcome theory , like the basic needs conception, is 
the only practical way of implementing redistributive social rights. I 
believe that this is indeed the only viable option and will discuss it in 
detail later on. But it is important to notice, first, that to adopt an 
outcome strategy based on basic needs is not the same as to endorse 
basic needs as the only morally relevant factor (as in the basic needs 
conception). Rather, one must use basic needs merely as a palpable 
device to implement as best as it is possible the intangible ideal of 
justice. I must explain that in more detail.
As I said, it will often be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
extract any practical consequence directly from the ideal of distributive 
justice that I defended above. This is because the information required 
for that purpose, i.e. that regarding the causes of inequalities in resources
the realm of rights. What makes a situation of lack of basic needs a matter of justice as well as 
solidarity is the causal connection with choice and circumstance, as I discuss above in the text,
85 An outcome theory focuses on the result, or the state o f  affairs, rather than on the acts and 
facts that led to that state of affairs. In moral philosophy such theories are often called 
consequentialist, as opposed to deontological theories.
67
86(choice or/and circumstance) will be rarely available. We must avail 
ourselves of some sort of presumption, therefore, to implement that 
ideal. The concept of basic needs can work as such a presumptive 
device, and a kind of “false target” in the achievement of distributive 
justice. That is, we might adopt the presumption that, whenever someone 
is not able to enjoy a certain standard of basic needs, there must be a 
matter of circumstance, and not choice, in the roots of that outcome. If 
we aim at distributing resources so that everyone is able to satisfy that 
standard of basic needs, therefore, we are bound to achieve a just (or 
more just) distribution of resources. We use basic needs, thus, not 
because inequalities of basic needs are inherently unjust (we saw above 
that this is not the case), but rather because, if resources were justly 
distributed in the community, most people would be likely to enjoy a 
certain standard of basic needs.
The difference is crucial for the justification of resource 
redistribution. As I claimed, inequalities in basic needs alone are not a 
sufficient reason to justify a forced transfer of resources from the better 
off to the worse off. If we can demonstrate (or adopt a plausible 
presumption) that such inequalities are caused by unjust factors, 
however, redistribution is then fully justified. The critical point, thus, is 
to establish a plausible presumption. I will try and do so below in 
Chapter 6. For now I want to suggest that, perhaps unwittingly, this is 
also what some of the proponents of the basic needs’ conception have in 
mind when they claim that everyone has a right to an adequate standard 
of living. Let us see, for instance, how one of the most influential
86 In the case of children, however, this difficulty is not present. No deficit in their capacity to 
satisfy basic needs can be attributed to choices. They might even be a result of choices made 
by their parents, but this is not a reason, of course, to consider those choices as if they were 
their own choices, i.e. to make them responsible for those choices. We might confidently 
assert, thus, that a child’s inability to satisfy her basic needs (in a community where resources 
are sufficient for the satisfaction of those needs) is unjust.
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proponents of rights to basic needs, Henry Shue, has tried to justify his 
thesis. He invokes, first, the idea of degradation (which gives rise to the 
principle of “degradation prohibition”). That is how he puts it:
“A refusal on the part of an affluent person to use any of the wealth at 
his or her command in order that others might be enabled to enjoy their 
basic rights would be an insistence upon the maintenance of a degree 
of inequality which is degrading: an inequality constituted by protected 
affluence and unprotected subsistence.”87
He is careful to explain, however, that his principle is not a strong 
egalitarian principle:
“The assumption about inequality incorporated into this principle is 
only that there are types of inequality that are morally unacceptable, 
namely, inequalities that are degrading. (...) The principle does not 
mean that all inequality is unacceptable -  it leaves open the possibility 
of justifying various sorts of inequality. The principle means only that 
inequalities that are incompatible with self-respect -  that are 
humiliating -  are impermissible. Inequality is not prohibited by the 
principle but limited.”88
The thrust of his argument, thus, is this idea of degrading 
inequality, i.e. of a threshold of inequality beyond which those at the 
bottom would be in a position that is degrading, humiliating. In those 
cases, then, society would be under a duty to transfer resources to those 
who would otherwise be subject to what he calls degrading inequality. 
This might sound, at first, like a defence of the intrinsic immorality of
OQ
inequalities in basic needs, which I have already rejected above. But
87 Basic Rights, p 119.
88 Id., 119-120.
89 I claimed that such inequalities might generate, at most, a duty of solidarity, or beneficence, 
that is, a duty to help our fellow human beings who are in dire need. But such a duty, as I tried 
to show, would be contingent on many factors, such as ability to help without sacrificing 
important, though non-basic needs, and not absolute as the basic needs conception to social 
rights seems to maintain. See also, on this point, the discussion in Chapter 6.
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Shue soon brings into his thesis the idea of unfairness, and admits some 
confusion about the justification of basic rights:
this kind of inequality may be degrading because it is patently 
unfair. I have no clear intuitions about which is the more primitive 
concept. In any case, protected affluence in the face of unprotected 
subsistence is clearly both degrading and unfair to those who are 
unable to maintain life and health. For both reasons it would be wrong 
for the affluent to maintain their current advantages rather than to do 
their fair share to aid those deprived of subsistence by the past failures 
of social institutions.”90 (my emphasis)
It seems clear from this passage that Shue is not claiming (or at 
least is not sure) that inequalities in basic needs are in themselves 
sufficient to ground a duty on the better off to transfer resources to the 
worse off. He has the telling need to bring in “unfairness” to the 
explanation and assumes, in the end, that those inequalities are a result 
of “the past failures of social institutions.” I believe, as I said, that this 
sort of presumption of injustice is indeed required to make the ideal of 
distributive justice practical. I will deal in detail with this issue in the 
final chapter of this thesis.
Now it is time I turn to the twin objections to the judicial 
enforcement of social rights I mentioned in the introduction: legitimacy 
and institutional competence. The next two chapters are devoted to each 
of those objections.
90 Op. cit., at 127. See also page 125.
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C h a p t e r  3 
T h e  L e g i t i m a c y  O b j e c t i o n :
S o c i a l  R i g h t s , D e m o c r a c y  a n d  S e p a r a t i o n  o f  P o w e r s
The so-called legitimacy objection maintains, as I mentioned in the 
Introduction, that the judicial enforcement of social and economic rights 
would represent an undue intrusion by courts into the arena of the 
political branches of the state. This is because social rights provisions 
will usually (though not exclusively, as discussed in chapter 1) require 
active measures from the state, i.e. elaboration of public policies 
(including the enactment of legislation91) and their implementation. They 
can be violated, therefore, not only by state action, but largely by state 
omission. Judicial enforcement would necessarily involve, thus, a power 
on the judiciary to compel the political branches to take action. 
Moreover, any effective judicial control would also have to encompass 
the power of the judiciary to indicate what precise measures should be 
taken when those adopted by the political branches prove inadequate.
But that would not be appropriate, it is claimed, due to the 
democratic principle of separation of powers. It would result in 
usurpation of legislative and executive powers by the judiciary, i.e. in 
“judicial tyranny”.92
It is important to notice two different aspects in this objection: one 
related simply to the positive character (i.e. structure) of social rights,
91 Constitutional provisions that require complementary legislation to be applied are usually 
called non-self-executing norms.
92 For an account of this argument in the United States of America see Jonathan Feldman,“ 
Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts
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the other to their content. In the former, which we might call the “formal 
objection”, it is contended that any attempt by the judiciary to tell 
government, or parliament what to do, lacks legitimacy irrespective of 
what subject-matter is involved. This view stems from a conception of 
separation of powers that is purely negative. That is, it accepts judicial 
review as a legitimate practice yet only insofar as it is restricted to a 
negative role, i.e. telling the political branches what they cannot do (so- 
called “negative judicial review”), not what they should do (“positive 
judicial review”). The legitimacy objection, thus, is based less on the 
subject-matter of the question involved than on the form  of judicial 
interference with the other state powers. Positive interference is regarded 
as much more intrusive and therefore offensive to separation of powers 
than negative interference. When a court strikes down a statute or some 
governmental act (negative judicial review), it is simply closing that 
specific route chosen by parliament or government, which is accepted in 
the light of the traditional theory of checks and balances. But when the 
courts have to tell parliament or government what to do (positive 
interference), as opposed to what not to do, it will often restrict 
significantly the options available.94
in an Era of Positive Government”, 24 Rutgers L.J. 1057 (1993), at 1060.
93 See Feldman, op. cit., passim.
94 Peter Schuck proposes the following continuum to classify remedies according to their 
degree of judicial intrusiveness on official freedom. The further the remedy is in the right, the 
more intrusive it is supposed to be. Cf Suing Government. Citizen remedies for official 
wrongs. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1983, at 14ff.
<—official freedom judicial intrusiveness—>
declaratory judgement damages prohibitory injunction mandatory structural
award injunction injunction
See also Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy, Washington, D.C., 1977 
(“Traditional judicial review meant forbidding action, saying “no” to the other branches. Now 
the judicial function often means requiring action, and there is a difference between 
foreclosing an alternative and choosing one, between constraining and commanding.” At 19) 
This point, though, can be easily overstated. Feldman argues that negative judicial review can 
sometimes be more intrusive than positive one. (1085).
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As to the latter, which we might refer to as the “substantive 
objection”, the stress is placed on the subject-matter of the issues that 
social rights adjudication would involve. The promotion of social rights 
requires the elaboration and implementation of complex and often costly 
public policies in the field of health, education, housing etc, that is, in 
what we are used to refer to as social welfare.95 But those are precisely 
the issues, it is claimed, that are to be decided through the democratic 
process, especially because they require decisions about the level of 
resources to be demanded from society through taxation and about how 
to allocate those public resources among the various areas of state 
responsibility.
This is, in brief, the so-called legitimacy objection to the judicial 
enforcement of social and economic rights. To sum it up, it claims that 
judicial enforcement of social rights would place the judiciary in a 
position to tell other state powers not only what to do to discharge their 
constitutional duties, but also how to do it, and, even more controversial, 
in fields traditionally regarded as the preserve of democratic (i.e. 
political) decision making. We must see now how partisans of social 
rights justiciability have responded to it.
As I have already mentioned in chapter 1, the most common 
strategy has been to deny the differences between social rights and 
classic rights so that the justification given for the legitimacy objection 
cannot stand. Most efforts have been concentrated, as a consequence, on 
showing that the distinction between civil and social rights as negative 
and positive is flawed. Civil rights also generate, the argument goes, 
positive obligations to the State, and thus are also dependent on public 
policies and resources for their effective protection. An often quoted
95 Horowitz, id..
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example is the right to physical security (or security of the person). The 
State is under a duty not only to respect this right by abstaining from 
hurting its citizens but also to protect citizens from themselves through a 
system of public security (i.e. positive measures) which is certainly 
costly (i.e. resource dependent).96 The mere positive character of social 
rights, therefore, cannot be a good argument for rejecting their 
justiciability.
Now, although it is true that the positive/negative distinction is 
flawed, or an oversimplification, as I have discussed at length in chapter 
1, this is not in itself a sufficient rebuttal of the legitimacy objection. 
Indeed, it might well be maintained that the positive elements of civil 
rights should also be excluded from judicial scrutiny. It can be 
contended, for instance, that public security measures, just as social 
welfare, is a matter of policy for the elected branches of the state to 
decide, and that only the negative aspect of the right to physical security 
is justiciable. What is required to refute the legitimacy objection, thus, is 
an argument on why the courts are legitimate to tell government and 
parliament what to do and how to do it in matters involving social rights. 
This is what we must now discuss.
The “formal” objection: positive vs. negative judicial review
As I have just said, someone might well accept that the 
positive/negative rights dichotomy is flawed when applied to distinguish 
social from civil and political rights but still maintain that courts are not 
legitimated to enforce either of those types of rights in their positive 
aspects. In fact, I believe that this is actually what most serious objectors 
to social rights justiciability have in mind. They are just as against courts
96 See chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of this point.
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getting involved with civil and political rights when their positive aspects 
are at issue. They would not condone, for instance, courts telling 
government or the legislature what to do in order to guarantee the 
security of the citizens, or how to do it, in a direct, mandatory manner. 
They would maintain, I suppose, that all that courts can do is to award 
damages when those branches violate the right to physical security of its 
citizens, or, at the most, stop them to do so (through issuing prohibitory 
injunctions).
We might call this type of judicial operation “negative judicial 
review”, as opposed to “positive judicial review”, that would involve 
judicial orders as to what and how the other branches should do (i.e. 
what positive measures they should take) to protect and promote rights. 
The formal legitimacy objection to justiciability, thus, can be understood 
in this way, that is, as an objection to positive judicial review in general, 
not specifically to the judicial enforcement of social rights. We cannot 
simply reject the positive/negative rights dichotomy, thus, and conclude 
that social rights should therefore be justiciable.97 Rather, we must 
consider in depth the argument that positive judicial review is 
illegitimate.
The formal objection can be observed in the works of courts 
themselves, who are often more reluctant to give positive orders to the 
other branches (“positive judicial review”) than to strike down their acts 
(“negative judicial review”). In the United States of America, for 
example, even though most States’ constitutions establish clear positive 
duties of the State (especially concerning the right to education), most 
State courts have systematically refrained from enforcing those
97 As it happens, social and economic rights are usually more readily identified with positive 
duties, and civil and political rights with negative ones. Thus, perhaps, the generalization that 
the latter are justiciable whilst the former aren’t.
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provisions. The reason given for such restraint, as explained by Feldman, 
has often been legitimacy concerns. So he puts it:
“State courts which have refused to enforce positive constitutional 
rights have relied on negative separation of powers. This doctrine 
counsels that judicial review should be exercised to check 
governmental tyranny. When courts are asked to respond to 
legislative inaction, however, legislative tyranny is not present. 
Courts which rely on the negative separation of powers doctrine 
reason that if they were to define the legislature's obligation and 
require legislative action, judicial tyranny would result.”9
The main legitimacy concern about the enforcement of positive 
duties, as illustrated with the passage just quoted, results chiefly from the 
positive character of judicial interference, and not from the substantive 
content of those duties. Thus our decision to call it the “formal” 
objection. It follows from a traditional conception of the principle of 
separation of powers that sees it as impeding the three main branches of 
state power to encroach on each other’s functions. If that conception 
were still accepted, however, judicial review itself, and not just positive 
judicial review, would have to be rejected as illegitimate, since any 
interference with another branch’s function, be it positive or negative, is 
a form of violation of the separation of powers in its pure conception.
But if one accepts judicial review in some form as a legitimate 
practice, as it is the case in most systems that have expressly recognised 
social rights in their constitutions," then one cannot avail oneself of the 
pure separation of powers’ doctrine. One must hold a different, less 
absolute conception of the principle of separation of powers, and explain 
why the enforcement of positive duties would be illegitimate whereas
98 Op. cit., at 1060.
99 As I have already mentioned, there are people who maintain this thesis (see for instance 
Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford, 1999), but I am assuming in this work that 
judicial review in some form is accepted as a legitimate practice.
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negative judicial review (i.e. the enforcement of negative duties) would 
not.
Here the argument (though not always explicitly articulated) has 
often been that, although certainly incompatible with a pure separation of 
powers doctrine, negative judicial review is less intrusive than positive 
judicial review and thus less harmful to that principle. That is, the 
principle of separation of powers is certainly not absolute. It has to be 
accommodated with other important principles of a democratic and just 
society, such as, for instance, the protection of rights, which requires 
some form of judicial review. Yet this accommodation should try and 
respect as much as it is possible the principle of separation of powers, 
and that, as it might be claimed, is achieved better through restraining 
judicial interference with other branches to a negative form.
But there seems to be no plausibility in this position, at least from 
a pure legitimacy standpoint. It is not at all clear why positive judicial 
review would offend less the principle of separation of powers than 
negative judicial review. As intrusiveness is concerned, it can be just as 
interfering (if not more) for a court to strike down a whole statute as for 
it to declare that a constitutional provision in need of legislative or 
administrative action has not been complied with, or even to issue a 
mandatory injunction specifying what has to be done. Indeed, imagine a 
statute passed by the legislature setting up a whole system of health care 
provision to the population funded by the state being struck down as 
unconstitutional by the courts. Would that not be just as, if not more, 
intrusive than a court issuing a positive, mandatory order demanding that 
the legislature passes a statute implementing such a system. I believe the 
answer to this question is in the positive, and shows the implausibility of 
the formal objection. Indeed, to quote Feldman again, that view
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“represents a serious misinterpretation of the negative separation of 
powers doctrine. A court's articulation of a legislature's duty does 
not result in judicial tyranny. Judicial interpretation of a 
constitutional provision entails a similar process whether the 
provision confers a positive right or a negative right. Consequently, 
a court oversteps its bounds no more when defining the parameters 
of required legislative action than when defining prohibitions on 
legislative behavior. ... In sum, the negative separation of powers 
doctrine imposes no obstacle to judicial review of positive rights 
claims, and the courts which conclude that it does are in error.”1
It seems clear, thus, that what I have been calling the formal 
legitimacy objection does not survive a close scrutiny of its professed 
justifications. Its popularity can be explained, I think, by historical 
reasons. Indeed, the practice of judicial review appeared and was 
developed at the height of the so-called Liberal State, when it was widely 
believed that the State should be concerned only with keeping the order 
so as individuals could go about their own business as they wished. In 
that context, the only rights individuals had against the State were liberal 
rights, or, to use the current human rights language, civil and political 
rights. Judicial review was limited to the protection of those rights 
against interferences by the state, and therefore was negative by default. 
With the rise of the Activist State, or Welfare State, which survives until 
now despite the revival of libertarian ideas, it becomes clear that negative 
judicial review is insufficient to protect rights. This is because more and 
more positive duties of the State were gradually recognised, not only 
generated by new welfare rights, but also by a more comprehensive 
interpretation of traditional liberal rights, thought before to be purely 
negative and now regarded as generating both positive and negative
100 Op cit, at 1060-1061. Furthermore, enforcement o f a positive right need not result in 
judicial tyranny. As long as the remedy initially allows the legislature to fashion the curative 
legislation, the imposition of a remedy is even less intrusive than where a negative rights 
violation is involved. When negative rights are violated, the offending legislation must be 
struck down, an absolute rebuke to the legislature. When positive rights are violated, however,
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duties. Now, given those positive duties are violated through State 
omission, not action, purely negative review is clearly incapable of 
enforcing them.
This schematic historical account101 serves nonetheless to explain, 
I believe, the popularity of the unjustified belief that negative judicial 
review is less harmful to the principle of separation of powers than 
positive review. A reluctance to let go solidified traditional schemes and 
conceptions outdated by social reality seems to be a widely shared 
characteristic of legal thinking in all places. One plausible explanation is 
that we seem to be thinking about problems brought by the welfare state 
with legal conceptions developed at the height of the liberal state.
In some legal systems, however, there have been attempts to 
break free of the past and move towards the future. Indeed, some 
countries have been establishing through legislation or judicial 
development specific judicial remedy for cases of omission of the 
legislature or the administration to give effect to constitutional 
provisions. The first country to explicitly adopt such a remedy through
the legislative process is set in motion, which allows for the exercise, albeit within judicially- 
prescribed boundaries, of legislative power.
101 See, for a more detailed analysis, Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, Polity 
Press, 1997, chapter 6, especially section 6.1 -  “The Dissolution of the Liberal Paradigm of 
Law”, pp 240-253. The following passage is particularly interesting for our discussion: “In the 
liberal model, strict legal constraints on the judiciary and the administration led to the classical 
scheme of separation of powers, which was once intended to bring the arbitrary will of an 
absolutist regime in line with the rule of law. The distribution o f powers among the branches 
of government can be modelled along the temporal axis of collective decisions: judicial 
decision making is oriented to the past and focuses on past decisions of the political legislature 
that have solidified into established law; the legislature makes decisions oriented to the future 
and binding on future action; and the administration deals with current problems cropping up 
in the present. (...) If one takes this model as the standard, then the materialized legal order of 
the welfare state can appear as an upheaval, even as the corruption of the constitutional 
architectonic. (...) it signifies increased power for the judiciary, and it enlarges the scope for 
judicial discretion in a way that threatens to upset the equilibrium in the normative structure of 
the classical constitutional state at the cost of the citizens’ autonomy. (...) [The protection of 
basic rights] can no longer be understood only negatively, as warding off intrusions; it also 
grounds affirmative claims to benefits.” Op. cit., at 245-247.
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legislation seems to have been Yugoslavia, in its constitution of 1974, 
whose article 337 reads as follows:
“If the Constitutional Tribunal of Yugoslavia establishes that the 
competent organ has not enacted the necessary provisions to give effect 
to the dispositions of the Constitution of the Yugoslavian Republic, its
federal laws and other federal provisions and general acts, it will give
102notice of this to the General Assembly.”
The Constitutions of Portugal (1976) and Brazil (1988) have 
similar provisions.103 It is expressly recognized in those countries, 
therefore, that parliament and executive can behave in contradiction to 
the Constitution not only actively, but also passively, and that when this 
happens the judiciary is perfectly legitimated at least to declare so. In 
other jurisdictions, such as Italy and Germany and South Africa, even 
though there is no express provision establishing positive judicial review 
in the constitution, the Courts have nonetheless tackled legislative or 
administrative omissions through more or less traditional interpretive 
methods.104 Now, this seems to be a logical corollary of the decision to 
include positive rights in a constitutional system that accepts judicial 
review as a legitimate practice. If courts can tell the other branches what 
not to do when active violations of rights are at stake, they should also be 
able, in principle, to tell them what to do when passive violations are at
102 Apud Flavia C. Piovesan, Protecao Judicial contra Omissoes Legislativas, Acao direta de 
inconstitucionalidade por Omissao e Mandado de Injuncao, Revista dos Tribunais, Sao Paulo, 
1995, at 113 (my translation from the Portuguese).
103 In Portugal this is to be found in article 283 of the Constitution, and in Brazil in article 103, 
para 2. For an account in English of the Brazilian system of judicial review see, Keith S. 
Rosenn. “Judicial Review in Brazil: Developments under the 1988 Constitution”, 7 
Southwestern Journal o f Law and Trade in the Americas 291 (2000)
104 For an account of the Italian practice, see Nardini, William J. “Passive Activism and the 
Limits of Judicial Self-Restraint: Lessons for America from the Italian Constitutional Court, 
30 Seton Hall Law Review 1 (1999).
105 For a similar argument in the context of American States’ judicial review see Helen 
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: the Limits of Federal Rationality Review,
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This is, I think, the correct way of responding to the first, formal 
aspect of the legitimacy objection. It dismisses the difference between 
positive and negative judicial interference (not between positive and 
negative rights), going thus to the heart of the matter. If the problem is 
mere intrusion into legislative and governmental affairs, then it is not 
significant which form (positive or negative) it takes. It is intrusion all 
the same. The positive character that judicial protection of social rights 
has necessarily to assume, therefore, cannot alone provide a justification 
for the legitimacy objection in its formal aspect.106As we will see later on 
in chapter 4, there is still an argument from competence to be made to 
justify the acceptance of negative judicial interference whilst rejecting 
positive one. But from the perspective of the formal legitimacy objection, 
as I have tried to show, no justification can stand.
But even when it is accepted that the mere positive character of 
judicial review of social rights does not make it illegitimate, it is still 
contended that such review has to be performed within certain limits. For 
some, it should not go beyond a mere declaration by the courts that the 
political branches have not complied with their positive duties. As a 
matter of fact, this is actually what a purely textual interpretation of the 
provisions of the Yugoslavian, Portuguese and Brazilian constitutions 
mentioned above would result in. Indeed, according to article 103, § 2° 
of the Brazilian Constitution, for instance: “Once the unconstitutionality 
for omission of a measure to make a constitutional norm effective is 
declared, the competent Power will be notified to adopt the necessary
107measures ...” . The judiciary simply declares, therefore, that it found
the omission of measures to give effect to a constitutional provision 
unconstitutional and notifies the legislature of its finding. There is no
112 Harv. L. Rev. 1131 (1999), at 1138.
106 We are assuming, it is important to keep in mind, that negative judicial review is accepted.
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order for the legislature to act to rectify the omission, let alone any 
sanction for the failure to do so. Under this model, thus, the judiciary is 
not impeded from ruling on the constitutionality of the political 
branches’ behavior even if this involves an indication of positive 
measures not taken by those branches. The judicial decision, however, 
has mere declaratory effects, i.e. cannot be enforced against the state in 
case of non-compliance.
The obvious problem with this model is the absence of any 
sanction for failure of the political powers to amend the declared 
unconstitutionality. One has to rely too much on their goodwill (not 
always plentiful) for effective implementation of the court’s finding. In 
other words, it runs the risk of depleting justiciability of any meaningful 
content. An effective judicial role in the protection of social rights, 
therefore, has to encompass at least the power to issue injunctive orders 
with time limits and sanctions for non-compliance.
A truly effective role for the judiciary, however, would require 
even more than that. It would require that the judiciary not only order the 
other branches to act, but also how to act. But that would invite, as we 
saw, the legitimacy objection in its second aspect, i.e. that related to the 
subject-matter of social rights adjudication. Let us discuss it now in more 
detail.
107 See Flavia Piovesan, op. cit., at 104, note 10.
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The “substantive objection” 
Principle, policy and democracy
According to the substantive aspect of the legitimacy objection, courts 
should not adjudicate social rights not simply because that would involve 
ordering the political branches what to do (i.e. positive judicial review) 
as opposed to what not to do (negative judicial review). This is, as we 
discussed in the previous section, what we decided to call the “formal 
objection” of legitimacy. Rather, courts should not enforce those rights 
because it would demand them to tell government and the legislature 
what to do in areas that are traditionally regarded as the preserve of those 
political branches (i.e. social welfare and resource allocation).
To put it another way, it would be inadequate for the judiciary to 
determine what the political branches should deliver in terms of health 
care provision, education, housing etc not because that would consist in 
positive judicial review, but rather because those issues are thought to be 
“political”, or matters of policy, and therefore to be decided by the 
democratically elected powers of the state.
This argument has been forcefully put by Michael Walzer in the 
following way:
“The judicial enforcement of welfare rights would radically reduce the 
reach of democratic decision. Henceforth, the judges would decide, and 
as cases accumulated, they would decide in increasing detail, what the 
scope and character of the welfare system should be and what sorts of 
distribution it required. Such decisions would clearly involve 
significant judicial control of the state budget and, indirectly at least, of
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the level of taxation -  the very issues over which the democratic
1 08revolution was originally fought.”
The argument is grounded, thus, on the contention that when 
certain issues are involved, decisions taken by the representative political 
institutions should not be subject, in their merits, to the review of the 
judiciary. They are part of what is called the discretion of the political 
branches.109
I think that the substantive objection has a stronger appeal than 
the formal one. Indeed, as I tried to show in the previous section, the 
formal objection is grounded on an outdated conception of separation of 
powers that can be easily seen to be inadequate to deal with the issues 
raised in the activist welfare state. The substantive objection, however, 
does not ignore this new social reality. On the contrary, it explicitly 
acknowledges it but contends that, in the activist state, some issues are 
eminently political and should, as a consequence, be decided by the 
political branches of the state without the interference of the courts.
We must analyse here in more detail, therefore, the justification 
for ascribing to the political branches discretion on issues of a political 
nature and the criteria proposed to identify those issues so as to see if 
social and economic rights are indeed to be qualified as such.
So, how are we to define what issues are political, and thus not 
subject to the review of the judiciary? A good starting point for this 
discussion seems to be the famous decision of the American Supreme 
Court regarded as the birthplace of the practice of judicial review. As 
famously put by Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, “the province 
of the court is ... to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire
108 In “Philosophy and Democracy”, Political Theory 9, (1981) at 391-2.
109 For an interesting analysis of the concept of discretion and its different possible variants see 
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at 31-39. For a thorough study of discretionary 
powers see Galligan, D J. Discretionary Powers, Oxford University Press, 1999.
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how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they 
have a discretion”. 110 He then went on to explain what duties are within 
the discretion of the executive:
“...whether the legality of an act of the head of a department be 
examinable in a court of justice or not, must always depend on the 
nature of that act.
If some acts be examinable, and others not, there must be some rule of 
law to guide the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
( . . . )
By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with 
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use 
his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his 
political character, and to his own conscience. (...) The subjects are 
political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being 
entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. 
( . . . )
But... when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance 
of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws 
for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights 
of others.”
“The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of 
departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, 
merely to execute the will of the president, or rather to act in cases in 
which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, 
nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only 
politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, 
and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it 
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured 
has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.”
According to the influential decision in Marbury v. Madison, thus, 
the criteria to distinguish between political and legal questions is whether 
an issue concerns only the nation or if an individual right is involved. In 
other words, the discretion of the executive (and that goes to the 
legislature as well) ends, or is limited, to issues that respect the nation, 
that is, the common interest of the whole population. Whenever a right of
110 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 1803 WL 893, (U.S.Dist.Col.), 2 L.Ed. 60.
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an individual is involved, then the judiciary has the power, and indeed a 
duty, to protect that right.
This historical justification for judicial review has been developed 
at the theoretical level by Ronald Dworkin through his famous 
distinction between matters of principle and matters of policy. This is 
how he puts it:
“Principle and policy are the major grounds of political justification. 
The former secures some individual or group right; the latter advances a 
collective goal of the community.”111
He distinguishes, thus, between issues involving rights of 
individuals, which Dworkin calls matters of principle and issues 
involving the general welfare of the community, which he calls matters 
of policy. It is the same distinction, I submit, we saw in Marbury v. 
Madison, and just as Justice Marshall maintained, so does Dworkin that 
the former should be subject to the scrutiny of the judiciary, the latter 
shouldn’t. Indeed, as he puts it in A Matter of Principle
“My own view is that the Court should make decisions of principle 
rather than policy -  decisions about what rights people have under our 
constitutional system rather than decisions about how the general 
welfare is best promoted - ...” 112
The reason for that separation of duties follows from a conception 
of democracy in which everyone’s interests should be taken into account 
in decisions affecting the whole community, but also where individual 
rights enjoy a kind of priority over the general welfare (i.e. they are 
“trumps” to use Dworkin’s terminology), and must therefore be protected
111 Taking Rights Seriously (1977), at 82-3.
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113against potential violations in the name of the collective good. Under 
such a conception of democracy, it seems natural to entrust the political 
branches with matters of policy and the judiciary with matters of 
principle. Indeed, matters of policy, i.e. those issues concerning the 
welfare of the population as a whole, must be decided, in a democratic 
society “through the operation of some political process designed to 
produce an accurate expression of the different interests that should be 
taken into account, [i.e. everyone’s interests]”114 In our western 
democracies the workings of the political branches, elected by the people 
to represent their interests, seems to fit that purpose better. In order to 
protect individual rights from potential violations arising from the 
decisions taken through the political process, however, an independent 
power is needed, and the judiciary here is usually thought to be the best 
candidate.115
A lot of criticisms have been raised against the correctness of the 
principle/policy distinction, and the separation of tasks between the 
judiciary and the political branches based on it. Some have claimed, for 
instance, that the distinction is wrong as a description and a prescription, 
i.e. that judges do not follow it neither ought to follow it.116 It would go 
beyond the scope of this study, however, to go into any detail into this 
debate. My contention is with those who, accepting the distinction (as I
112 Cf The Forum of Principle, in A Matter o f Principle, 1986, p69.
113 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), at 184-205.
114 TRS, at 85.
115 It is important to note that this traditional division of tasks between the political branches 
and the judiciary is not a necessary feature of a democratic system, but rather a matter of 
institutional design. As it happens, most western democracies have developed into a 
constitutional model where courts are entrusted with the protection of rights. See Vojciech 
Sadursky, “Judicial Review and the Protection of Constitutional Rights”, Oxford Journal o f  
Legal Studies, vol. 22. n. 2, 2002, 275-299.
116 See, for instance, the Appendix of Taking Rights Seriously, A Reply to Critics where 
Ronald Dworkin discusses some criticisms raised against his distinction.
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do)117, claim that social rights are matters of policy and, thus, should be 
decided by democratically accountable powers and not by courts. 
Indeed, the substantive objection from legitimacy I am discussing in this 
section holds precisely that, i.e. that social rights should not be 
justiciable because they involve matters o f policy, not principle. Now 
that I have clarified the distinction, thus, I must discuss if this contention 
is correct. That is, are social rights really a matter of policy?
The usual justification for the claim that social rights, despite their 
name, are in reality a matter of policy is their strong dependence on 
resources. Education, health care, housing etc are costly goods. Their 
protection, as a consequence, is dependent on the resources available to a 
given state, and those resources are, in turn, dependent on the level of 
taxation imposed on the correspondent community. Those tasks (taxation
and resource allocation) are traditionally regarded as a prerogative of the
118political branches.
Yet again, historical factors seem to play an influential role in the 
explanation of the prevalent opinion. In fact, as well pointed out by
117 I believe that, if we are to have a criterion to set the boundaries of judicial and political 
powers the principle/policy distinction is the best available. Matters concerning the general 
welfare of the population should be entrusted with the political, democratically accountable 
powers, whereas the judiciary should restrict itself to protect rights. People will surely disagree 
on whether to define matters as principle or policy, as it is the case with social and economic 
rights as I discuss in the text. The distinction, however, is not dependent on such agreement. 
Another common point of contention is so-called group rights. My view is that, if by group 
rights one means rights which, though usually attributed to groups, can be exercised by each 
individual of that group, then they are matter of principle, and not a collective goal (e.g. the 
right of women to maternity leave, or the right of homosexuals to get married etc). If, 
however, one means interests which are not exercised individually, such as the sometimes 
called “right” to a balanced environment, then they are better seen as collective goals, i.e. 
matters of policy.
118 See Frug, “The Judicial Power of the Purse”, University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review, 
1978, arguing that
“The judicial impact on the purse is acceptable only if the legislature retains its discretion to 
raise and allocate money, a discretion limited by the need to meet the judicial order but not 
eliminated by it.” 788-9
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Walzer in the passage I quoted above, the control of taxation (and 
distribution of resources derived from taxation) by the people through 
their elected representatives was one of the cornerstones of the 
democratic revolution. The power of exacting taxes and deciding how to 
invest its products, once the privilege of a non-elected and self-serving 
ruler or elite was transferred to the whole population. Those tasks have 
been considered ever since to be the preserve of the political branches.
It is not surprising, therefore, that any attempt to entrust the 
judiciary (a non-elected, and in many cases elitist power with this task) is 
seen with suspicion, as a potential usurpation of power from the political 
branches. Yet there seems to be no grounds, at least from the perspective 
of pure legitimacy, for regarding any interference of the courts with 
issues of taxation or resource allocation as inherently inadequate. Once it 
is realised that rights, all rights as we saw in chapter 1, are dependent on 
resources, then it must be accepted that their effective protection by the 
judiciary will necessarily involve some interference with matters of 
taxation and resource allocation, and that such interference won’t be 
inherently illegitimate. Otherwise the political branches would be free to 
disrespect those rights by not taxing enough, or by distributing resources 
in an inadequate manner.119 One can always argue, of course, that the 
political branches are accountable to the people they represent through 
the mechanism of periodical elections. If they don’t tax enough, one 
might say, the people can always punish their representatives with not re­
electing them. This contention has been classically put forward by 
Thomas Jefferson several times, such as in a letter of 1820 to William C. 
Jarvis:
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“When the legislative or executive functionaries act 
unconstitutionally, they are responsible to the people in their 
elective capacity. The exemption of the judges from that is 
quite dangerous enough... The people themselves,... [with]
their discretion [informed] by education, [are] the true
corrective of abuses of constitutional power. " 120
This kind of accountability, however, might well be insufficient to
guarantee the respect of rights. We don’t need to go into any discussion
121about the shortcomings of the democratic process to see that. Even m
an ideal, perfectly functioning democracy, the majority may well be in
favour of curtailing rights, especially those of social and economic 
nature. If it is satisfied with the current pattern of resource distribution, 
for instance, it is very likely that any decision to increase taxation and
redistribution will be politically unviable. The role of the judiciary is to
122guarantee those rights in spite of the will of the majority of voters.
1191 reemphasise here that there might be a reason of institutional capacity, which I discuss in 
the next chapter, to bar courts from adjudicating on those matters. Here I discuss simply 
legitimacy in its pure form.
120 See The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Memorial Edition (Lipscomb and Bergh, editors), 
20 Vols., Washington, D.C., 1903-04 (15:278), available at the University of Virginia 
Thomas Jefferson Digital Archives, at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/.
121 For an interesting argument on this point, claiming that judicial review might actually 
enhance democratic accountability, see Kim Lane Scheppele A Realpolitik Defence of Social 
Rights, Texas Law Review June, 2004, at 1921 (“However, the larger problem with democratic 
fundamentalism, as with market fundamentalism, is that institutions in practice rarely, if ever, 
live up to the promises of theory. What are democratic failures? Some of the flaws of real 
world democratic institutions are well known. Politicians, parties, and agencies can be 
captured by particularly well-mobilized and resourceful constituents. Money can buy much of 
what is offered in politics—particularly access, but probably also influence. Collective action 
problems mean that many individuals who may share common interests with others never 
mobilize to express themselves to politicians with adequate forcefulness.”)
122 This follows from the theory of rights as trumps against majoritarian will which I adopt in 
this thesis. See pages 47 ff and 84.
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Walzer is quite right in observing that the judicial enforcement of 
welfare rights radically reduces the reach of “democratic” decision 
making.123 But this is a necessary corollary of the recognition of rights. 
The function of rights is precisely this, that is, to exclude from the scope 
of political deliberation some outcomes that are morally unacceptable. 
So, once it is recognized that health, education, food etc are to be 
protected as rights, political decisions regarding those issues (including 
resource issues) are necessarily limited.
I must deal now, in the remainder of this chapter, with a possible 
objection to the argument I have just presented. It might be said that, 
though in principle there seems to be no illegitimacy in the judicial 
enforcement of social rights, in practice such an enforcement would 
reduce so much the discretion of the political branches that most 
important issues would be decided by the courts. That is, not many 
important issues would be left for the political branches to decide, and 
that would go against the democratic ideal.124
It must be noted, first, that it is rather difficult to establish at 
which point one should consider that too many important issues have 
been taken out of the discretion of the political branches. I agree, though, 
that making social rights judicially enforceable does involve a risk of 
over-interference by the judiciary on important issues, however one 
quantifies how much interference is adequate. But this risk, I submit, 
derives less from justiciability itself than from a wrong conception of 
social rights. As I discussed in chapter 2 and will further discuss in 
chapter 6, social rights are traditionally conceived as rights to an
1231 take democratic here to mean simply political, since it is quite arguable that democracy is 
enhanced, not diminished, by judicial review. See, on this debate, Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s 
Law, The Moral Reading o f the American Constitution, Harvard University Press, 1996, 
Introduction.
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adequate standard of living measured in terms of basic needs. Now, if 
they try to enforce social rights under this conception, courts will 
probably get involved with all important issues, leaving nothing to the 
political branches to decide in a discretionary manner.
Let me try and explain this. As I tried to show in chapter 2, under 
the basic needs conception everyone has a right to have their basic needs 
satisfied so long as there are enough resources in society to afford that. It 
doesn’t matter, as we saw, why some people are not able to enjoy basic 
needs whilst others are. It is an outcome conception. As a consequence, 
until everyone has been provided with sufficient resources to satisfy 
basic needs, no other goal of the community can be pursued. So, to give 
an example, if a community wishes to use some resources raised by taxes 
to improve the quality of its parks, and passes a statute to that effect, the 
judiciary would always be able to invalidate that statute and determine 
that those resources be used to provide basic needs to those unable to do 
so. No decision taken by the political branches, therefore, is immune 
from judicial interference as long as it involves the use of resources that 
are lacking for some people to satisfy basic needs. This, especially in less 
affluent societies, would indeed establish a government of the judiciary.
Under the distributive conception, however, this risk is much 
diminished (though not eliminated), since social rights are determined 
according to the resources available, as a matter of distributive justice. 
There will always be a significant scope of manoeuvre for the political 
branches to decide how to allocate resources which are not “earmarked” 
to the provision of basic needs.
1241 am grateful to Yorgus Letsas for many enlightening discussions about this point.
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Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that the so-called legitimacy 
objection to the judicial enforcement of social rights does not stand. As 
to what I called the “formal objection” that rejects justiciability merely 
for the positive character that it takes (i.e. telling the political branches 
what to do), I claimed that it is grounded on an outdated and incoherent 
conception of the principle of separation of powers. Positive judicial 
review is no more intrusive than negative judicial review. As to the 
“substantive objection”, that rejects justiciability due to the issues 
involved in social rights (allegedly matters of policy), I contended that it 
also follows from traditional views that are not in touch with the modem 
functions of the activist state. If the state has a duty to promote and 
protect social rights, then the judiciary has, in theory, a power to interfere 
whenever that duty is disrespected. This is, in short, a matter of principle, 
despite the questions of resources and taxation involved.
I say in theory because practical factors can also bar the judiciary 
from interfering with decisions taken by the political branches, even 
when, in principle, no illegitimacy would be involved. It might be 
inadequate for the judiciary to try and enforce social rights due to a lack 
of institutional capacity to do so. This is, as I mentioned in the 
introduction, one of the most common objections to social rights 
justiciability. In the next chapter, I discuss it in detail.
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C h a p t e r  4  
I n s t i t u t io n a l  C o m p e t e n c e
In the previous chapter I argued that no objection from legitimacy alone 
can be raised against the justiciability of social rights. If there are social 
rights to health care, education, housing etc, it must be legitimate, in 
principle, for the judiciary to protect those rights against violations by 
the political powers. I say legitimate in principle, however, because 
there might be practical obstacles that make it inappropriate for courts to 
enforce them. It is often argued, for instance, that courts lack the 
institutional competence needed to deal with issues involving social 
rights appropriately. That is, the judiciary is not well equipped to 
adjudicate the types of disputes that arise in relation to those rights.
It is important to see the different character of this objection. It 
does not claim that in a democratic society respectful of the principle of 
separation of powers social rights are a matter of policy to be decided by 
the political branches with total discretion. It rather claims that if courts 
tried to enforce those rights, they would do more harm than good to the 
protection and promotion of social and economic rights. This is because 
they lack the institutional capacity to deal with those issues, or are worse 
equipped than the other branches to do so.
This is arguably the most powerful objection raised against social 
rights justiciability. If correct, it applies also to systems that have 
expressly recognised social rights in their constitutions, which is the 
main focus of our study. Indeed, most of the proponents of this position 
do not deny the existence of those rights, or defend the legitimacy
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objection we discussed in the previous chapter. They rather maintain that 
those rights, even if existent and expressly or implicitly recognised in 
the constitution, are “good candidate[s] for membership in the class of
125 •judicially underenforced constitutional principles". In this chapter, 
then, I shall analyse in some detail the arguments given to support the 
so-called institutional competence objection to the justiciability of social 
rights.
An illustrative case
We might start by imagining a case in which the claimant maintains that 
one of his constitutionally protected social rights has been violated in 
order to see what sort of difficulties would arise for the court in such a 
case. Imagine, for instance, a plaintiff in a country that has expressly 
recognised a right to health care in its constitution. He suffers from a 
medical condition whose treatment, though available in the private 
health care system, is too expensive for him to afford. He seeks then 
treatment in a local state hospital but is denied on the grounds that there
125 Cf Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993), at 155. For the concept of under­
enforcement, see also Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the 
Thinness o f Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410, 432 (1993), claiming that: "Basic 
welfare payments ... ought to be understood as constitutional entitlements, the primary 
provision of which is the constitutional responsibility of nonjudicial governmental bodies.").. 
For a good review of the relevant literature, see Hershkoff, op. cit., quoting the following 
authors: Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1336 (2d ed. 1988) (referring to "the 
familiar difficulties with judicial enforcement of affirmative duties"); Amar, A Neo- Federalist 
View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 
238 & n.l 15 (1985) (stating that "[tjhere may be a variety of institutional limitations on courts 
that make them unsuitable for the task" of enforcing minimal entitlements); Thomas C. Grey, 
Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 
877, 900-01 (1976) (suggesting that "it may be that institutional considerations governing the 
relations between the judiciary and the legislative branch will forever preclude" judicial 
enforcement of subsistence rights); Michelman, Welfare Rights, at 684-85 (stating that the 
duty to satisfy unmet human needs "seems to be one that courts acting alone cannot or ought 
not undertake to define, impose, and enforce"). For the opposite view, see Mark Tushnet, Civil 
Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction Amendments, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 
1207, 1211-16(1992).
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are not enough resources available to fund it. He goes to the judiciary, 
thus, and claims that such denial amounts to a violation of his
1OA • • •constitutional right to health care. Would courts be institutionally 
competent, that is well equipped, to assess if there was such a violation?
The key to decide such a case, and any right’s case for that 
matter, is obviously the determination of what precisely the plaintiff has 
a right to. Once this is done, then the issue is simply to assess if this 
right has been violated or not. But here lies, of course, the most 
intractable problem involving social rights: what precisely are people 
entitled to in terms of food, education, housing etc as constitutionally 
recognised rights? In our imagined case, what exactly is the plaintiff 
entitled to in terms of health care?
This will depend, of course, on the specific legal provisions 
establishing social rights in the system in which the case is to be heard. 
Let us assume, then, that in our imagined case health care is expressly 
recognised in the constitution, or in an ordinary piece of legislation, in 
the following terms: “everyone has a right to access to health care ...”. 
Now, this is a rather abstract provision, as is usually the case in most
127systems that recognise social rights, as we have seen in Chapter 2. It 
is the capacity to translate such abstract provisions into clear and 
specific rights that is primarily at issue when the institutional 
competence of courts to adjudicate social rights is questioned.
126 My imagined case is of course inspired in the famous real case Soobramoney, judged by 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which I discuss in detail in Chapters 6 and the 
Appendix.
127 This is usually the case in most systems that expressly recognise social rights. Our 
imagined case, therefore, could be set in many different places, including South Africa and 
Brazil.
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Vagueness and Policentricity
This is often called the “vagueness” obstacle to the justiciability of 
social rights.128 According to this objection, social rights cannot be 
made justiciable because they are too vague, i.e. what they entail in
1 9 0terms of duties is extremely imprecise. Courts have no clear standard 
to resort to in their adjudication. Here, again, the debate seems to have 
been focused on immaterial issues at the cost of tackling the really 
important ones. Indeed, some have simply argued that courts are used to 
working with vague concepts and therefore would not have problems to 
deal with the vagueness of social and economic rights. As put by one 
commentator:
"The so-called ’absence-of-standards' rationale borders on the 
disingenuous, because the Supreme Court has never been at a loss to 
decipher roughly workable standards for the vaguest of constitutional
130provisions when it so desires.”
128 See, for instance, Cecile Fabre, Social Rights under the Constitution, Oxford, 2000, p 154; 
Asbjom Eide, “Realization of Social and Economic Rights and the Minimum Core Approach”, 
Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 10, n. 1-2, 1989, pp 35-51, referring to "the fact that ... the 
precise content of a number of economic, social and cultural rights ... remains extremely 
vague" at 35, Andreassen, Bard-Anders, Skalnes, Tor, Smith, Alan G., and Stokke Hugo. 
“Assessing Human Rights Performance in Developing Countries: The Case for a Minimal 
Threshold Approach to the Economic and Social Rights”, in Human Rights in Developing 
Countries 1987/88, A Yearbook on Human Rights in Countries Receiving Nordic Aid, 
Andreassen, Bars-Andres and Eide, Asbjom (eds.), Akademisk Forlag, 1988, at 335 and 
Etienne Mureinik, “Beyond a charter of luxuries: economic rights in the constitution”, in South 
African Human Rights Journal, vol. 8, 1992, p467, and, in relation to the right to health care, 
Brigit Toebes, “Towards an Improved Understanding of the International Human Right to 
Health”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 21, 1999, pp 661-679, at 661. see also Scott and 
Macklem, op. cit., at 45.
129 This difficulty is usually referred to s often called the “vagueness” or “indeterminacy” of 
constitutional provisions that recognise them. It seems to me, however, that this terminology is 
rather misleading. Firstly, because vagueness (or indeterminacy) does not pose in itself an 
insurmountable obstacle for the judiciary, which is of course used to deal with indeterminate 
concepts as a matter of routine, (e.g. negligence, reasonableness etc). Moreover, because there 
is nothing vague in some provisions establishing social rights, as we will see below.
130 Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question", 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1031, 
(1984-1985), at 1060.
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Others have followed the strategy I criticised in Chapter 1 of 
comparing social rights to civil and political rights. The strategy, as we 
saw, is to dismiss the alleged differences between those rights so as to 
claim that, given civil rights are regarded as fully justiciable, so should 
social and economic rights be. Many have claimed, thus, that civil and 
political rights can be, in some aspects, just as vague as social and 
economic rights. The discussion here has a link with the 
positive/negative rights debate. Indeed, it is widely thought that 
vagueness is closely connected with the positive character of the duties 
entailed by some rights. That is, positive duties are thought to be usually 
much more imprecise than negative ones. Now, if the theory presented 
in Chapter 1 is correct, that is, if all rights generate positive and negative 
duties (i.e. duties of respect, of protection and of promotion), then 
vagueness is a feature of both social and civil rights. So, even if it is 
accepted that it is more difficult to establish the precise content of 
positive duties than negative ones, at least the negative duties entailed 
by social rights should not be subject to this criticism. Moreover, given 
civil and political rights also entail positive duties of protection and 
fulfilment, imprecision is not an exclusive attribute of social rights. In 
short, thus, civil rights can also be fairly indeterminate in their positive 
dimensions and social rights can be as determinate as civil rights in their 
negative aspects. As stated in an influential paper:
“The implications of primary obligations to respect social rights are 
relatively straightforward and precise. Imprecision increases the more 
one moves toward tertiary obligations to fulfil social rights. Yet this is 
also the case with civil rights, which can be hopelessly imprecise in the 
context of determining what a state must do to fulfil civil and political 
rights. In effect, when critics claim that, unlike civil and political 
rights, social rights suffer from lack of precision and therefore ought to
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be imagined as nonjusticiable, they are comparing apples and oranges. 
That is, they are comparing civil and political rights at the relatively 
precise first level of obligations with social rights at the relatively 
imprecise third level of obligations, with second level obligations
131playing an ambivalent role in between.”
This kind of argument, however, does not go very far in making 
the case for social rights justiciability. Indeed, even if it is accepted that 
the vagueness objection compares apples with oranges, this does not 
respond to the claim that positive duties generated by social rights are 
too vague and thus inadequate for courts to implement. It simply shows 
that, on one hand, civil and political rights also generate positive duties 
that are vague, and, on the other, that social rights also generate negative 
duties that are clear.
Now, one might claim that this would be already a progress 
towards justiciability, since at least one type of duty generated by those 
rights, that is, those negative duties of respect, could be just as 
justiciable as the negative duties generated by civil and political 
rights.132 But this seems to me a mistake for two main reasons. Firstly, 
because judicial enforcement of negative duties generated by social 
rights would not be such a great progress. It seems clear that the positive 
duties generated by social rights are often more significant and in need 
of enforcement, at least in developing countries. Indeed, in those 
countries, where many people fall bellow the standard of health care, 
education, housing etc that they should have as a matter of right, the 
state is failing to comply with its positive duties to promote social rights. 
Effective judicial enforcement, thus, would require primarily the 
adjudication of those duties, not negative ones.
131 Scott and Macklem, "Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights 
in a New South African Constitution" (1992), 141 University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 1- 
148, at 76.
132 See Craven, op. cit.
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Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, because, contrary to 
what was claimed in the passage just quoted, the implications of 
negative duties to respect social rights are not “relatively straightforward 
and precise.” Even when the claim is one of violation of a negative duty 
to respect, for example, a case where the state withdraws a social benefit 
previously provided (more likely in developed countries), adjudication 
will necessarily depend on the definition of what was owed by the state 
in the first place. In such cases, therefore, the negative duty of respect 
suffers from the same problem of lack of precision as the positive duties 
to protect and fulfil. There is no reason to conclude, then, that it is 
harder for the courts to establish the unconstitutionality of an omission 
than the unconstitutionality of an act at the conceptual level.
This seems to show that the debate has not only focused on a 
narrow and not very helpful comparison between civil and social rights, 
but also that it has been based on prevalent yet mistaken premises. There 
is nothing intrinsic in negative and positive duties that make the former 
more and the latter less precise. The positive duty to pay income tax at a 
rate of 25% of someone’s salary is as precise as any duty can be, 
whereas the negative duty not to interfere with freedom of speech, for 
instance, can be extremely “vague”. Is burning one’s country flag an 
instance of speech protected by such freedom?
What makes a duty vague, or imprecise, is not its formal structure 
(positive or negative), but rather the nature of its content. What makes 
social rights’ duties (positive and negative) difficult to determine, as we 
have discussed in Chapter 2 and shall discuss further below, is the fact 
that they involve the intractable problem of distributive justice (i.e. 
resource allocation), not that they are often of a positive character. An 
adequate discussion of the judiciary’s institutional competence to 
adjudicate social rights, therefore, has to analyse how well prepared
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courts are to deal with this difficult issue. This is what the debate on 
social rights justiciability has largely neglected, and we must now turn 
our attention to.
Social rights, resource allocation and distributive justice
The chief problem in defining the precise content of social rights, as we 
saw in chapter has to do with the fact that they are dependent on scarce 
resources.133 What exactly an individual is entitled to in terms of health 
care, education, housing etc, as a consequence, is the outcome of a 
complex judgement of distributive justice, that is, a judgement on what 
distribution of the scarce resources of a certain community among its 
citizens is just. It is the extreme complexity of this enterprise that 
underlies (though often unwittingly) the assertion that social rights are 
too vague to be justiciable.134 Are courts institutionally capable to make 
those distributive decisions on which the precise content of social rights 
turns?
The problem here, it is important to notice, is not just that there is 
no clear and infallible method to determine what distribution of
135resources is just. This is surely a complicating factor. Reasonable 
people will hold different theories of distributive justice and will 
therefore disagree about what a just distribution of resources is. But this 
is the unavoidable case with any interpretive concept, such as liberty, 
equality, democracy, usually involved in fundamental rights issues. The 
problem here is also that the practical application of whatever theory of
133 This is not, as we saw, a difficulty that affects exclusively social rights, but rather rights in 
general.
134 See Chapter 2, where I discuss different conceptions of social rights and criticise the 
popular basic needs conception that seems to imply (or at least makes it ambiguous) that 
resource availability is an empirical, and not normative, constraint on social rights.
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distributive justice is adopted requires an extensive and extremely broad 
analysis of numerous different factors 136of the whole relevant 
community.137 This is because, given resources are scarce, the decision 
to allocate some resources to a person or group will necessarily affect 
numerous other persons whose needs are also dependent on those 
resources. To go back to our example, if a decision is made that 
guarantees to our plaintiff the resources required for the treatment of his 
medical condition, other needs will have to go unmet due to the 
diversion of those resources to him. An adequate decision on the 
plaintiffs individual right, therefore, has to take into account not simply 
the individual need of the plaintiff, but all needs competing for the 
scarce resources of the community.
This requires not only the possession of a vast amount of 
information but also the ability to understand and process it. One must 
know, first of all, what the needs in the relevant community are. Then it 
must be decided how the available resources should be distributed 
among all those needs. This involves not only moral judgement but also 
technical knowledge. That is, the decision about who is to receive what 
has to be reached through the application of principles of distributive 
justice and informed by highly technical knowledge about effectiveness 
and efficiency (i.e. cost-benefit analysis). To illustrate this, let us take 
our example again. We know already that our plaintiff is in need of
135 See, on this, Ronald Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d better believe it”, Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 25, no. 2 (Spring 1996).
136 And merits, depending on the distributive justice conception held.
137 This makes it more difficult to determine what social rights are than basic liberties. See 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, claiming: 
“[wjhether the constitutional essentials covering the basic freedoms are satisfied is more or 
less visible on the face of constitutional arrangements and how these can be seen to work in 
practice. But whether the aims of the principles covering social and economic inequalities are 
realized is far more difficult to ascertain. These matters are nearly always open to wide 
differences of reasonable opinion; they rest on complicated inferences and intuitive 
judgements that require us to assess complex social and economic information about topics 
poorly understood.”, at 229
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some kind of medical resources to tackle his medical condition. 
Suppose, now, that his medical condition is renal failure and that there 
are at least two alternative types of medical resources that might be used 
for his treatment, e.g. renal dialysis or transplantation. If both were 
equally effective, justice would seem to demand the use of the least 
costly, because then more resources would be available for other needs. 
If both were not equally effective, but did cost the same, then justice 
would require that the most effective be used. But if they are neither 
equally effective nor cost the same, then it would be necessary to know 
exactly the difference between them in both respects (effectiveness and 
cost) to decide if possible advantages in effectiveness are enough to 
justify the additional expenditure required. So, a just allocative decision 
necessarily requires information on effectiveness, cost, and the relation 
between the two (cost-benefit).
The picture emerging from the discussion so far is already 
daunting. To decide if a plaintiff has a right to receive a certain kind of 
treatment one must possess information about all competing needs of the 
relevant community, all possible means of tackling them, their cost- 
effectiveness and, only then, apply an adequate theory of distributive 
justice to allocate among them the resources available. Yet, 
unfortunately, the difficulties do not stop here. Another significant 
complexity is that for each different allocative decision available there 
will be a different set of consequences affecting multiple different 
persons and groups. If a decision is made to give out resources for the 
treatment of the condition of our imagined plaintiff, a set of 
consequences will result. To imagine just a few, he will leave a longer 
and healthier life, during which he will possibly contribute somehow to 
the economic prosperity of his community, but will also require other 
kinds of resources to face other needs that his longer life will entail.
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Moreover, those resources spent on him could well have been allocated 
in a different manner, say to provide housing to homeless people, or an 
educational programme to teach people how to prevent certain kinds of 
diseases, or whatever might be thought of among the infinite 
possibilities available. The consequences in each allocation would be 
totally different. When a choice is made to follow one allocation rather 
than another, all this possible consequences have to be taken into 
account and balanced against each other if an adequate and just decision 
is to be reached.
This type of decision-making context is what Lon Fuller 
famously called “polycentric”.138 He explained what a decision of a 
polycentric issue involved with a set of examples, ranging from the 
division of an art collection between two heirs to the assignment of 
players in a football team to their positions. In all those cases, he 
claimed, each shift of any one player [or painting] might have a different 
set of repercussions on the remaining players [or paintings]”, since “we 
are dealing with a situation of interacting points of influence and
138 See “The Forms and Limits to Adjudication”, 92 Harvard Law Review 353 (1978). He 
maintains that a multiplicity of affected persons is not an invariable characteristic of 
polycentric problems and that it is important to realize that policentricity is often a matter of 
degree. That is, there are polycentric elements in almost all problems submitted to 
adjudication. “A decision may act as a precedent, often an awkward one, in some situation not 
foreseen by the arbiter. Again, suppose a court in a suit between one litigant and a railway 
holds that it is an act of negligence for the railway not to construct an underpass at a particular 
crossing. There may be nothing to distinguish this crossing from other crossings on the line. 
As a matter of statistical probability it may be clear that constructing underpasses along the 
whole line would cost more lives (through accidents in blasting, for example) than would be 
lost if the only safety measure were the familiar "Stop, Look & Listen" sign. If so, then what 
seems to be a decision simply declaring the rights and duties of two parties is in fact an inept 
solution for a polycentric problem, some elements of which cannot be brought before the court 
in a simple suit by one injured party against a defendant railway. In lesser measure, concealed 
polycentric elements are probably present in almost all problems resolved by adjudication. It is 
not, then, a question of distinguishing black from white. It is a question of knowing when the 
polycentric elements have become so significant and predominant that the proper limits of 
adjudication have been reached.”, at 397
104
therefore with a polycentric problem ...”.139 He further clarifies the 
point with the evocative allegory of a spider web:
“We may visualize this kind of situation by thinking of a spider web. A 
pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern 
throughout the web as a whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all 
likelihood, not simply double each of the resulting tensions but will 
rather create a different complicated pattern of tensions. This would 
certainly occur, for example, if the doubled pull caused one or more of 
the weaker strand to snap. This is a "polycentric” situation because it is 
"many centered" — each crossing of strands is a distinct center for 
distributing tensions.”140
Resource allocation was another example given by Fuller of a 
typical polycentric issue. As I have just tried to show, he was right, and 
this makes the task of determining the content of social rights even more 
difficult.
Yet this is still not the end of the story. There are yet other 
complicating factors that must be reckoned with. Even when all the 
difficulties discussed are somehow overcome and a seemingly just 
allocative decision is reached, there is no guarantee that it will remain so 
for a long time. That is, allocative decisions that seemed right, or 
reasonable, when they were made might soon become inadequate due to 
change in circumstances, such as the availability of better technology or 
more accurate information. Those can be related to the needs intended to 
be satisfied or to the means adopted to cater for them. Let us remain in 
the field of health care to illustrate this. Suppose that the health care 
needs of a population, and the corresponding means to cater for them, 
have been duly researched and determined, and that a seemingly just 
decision has been made as to the distribution of resources among those 
needs. A few months later, however, it becomes apparent that the
139 M a t  395.
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decision is not as adequate as it seemed to be. This can be due to various 
different reasons. It might be found out, for instance, the number of 
people suffering from a certain disease has diminished or grown more or 
less than initially predicted, or an epidemic of a new disease not covered 
in the initial plan might have broken out. It might be discovered, to give 
another example, that a certain treatment method is not as efficacious as 
thought, or more efficacious than thought etc.141 This highlights the 
tentative nature of measures aimed at the promotion of social rights and 
the need for continuous and periodic revisions.142
This completes the rough picture I intended to draw of the 
complexities involved in the determination of the contents of social 
rights due to their resource dependence and resulting distributive nature. 
To recapitulate, it involves tackling an intractable moral and polycentric 
issue (i.e. resource allocation) for which a vast amount of information 
and expertise is required. It involves, additionally, a continuous revision 
of the decisions taken due to the probabilistic and changing nature of the 
circumstances on which those decisions are based. We must turn back 
now, thus, to our main question in this chapter: are courts institutionally 
well equipped to deal with those problems?
For many commentators, the answer to this question has to be in 
the negative. The very nature of the judicial function and the 
adjudicative process, it is claimed, is unsuitable to deal with the type of 
problem we have just described.143 Let us see their position in more 
detail.
140 ibid.
141 People’s behaviour change, the environment changes, new technologies arise, unforeseen 
events happen etc.
142 It should be emphasised again that this is a characteristic of all positive rights.
143 See, for instance, Fuller, op cit, arguing: “Generally speaking, it may be said that problems 
in the allocation of economic resources present too strong a polycentric aspect to be suitable 
for adjudication.”, at 400.
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Institutional Limits of Adjudication
One common line of reasoning is that the judicial process is not suitable 
to pay adequate consideration to the wide breadth of interests that have 
to be balanced in the determination of the content of social rights. This is 
allegedly due to what is usually referred to as the narrow focus of 
adjudication.144 Litigation is highly focused on the parties that come to 
court, who have a significant power to shape the terms of the dispute and 
to seize the exclusive attention of the judge. Indeed, most of the 
information based on which the judge is to make her decision is brought 
to court by the parties themselves.145 As a result, litigation tends to focus 
on the individual case and neglect the general picture, unduly 
disregarding interests that will be necessarily affected by the judicial 
decision.146 This results in the problem of unrepresentativeness, which 
raises questions not only of institutional competence but also of fairness. 
It deprives courts from the information required to make an adequate 
decision and excludes parties that will be affected by that decision from 
participating effectively in the process.147
144 See Horowitz, op cit, at 33, and also Sunstein, op. ch. (1993).
145 The judge herself is not supposed, as a matter of rule, to seek information. This passive 
feature, which is allegedly necessary to preserve the impartiality of the judge, has the 
consequence of narrowing significantly the breadth of facts taken into account in the judicial 
decision.
146 This bias is compounded by a strong psychological element not to be overlooked. The mere 
exposure of the judge to the detailed facts of the individual case can easily magnify the party’s 
plight before her eyes in detriment of the equally deserving needs of those who, although not a 
party to the suit, are directly affected by the decision. I thank Riz Mokal for having drawn my 
attention to this point, which he calls the problem of “presence”.
147 A case such as the one we imagined, thus, is likely to be seen as a dispute between the 
individual plaintiff and the state rather than a matter of resource distribution among competing 
needs of the population as a whole. This can be clearly observed, as we will see below in the 
Appendix, in the right to health care decisions in the Brazilian courts. The problem of 
unrepresentativeness in the judicial process is usually resolved by the procedural rule that 
limits the effects of the judicial decision to the parties represented in court. Polycentric 
decisions, however, necessarily affect third parties. This realisation has actually spumed 
procedural developments towards the extension of the breadth of interests represented in
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Another institutional limit commonly raised is the alleged 
inability of courts to deal with the kind of technical information required 
to tackle social rights cases. As we saw above, an adequate determination 
of the content of social rights involves extensive information about all 
competing needs in society and alternative means of satisfying them. 
Assuming all this information can reach the court, the question is 
whether judges are well prepared to use it, that is, to determine which is 
or are the adequate means to be employed, within the available 
resources, in the promotion of social rights. It is usually argued that 
judges lack the necessary expertise to carry out this task.
Finally, there are institutional problems in the remedial phase of 
adjudication. As we saw, the informational basis of decisions about the 
content of social rights is always changing, requiring, as a consequence, 
continuous monitoring and review. But the adjudicative process does not 
possess, it is argued, the necessary agility to deal with this. It lacks, in 
particular, adequate self-starting mechanisms for follow-up and review 
of its own decisions. If a remedy is not effective or becomes inadequate, 
the court has to rely on the parties to the case to come back to court and 
seek review. But if they fail to take this initiative, as it might well happen 
for lack of resources or loss of interest, the ineffectiveness or inadequacy 
of the judicial provision will go unchanged.148 Moreover, even if the 
parties come back to the court to seek adjustment of the judicial decision, 
the sluggish pace of the judicial machinery makes any review extremely 
slow.
All these institutional limitations of the adjudicative process 
(narrowness of focus, lack of expertise of judges and remedial
courts, through devices such as collective legal suits (e.g. class actions) and amici. See, Abram 
Chayes, "The role of the judge in public law litigation", 89 Harvard Law Review 1281.
1311. Some claim, however, that those devices simply mitigate the unrepresentativeness 
problem, see Horowitz, id.
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inflexibility) are supposed to make it inadequate for the task of 
determining what the abstract provisions recognising social rights 
actually entail. But how strong are those arguments on deeper reflection? 
It might be helpful to use our example again to tackle this question. So, 
how difficult would it be for the court to determine what the plaintiffs 
constitutional right to health care entailed in the face of the institutional 
limitations we have just discussed? Here I will also bring examples of 
real cases to illustrate the issue.
As regards the narrowness of focus of adjudication, it seems at 
first sight true that our imagined case would indeed place the court in a 
disadvantaged position to make an adequate decision. In fact, the court 
would find itself before an individual plaintiff who claims that his right 
to health care has been violated by a refusal of the local hospital to 
provide him with treatment. All the information available to the court, 
therefore, would be brought into the lawsuit by those two parties, and 
would tend to be narrowly focused on their own situation. The plaintiff 
would probably highlight his awful predicament, i.e. his desperate need 
to the treatment denied by the defendant. The defendant, in turn, would 
probably stress that there are not enough resources available to attend the 
plaintiffs request. But how is the judge to reach an adequate decision 
based on such narrow information? As we have seen, the question here is 
not simply empirical. It does not suffice to determine if, on one hand, the 
plaintiff really suffers from the medical condition stated and if, on the 
other hand, the state really hasn’t got enough resources to fund the 
treatment of that particular plaintiff.149 That would be the ideal, ordinary
148 Horowitz, op. cit. at 53.
149 Those who maintain a reversal of the burden of proof in the matter of resource availability 
seem to think that the question is this simple, see Bilchitz, “Towards a Reasonable Approach 
to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-economic Rights 
Jurisprudence”, South African Journal o f Human Rights (forthcoming) at 11, at 22 and Eric
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case to be dealt with by a court. But this is not, as we saw, what is 
required in our case. What the court has to decide is whether, within the 
available resources in the relevant community, the plaintiff s right to a 
share of those resources would enable him to fund the treatment of his 
condition. This involves a broad analysis of all potential needs that 
compete for the same resources claimed by the plaintiff. That is, an 
intractable normative and polycentric question requiring a wealth of 
information and technical knowledge to be adequately answered.
It seems clear, thus, that with the restricted scope of information 
likely to be brought into court by the parties, it is virtually impossible for 
the judge to make an adequate, conscientious determination of the 
plaintiffs right. This problem can be observed in some cases involving 
the right to health care in South Africa and Brazil which I will discuss in 
more detail in the Appendix. In Soobramoney, for instance, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa found itself unable to determine if 
the plaintiffs right to health care had been violated or not due to lack of 
information.150 The court was therefore forced to take a restrained 
attitude, limiting its task to an assessment of whether the hospital’s 
refusal to treat the plaintiff was irrational or in some way discriminatory, 
which it found it was not.151
In Brazil, the problem of narrowness of focus has also been 
producing unsatisfactory results, yet in an opposite direction. There, 
courts have been taking a more active role, actually deciding, beyond 
rationality and non-discrimination, if the state has complied with its duty 
to promote the right to health care constitutionally recognised. Due to the
Berger, “The Right to Education under the South African Constitution”, 103 Columbia Law 
Review 614 (2003).
150 But see my discussion of Soobramoney in chapter 6.
151 It would remain debatable, of course, if the court would have the expertise to use that 
information even if it were available, or would be able to fashion a suitable remedy. But here 
the court has to stop in the very first hurdle (narrowness of focus).
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problems of narrowness of focus we have discussed above, however, 
those decisions can be hardly considered adequate. Indeed, given th e  
traditional bipolar structure followed in those cases - i.e. an individual 
plaintiff against the state, the polycentric character of the problem h as  
been completely missed by the courts and parties alike. On one side, 
there is the plaintiff claiming that his constitutional right to health care  
has been violated by the omission of the state to provide some sort o f  
medical treatment. On the other side, there is the state arguing that there 
are not enough resources to satisfy the plaintiffs claim. The whole issue, 
then, is seen as an empirical matter of availability of resources to trea t 
that specific individual’s need rather than one of a just allocation o f  
resources among the numerous needs of the entire population. Now, a s  
the courts have a traditional suspicion about the state’s management o f  
public funds, they invariably dismiss the state’s defence and order it to  
provide the individual plaintiff with the medical treatment required 
irrespective of the costs. The perverse outcome is that other needs, w hich 
might well be more deserving of resources, are sacrificed for the benefit 
of those individuals who have the means to access the courts.
These examples seem to give some support - or at least caution u.s 
to be more attentive, to the argument that the narrow focus o f  
adjudication makes it unsuitable to deal with issues involving social 
rights. Let us appraise carefully, then, the points that can be offered to  
counter it.
It can be always contended that adjudication is not necessarily 
narrow in focus, even if it tends to be so. The information brought to th e  
lawsuit can be always expanded, either by the parties themselves or b y  
others called or allowed to participate in the case. As suggested b y  
Chayes in his influential paper,
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“[A] number of techniques are available to the judge to increase the 
breadth of interests represented in a suit, if that seems desirable. He 
can, for example, refuse to proceed until new parties are brought in, as 
in the old equity procedure, where the categories of necessary and 
proper parties converged. In class actions, the judge may order such . . 
. notice as may be required ["]for the protection of members of the class 
or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action,” including "sampling 
notice” designed to apprise the judge of significant divisions of interest 
among the putative class, not brought to light by its representatives. . . 
.The judge can also appoint guardians ad litem for unrepresented 
interests. And . . .  he can and does employ experts and amici to inform 
himself on aspects of the case not adequately developed by the parties.
152Finally, the judge can elicit the view of public officials at all levels.”
Two issues, however, need to be raised. Firstly, not all legal 
systems have similar procedural devices to enlarge participation in 
lawsuits. Where those mechanisms are not available, therefore, the 
argument from narrowness of focus seems to stand. Moreover, even 
where those devices are available, it is not uncontroversial that they will 
always produce the desired results, i.e. to enlarge the breadth of interests 
represented in the lawsuit and its range of information so as to make 
possible an adequate decision.
Let us assume, however, that the problems of information and 
representation can indeed be superseded by those procedural devices. 
The question then is whether the court is capable of making good use of 
all this information, that is, of determining if the current allocation of 
available resources against which the plaintiff is contending is just. As 
we saw above, this is an issue whose decision involves extensive 
technical knowledge about the cost-effectiveness of all possible choices 
of means to satisfy competing needs. Here again it is claimed that 
judges, who are by nature generalists, don’t have the required expertise 
to deal with that information. Even if in the possession of all information 
available about resources, needs and possible means of satisfaction, thus,
152 Op. cit.
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it would still be impossible for the judge, for lack of expertise, to 
determine if the plaintiffs individual need is to prevail over all other 
competing needs in society (i.e. if his individual need is to be granted the 
status of a right).
This seems to me the weakest argument raised about the 
institutional limits of the adjudicative process, since it could be easily 
defeated by pointing out to the possibility of training judges to acquire 
the technical expertise needed to make those decisions or, even simpler, 
the use of experts, which is obviously not alien to the adjudicative 
process.153 The real point, though, is not whether judges have the 
expertise (expertise can always be acquired or borrowed), but rather if 
anyone, however well trained, can reach an adequate answer to the 
intractable question involved in the determination of an individual’s 
social right. In other words, does this expertise really exist? What is it 
exactly? These important questions have been deeply overlooked in the 
debate, yet are clearly important. We must inquire, then, what exactly is 
this expertise that judges are supposed to lack?
Take our case again. What skills are required from a person in 
order to make an adequate determination of the right to health care of the 
plaintiff? Firstly, one must know what the need of the plaintiff is and 
what the available means to satisfy it are. One must also have 
knowledge, as we saw, of the cost-effectiveness of those means. In our 
case, this will involve medical and health economics information and 
knowledge. Yet, as we have also noted, one has also to know what other 
needs are competing for the same resources, and thus hold technical 
knowledge in the specific areas of those needs as well. Now, this will 
involve virtually all areas of knowledge that exist, since the needs 
competing for the scarce resources claimed by the plaintiff are simply all
113
needs of society. Indeed, to ascertain if the plaintiff should be entitled to 
his medical treatment one must decide if his plea is to prevail against 
educational, housing, security, environmental and all the other numerous 
needs of society. Expertise must be held, therefore, in all those areas. 
Now, it is obvious that no single person will possibly be an expert in all 
those areas of human knowledge. The question, thus, is evidently not if 
the judge, or whoever is to be entrusted with the decision, has the 
technical expertise in all those areas, but rather if, with the aid of expert 
information and advice in all those areas he or she is capable of making 
an adequate decision on who is to have what share of society’s 
resources, that is, what needs of society are to be satisfied with the 
resources available.
This, then, is the “expertise” required for the determination of the 
content of social rights. That is, the ability to distribute the available 
resources of society among its numerous needs in a just way. The sheer 
scale of the task is daunting. What amount of resources should go to 
improve the health system, prison conditions, road conditions, make the 
streets safer, protect the environment, subsidise art, and the list goes on 
and on? We must remind ourselves, moreover, about the polycentric 
character of the problem. That is, for each choice of decision there is, a 
different set of consequences (often unpredictable) will follow. So, a 
decision to improve road conditions might diminish the rate of accidents 
and thus save resources in the health system. But it might also increase 
the number of cars in the roads, raising the levels of pollution and 
associated health problems, putting more pressure on the health system. 
The “expertise” required for such a decision is therefore Herculean. Do 
judges possess it? Certainly not. But neither do any other officials or 
experts. No one, it seems to me, can claim such “expertise”. Some
153 See, for such an argument, Fabre, op. cit., at 171. But see, contra, Horowitz, op. cit.
114
people are surely better prepared than others in specific areas and that is 
why we call them experts. Public health experts will know with some 
degree of precision, for instance, how much money is required to 
minimize significantly the risks of public health hazards, but their 
technical expertise will provide limited (even if valuable) insight on, 
say, if this money would be more justly spent in giving subsidies to 
exporting industries so as to strengthen the economy or to improve the 
conditions of the transport system. Even someone in possession of 
reliable information of all the needs of society and the means and 
resources required to satisfy them, as a judge aided by experts or a 
member of parliament might well be, will be incapable of reaching such 
a comprehensive allocative decision and claim that it is correct.
It seems inadequate, thus, to keep discussing whether judges have 
the required technical expertise to make the broad allocative decisions 
involved in the determination of the content of social rights in the type 
of case we have imagined. No one has. The real problem seems to lie, 
therefore, not in the unsuitability of the adjudicative process to tackle 
polycentric tasks, but rather of any process. How is any institution 
(courts, parliament, executive, regulatory agencies etc) to determine 
what mix of specific medical treatments, educational or housing policies, 
food provision etc is required to guarantee social rights? In other words, 
it is the very intractability of the questions involved in social rights that 
make it virtually impossible for any process (adjudicative, legislative, 
and administrative) to define their precise content.
But where does that leave us? Two main options come to mind. It 
could be argued, for instance, that social rights cannot entail, after all, 
individually claimable rights (what is usually called a “subjective right” 
in civil law jurisdictions. Given this impossibility of determining their
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precise content that we have just seen, all they entail are generic duties 
on the state to implement policies aimed at improving the satisfaction of 
the social needs of the population. If there is a role for the courts, then, it 
is not one to order the state to provide individual plaintiffs with a certain 
precise level of social goods. It is rather, at the most, one of assessing if 
the policies devised and implemented by the state are roughly capable of 
achieving their aim (sometimes called a “reasonableness” assessment). 
But it could also be insisted, alternatively, that social rights do entail 
subjective rights that might be claimed by individuals in the court, so 
long as we adopt some kind of presumptive device that enables us to 
determine their content with some precision without the need of 
embarking on the extremely broad and complex task of allocating 
resources among all competing needs of society. The former option is 
the topic of the next chapter. The latter will be discussed in chapters 6 
and 7.
116
C h a p t e r  5
S o c i a l  R ig h t s  a s  G e n e r i c  G o a l s  o f  S t a t e  P o l i c y
Given the significant difficulties of defining the precise content of social 
rights we have discussed in the previous section, it is often claimed that 
the constitutional provisions recognising those rights do not give rise to 
what is normally implied when a right to something is invoked, that is, 
the imposition on others of precise duties that can be individually 
enforced by the right-holder, usually through the courts (what is called a 
“subjective right” in civil law jurisdictions). Instead, it is argued, they 
entail generic goals that the state should pursue for the improvement of 
the population’s standard of living through the protection and direct 
provision of the social goods related to social rights (i.e. education, 
health, housing etc).154 This type of constitutional norm is usually 
referred to as “directives of state policy” (in common law countries) or 
“programmatic norms” (in civil law jurisdictions).
The normative status of those norms is a matter of debate. For 
some, they give the political branches full discretion as to how and when
154 For a philosophical defence of this position see L. W. Sumner, The Moral Foundations o f 
Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1987), arguing : “The coexistence of these two categories of 
rights in international law stands as a fossil record of the expansion, and consequent dilution, 
of the notion of a right. Rights in their narrow sense formulate urgent or insistent demands 
precisely because they constrain the pursuit of social goals. They are thus completely at home 
when they are invoked to protect basic liberties, due process, or political participation, since 
we are prepared to say that a society must secure these goods for all of its citizens alike 
regardless of any further goals it might elect to pursue. However, a society which fully 
satisfies this standard might for all that still contain widespread poverty, illiteracy, 
unemployment, or disease. When we notice this fact the obvious remedy is to formulate 
additional standards to eliminate these further economic, social and cultural evils. And when 
we wish to underscore the importance of these additional standards the obvious device is to 
formulate them in the same language of rights. Thus by degrees we move from using rights to 
impose constraints on the pursuit of social goods to using them to formulate just such goals.” 
At 17.
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to pursue those goals. There should be no mechanism, they claim, to 
force the political branches to implement measures aiming at those 
goals, or to review the measures actually taken. They are, in short, 
merely “aspirational”. But this extreme position cannot be coherently 
maintained. It would render the constitutional provisions related to 
social rights devoid of any normative force, which would be 
incompatible with the role constitutional norms are meant to play in any 
legal system.155 Any defensible position, therefore, has to ascribe some 
kind of normative force to those constitutional provisions. That is, they 
cannot be simply aspirational.
A less extreme position maintains that the state is indeed under a 
duty to pursue those goals. This duty has positive and negative 
dimensions. Under the former, the state has to devise and implement 
policies aimed at the protection and achievement of those constitutional 
goals. Under the latter, the state is forbidden from taking action that 
affects them.
Those duties, moreover, can be subject to some judicial control, 
though maybe not as thoroughly as they would be if subjective rights 
were at stake. When the state completely or partially fails to pursue the 
constitutionally mandated social goals, or takes action that unjustifiably 
affects them, it incurs in unconstitutionality. There is no reason, 
therefore, why the judiciary, as a guardian of the constitution, should not 
be called upon to remedy the violation. The question is how exactly the 
courts should exercise this constitutionality control. The matter was put 
with clarity by Professor Fabio Konder Comparato in the following way:
the legal system does not create a legal claim on the individual
against the state to force it to realise those [social] rights ...
155 See J.J. Gomes Canotilho, Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituicao, Coimbra, at 
1102-3.
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It is simply a matter of checking if the state really develops or not, 
programmes of action aimed at ‘eradicating poverty and exclusion, and 
at reducing social and regional inequalities, as determined by article 3 
of the constitution....
That doesn’t mean, obviously, that people don’t have, as individuals, 
any right to those social welfare benefits. The individual distribution of 
those goods and services appear in a second moment, as reflex 
rights...”156
Amartya Sen proposed to call these meta-rights in a well-known
article:
“A metaright to something x can be defined as the right to have 
policies p(x) that genuinely pursue the objective of making the right to 
x realisable. As an example, consider the following "Directive 
Principle of State Policy” inserted in the Constitution of India when it 
was adopted in 1950:
"The state shall, in particular, direct its policy toward securing ... that 
the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate
1 cnmeans of livelihood:"
As regards form , two different options arise. When the state takes 
measures that unjustifiably affect social rights, it incurs in 
unconstitutionality by action. The remedy is thus conventional enough, 
that is, a declaration of unconstitutionality or, depending on the case, a 
negative injunction (i.e. “negative judicial review”). When the state fails 
to act, however, it commits unconstitutionality by omission, and the 
remedy has to be positive, that is, the court has to order the state to take
156 See O Ministerio Publico na Defesa dos Direitos Economicos, Sociais e Culturais (2001). 
My translation from the Portuguese text: “o ordenamento juridico nao cria pretensao e agao 
individual do particular contra os Poderes Publicos, para a realizagao desses direitos. ... 
Cuida-se, tao so, de verificar se os Poderes Publicos desenvolvem ou nao, de fato, programas 
de agao para “erradicar a pobreza e a marginalizagao e reduzir as desigualdades sociais e 
regionais”, como determina o art. 3° de nossa Constituigao. Isto nao significa dizer, 
obviamente, que as pessoas nao tenham, enquanto individuos, nenhum direito a essas 
prestagoes de bem-estar social. A distribuigao individual desses bens e servigos surge num 
segundo momento, sob a forma de direitos reflexos, ...”
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action in order to comply with its constitutional duty (i.e. “positive 
judicial review”). We have already discussed the problems and 
objections to positive judicial review in chapter 3. Here I will 
concentrate on the substantive dimension of the judicial task. That is, by 
what standard is the court to assess unconstitutionality (active or 
omissive)? In other words, how can the court determine which measures 
are required in the pursuance of the social goals mandated by the 
constitution?
There seems to be a preference among partisans of social rights as 
generic goals for what has been called an administrative law approach in 
the adjudication of those rights.158 Given the impossibility of deriving 
“subjective rights” from the constitutional norms that recognise social 
rights, courts should focus on the measures taken by the state to further 
the constitutional goal of improving the population’s standard of living. 
Now, the way in which courts have traditionally assessed the legality of 
state’s measures to further legal goals has been through the concept of 
reasonableness developed in administrative judicial review.
Let us see, then, if this administrative model provides an adequate 
answer to the question I have just posed. In this task, I will look at two
157 “The right not to be hungry”, The Right to Food, P Alston and K Tomasevski (eds), 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp 69-81.
158 See, for instance, Cass Sunstein, Designing Democracy (2000), Eric Berger, “The Right to 
Education under the South African Constitution”, 103 Columbia Law Review 614 (2003), and 
Hare, Ivan, “Case Analysis -  Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign: The South 
African AIDS Pandemic and the Constitutional Right to Healthcare”, [2002] European Human 
Rights Law Review, Issue 5, pp 625-630. “... the manner in which it gives effect to those 
rights must be sensitive to the legitimate functions of the other branches of government and to 
the interests of the general population it serves as well as to the constitutional rights of the 
parties before it. This presents a curial body with an immensely difficult balance. ... [he 
criticizes Brown and praises South Africa for choosing a different route]: one which uses the 
principles of administrative, rather than constitutional, judicial review to supervise the exercise 
of power.” P 629
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recent decisions involving social rights taken by the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa where it has adopted that model.
The Administrative Model
The South African cases I mentioned deal with the rights to housing and 
health care (Grootboom and TAC). In Grootboom, a group of homeless 
people complained that their right had been violated by the state, whose 
policy did not provide them with housing as guaranteed in the 
constitution. In TAC a. group of organisations headed by Treatment 
Action Campaign challenged the policy of the state on the AIDS 
problem for not complying with the right of all HIV infected mothers to 
receive nevirapine (an AIDS drug) in the state hospital system. This 
drug, which was offered to the state for free, was scientifically proven to 
reduce significantly the rate of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, but 
was being provided by the state only in two state hospitals, in a pilot 
scheme planned to last for 2 years. In both cases, the role of the court 
was not, the court said, to determine if an individual’s social right had 
been violated and order the state to provide that individual with 
whatever the court defines as her specific social right. Constitutional 
provisions concerning social rights do not entail, for the court, subjective 
rights (i.e. individually claimable rights). They state, as we have seen, 
generic goals to be pursued by the state in order to improve the standards 
of living enjoyed by the population. The role of the court, thus, is rather 
to assess if the state has discharged properly its constitutional duties. 
This is to be done through the standard of reasonableness. That is, the 
court is to determine if the measures taken by the state in order to 
comply with its duties are reasonable. In the words of the Court in 
Grootboom, “the real question in terms o f our Constitution is whether
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the measures taken by the state to realise the right ... are 
reasonable. ”l59
In those two cases where the reasonableness test was applied, the 
measures under scrutiny were those implemented by the state in 
compliance with its constitutional duties to provide access to housing 
{Grootboom) and health care (TAC) to the population. In both cases the 
Court found that those measures were unreasonable, and hence declared 
them unconstitutional. But how exactly did the Court reach those 
conclusions? That is, how did it determine that the state’s measures were 
unreasonable?
The concept of reasonableness pervades all fields of law, from the 
“reasonable man” standard in torts to the “beyond reasonable doubt” 
criteria in criminal law. It is the specific administrative law use of 
reasonableness, however, that interests us here. A measure is reasonable 
if it is capable of achieving the aim it is supposed to achieve (in our 
cases, the realization of the rights to housing and health care). The test of 
reasonableness focuses, therefore, on the relation between the means 
selected and employed by the state and the ends established in the 
Constitution. Now, though the test appears very neat and simple in its 
general formulation, it is obviously far from that when it comes to its 
employment. Two main orders of problems should be emphasized, one' 
related to the means, the other to the ends side of the relation.
As to the former, there are two sets of concerns. Firstly, there 
might be more than one means capable of achieving an established aim. 
Secondly, it might be extremely difficult to establish whether a 
particular mean is in fact capable of achieving that aim. The Court dealt 
with the first set of problems in the following way:
159 Grootboom, para 33.
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“A court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other 
more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or 
whether public money could have been better spent. The question 
would be whether the measures that have been adopted are reasonable. 
It is necessary to recognise that a wide range of possible measures 
could be adopted by the state to meet its obligations. Many of these 
would meet the requirement of reasonableness. Once it is shown that 
the measures do so, this requirement is met.”160
It left for the state, therefore, a scope for choice between more 
than one reasonable means. This is certainly correct and is justified on 
general principles of law and morality related to positive duties. Positive 
duties can be usually discharged by a set of different but equally 
efficient (i.e. reasonable) measures. When that is the case, it is logically 
possible to comply with the duty by choosing any of those measures. 
Robert Alexy instructively calls it “means-selecting discretion” and 
gives a simple and clear example to illustrate it:
“This discretion arises from the structure of positive duties. If one is 
required to save a drowning person, and if this can be done by 
swimming out to them, by throwing them a life-ring or by sending out 
a boat, then the duty to save does not require the implementation of all 
three measures.”161
As to the availability of more efficient measures than those 
chosen by the duty holder, it is also a general feature of reasonableness 
that a person is not under a duty to act always in the best possible way, 
but rather in a way that an average person (the “reasonable man”), in his 
place, would have acted.
The Court did not deal, however, with the second difficulty we
160 Ibid, para 41.
161 Robert Alexy, A Theory o f Constitutional Rights, Oxford University Press, 2003, at 396. 
see also Limburg principles, para 71: “In determining what amounts to a failure to comply, it 
must be borne in mind that the Covenant affords to a State party a margin of discretion in 
selecting the means for carrying out its objects, and that factors beyond its reasonable control
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mentioned. What if it is impossible to establish the reasonableness (i.e. 
the capability of achieving aims) of the measures chosen by the state? In 
that case, as we will see below in more detail, there is also a strong 
reason for courts’ deference to the state’s decision out of what we might 
call, following Alexy again, epistemic discretion. If it is uncertain what
measures are adequate to achieve the established aim, then a court will
162have little grounds on which to base its reasonableness assessment.
Yet the most important difficulty seems to be related to the ends 
side of the relation of reasonableness. To establish whether a certain 
measure or set of measures are reasonable one must necessarily be clear 
about the aim that those measures are supposed to be capable of 
achieving. In our context, the aim is the realization of social rights. But 
what do those rights exactly consist in? In other words, what do the 
abstract provisions of the Constitution (access to health care, access to 
adequate housing) exactly entail? So that the measures taken by the state 
to provide those goods to the citizens can be deemed reasonable or 
unreasonable, one must necessarily answer those questions. Absent that,
163the assessment of reasonableness is obviously impossible.
Yet nowhere in the judgements of the cases in question is a clear 
definition of the rights involved to be found. In Grootboom, for instance, 
the court was satisfied with a very abstract formulation of the right to 
access to housing:
may adversely affect its capacity to implement particular rights.”) and Scott and Macklem, at 
79.
162 Here Alexy talks of “epistemic or knowledge related discretion”, op cit, at 414 ff. See also 
David Bilchitz, “Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and its 
Importance”, (2002) 118 The South African Law Journal, 484, at 495, for a similar treatment 
of reasonableness.
163 This same point was made by David Bilchitz in “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the 
Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence”, 
South African Journal o f Human Rights (forthcoming) at 11. Yet our proposed solutions for 
the problem differ substantially, as will be clear in the next chapter.
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“The extent and content of the obligation consist in what must be 
achieved, that is, ‘the progressive realisation of this right.’ ... the right 
referred to is the right of access to adequate housing.”164
The same problem is to be found in TAC, where the Court never 
attempted to formulate with any precision what exactly the right to 
access to health care consisted in.
Now, against such abstract paradigms, the reasonableness test, if 
not rendered impossible, becomes almost impracticable. Indeed, if one 
doesn’t know with more precision165 what access to housing and health 
care mean, how can it be established if state’s measures in that direction 
are reasonable or not?
It is rather surprising, thus, that the South African Constitutional 
Court did find, in both cases, that the state’s housing and health care 
policies were unreasonable without a clear standard for assessment. In 
Grootboom, the court found that the state failed, in his policy, to pay 
adequate regard to desperate homeless people, providing them with short 
term accommodation relief. The state’s policy was unreasonably 
focused, the court claimed, on medium and long term results. In TAC, 
the health policy of the South African state was deemed unreasonable 
for not providing the drug nevirapine comprehensively, that is, in all 
public hospitals in the country. Yet why, it might be asked, was the state 
under a duty to provide short term accommodation relief for homeless 
people in desperate need instead of maintaining its exclusive medium 
and long term plan to provide housing for everyone? What makes the 
provision of nevirapine only to selected hospitals of the public system
164 Grootboom, para 45.
1651 am not saying here that one needs a fully “fleshed out” conception of a standard before 
one can claim a violation of it. Even the insurance based standard I defend in chapter 7 cannot 
be fully fleshed out, as I myself admit. What I claim here is that the South African 
Constitutional court did not even try to give some content, however vaguely, to the standard 
they were judging in those cases, i.e. the rights to health care and housing.
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unconstitutional?
It is important to make clear that I am not questioning the 
possibility that the Court’s conclusion might have been right in both 
cases. Rather, I am challenging the method through which those 
conclusions were reached. In other words, how do they follow from the 
abstract constitutional provisions that recognise to everyone a right to 
access to housing and health care?
Reasonableness in itself, as I hope is clear by now, cannot 
provide this answer, since it depends on (rather than provides) a clear 
determination of the aims to be pursued by the state. The findings of 
unreasonableness in Grootboom and TAC could be properly justified, 
thus, only if the goals of access to adequate housing and health care had 
been furthered specified by the Court as encompassing short term relief 
of those in desperate need (in the case of Grootboom) and the provision 
of nevirapine (in TAC). It is arguable that this is in fact what the Court 
actually did, albeit in a confusing way, that is, by “implicitly building 
[those goals] into the concept of reasonableness” in the apt phrase of a 
commentator.166 The problem is that reasonableness in itself, as I have 
just contended, cannot do this work. We need a proper justification for 
why the abstract provision of the South African constitution 
encompasses those goals, which was by no means provided in the 
judgement of those two cases. In other words, we need a clear definition 
of the content of the social goals guaranteed in the constitution. That 
involves the very same complex normative and polycentric issues of 
resource distribution we discussed in the previous chapter. Why is the 
state to spend resources on short term housing, for instance, instead of 
improving the quality of primary education, or satisfying any other need 
that might be competing for its scarce resources?
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The main problem with the generic goals conception of social 
rights in terms of justiciability, thus, is exactly the same faced by the 
subjective rights conception, i.e. the lack of a clear standard for the 
assessment of compliance with the constitutional norms (be they rights or 
generic goals). The administrative model of social rights adjudication, as 
we have just seen, provides no solution for this problem.
Other proposals
Other proposals take this lack of standards problem into consideration 
but come to a much less ambitious conclusion. The role of the judiciary, 
for them, is necessarily dependent on the previous action of the political 
branches. For the judiciary to be able to play any role, they claim, there 
must be first some action by the political branches specifying the 
constitutional provisions that recognise social rights. Once this is done, 
then courts can exert some control by assuring that they are promoted to 
everyone without discrimination or that they are not curtailed without 
justification.167
Ronald Dworkin has defended the option recently on a comment
168about the South African cases involving social rights discussed above. 
When constitutions expressly recognise enforceable social rights, he 
says, courts must choose between two different strategies:
“Judges must choose between two strategies. The first strategy is 
substantive. It requires judges to review at least the major decisions 
that government has made in allocating resources to satisfy the basic 
needs specified in the Constitution, and to reject any such decisions
166 David Bilchitz, op. cit., at 498.
167 In chapter 3 I have discussed a similar approach yet from the perspective of legitimacy. 
Here I am dealing with the problem of institutional capacity discussed in chapter 4.
168 “Response to Overseas Commentators”, The International Journal o f Constitutional Law, 
vol. 4, issue 1, 2003, pp 651-662.
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they find unreasonable. This substantive strategy might require judges 
to declare that government policy is unreasonable because it spends 
much too much on health care and, therefore, not enough on housing, 
for example, or vice versa. The second strategy is egalitarian: it insists 
not that government must make any particular allocation of resources 
but that it must show equal concern for all in the allocations it does 
make. It cannot, for example, distribute what it does assign for health 
care in a way that ignores greater or more basic health needs for that 
allocation.
A literal reading of the language of the South African Constitution 
might seem to recommend the first, substantive strategy. The 
constitution declares that “ [t]he state must take reasonable legislative 
measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realisation” of the rights it recognizes, and that would seem to mean 
that the state’s major allocation of resources must themselves be 
reasonable. It would be open to the courts, on this view, to declare that 
money must be taken from the government’s road building programs, 
for example, to provide renal dialysis for all patients whose life that 
would prolong, because it is unreasonable to devote monies to 
transportation that might be used to save lives. But the second, 
egalitarian, strategy is also a plausible reading: the Court may read 
“reasonable”, in this context, to mean “consistent with equal concern 
for all.
Chaskalson’s account of the three decisions he discusses suggest that 
the Court has adopted (properly, in my own view) the egalitarian 
strategy. ”.169
According to this view (which Dworkin calls the egalitarian 
strategy), thus, courts should not impose on government any particular 
allocation of resources. Yet once an allocation is done, it should make 
sure it abides by the egalitarian principle that requires that individuals be 
treated with equal concern and respect. So, if the legislature passes a law 
determining that a certain benefit will be available to a certain class of 
people the judiciary can extend that benefit to everyone else excluded 
without a justified reason based on the principle of non-discrimination or
170equality. This method has been largely used in Italy, for instance,
169 Id., at 651-2.
170 See, on this point, Victor Abramovich and Christian Courtis, “Apuntes sobre la
exigibilidad judicial de los derechos sociales”, p. 4, available at
http://dexl.tsd.umfi..it/i g/es/surveys/latina/courtis.htm
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under the name of “additive interpretation” (“sentenze addittive”). To 
give an example, the Italian Constitutional Court has extended one 
aspect of the right to housing, namely the right to succeed deceased 
spouses in rental contracts, to unmarried partners, who hadn’t been
171included by parliament in the relevant statute.
The other method of judicial intervention mentioned above is 
based on the so-called “principle of non-retrogression”. According to 
this principle, if the state decides to withdraw or curtail an existing 
benefit, the judiciary might veto the decision. This principle was 
maintained by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in the following way:
"[A]ny deliberately retrogressive measures ... would require the most 
careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference 
to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the1 79context of the full use of the maximum available resources."
The advantage of this principle in terms of justiciability is 
supposed to be that social and economic rights become more like 
“negative rights”, demanding from the judiciary to apply the traditional 
enough for of judicial review we discussed in chapter 3 (“negative 
judicial review”). As put by Scott and Macklem,
“[ljevels of provision of social goods existing in statutory form at the 
time of constitutionalization can themselves be specifically worded and 
entrenched in the constitution as minimum constitutional, as opposed 
to statutory, standards. For example, debate is currently occurring in
171 See Luis Maria Diez-Picazo and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau, “The Constitutional Protection 
o f Social Rights: Some Comparative Remarks”, European University Institute, Florence, 1991, 
at 12.
172 General Comment No. 3, Report on the Fifth Session, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, Annex 3, at 85, U.N.Doc. 
E/1991/23, E/C. 12/1990/8 (1990)
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Canada over whether to constitutionalize the elements of universality, 
accessibility and portability of the existing health care system so as to 
render those elements constitutionally sacrosanct. Were this to occur, a 
so-called positive right would in effect be recognized as a negative 
right, at least in the sense that specified components of the social state 
(as opposed to the ’state of nature') become the baseline for 
constitutional analysis. Social rights constitutionalized in this way 
would operate in much the same way that the system of private 
property and contract rights functions as a constitutional baseline in the 
United States.”173
The principle of non-retrogression was applied in Portugal, 
where the Constitutional Court invalidated a statute that tried to diminish 
significantly the scope of the Portuguese National Health Service 
(Servico Nacional de Saude)174
Hence, although the constitutional provisions cannot give rise to 
“subjective rights”, they do give rise to rights (call it meta-rights if you 
will) that government should adopt policies to advance the standard of 
living of the population and, once those policies are adopted, rights of 
equal access and non-retrogression are created, which are sometimes
175referred to as derivative, or reflex rights, as we saw above.
But these solutions suffer from obvious problems. Firstly, they still leave 
to the political branches a considerable degree of discretion on when and 
how to act. Indeed, as we saw, the judiciary can take some action only 
when, and if, the political branches decide to implement policies. If they 
remain inert, however, there would be no baseline from which the
173 Scott and Macklem, op. cit., at 80, and note 265. See also Charles Reich, 73 Yale Law 
Journal 733, (1964) at 739-46 (describing removal of social benefits as a government activity 
bounded by constitutional protections), at 739-746.
174 See Canotilho, op. cit., at 448-9, Acordao do TC n.o 39/84 (DR, I, 5-5-1984).
175 E. W. Vierdag, The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1978, pp 69-105, at 101-3. Fabio Konder Comparato, 
idem.
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judiciary could apply the principles of equality and no-retrogression. In 
Dworkin’s egalitarian strategy, for instance, courts should not tell 
government how to make major allocations. Yet, it must be asked: what 
if government fails to allocate any resources at all, for instance, to health 
care?
Moreover, that might even discourage action to promote social 
rights rather than encourage it. In fact, the political branches are aware 
that, when they act, then the judiciary will be able to interfere. It might 
be better, thus, not to act, and thus be free of judicial interference, than 
to do so and become subject to it. There are of course political pressures 
that impede the political branches from remaining inert, so there will 
always be some opportunity for courts to intervene whenever they do 
act. But this takes us to a final problem. Such a fragmented method of 
intervention impairs the development of a coherent system of definition 
and implementation of social rights. On the contrary, it establishes a 
haphazard system where social rights are guaranteed through patchy 
measures adopted by the state and enlarged by the judiciary in a 
disordered manner. It might well be the case, for example, that the 
political branches made a wrong decision to concede a certain benefit, 
one that should be now withdrawn in order to liberate resources for more 
important needs. Yet, judicial interference to control equality or non­
retrogression might extend or perpetuate such benefits and by that 
increase, not diminish real inequalities.
The principles of equality and non-retrogression, therefore, are 
meaningless, or inadequate, unless we can establish in the first place 
with some degree of precision what goals should be pursued by the state 
to advance social rights. Once we are able to do that, however, there is 
no reason to limit courts’ role to those two methods. They might well
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then interfere when government does not take the measures they should 
to advance those goals.
The very same problem we highlighted in the previous chapter, 
therefore, thwarts the conception of social rights as generic goals of state 
policy. Unless those goals can be determined with some precision, an 
adequate judicial control will remain impracticable. No meaningful 
reasonableness test will be possible. Equality and non-retrogression 
reflex rights, as we saw, will not fare any better.
Conclusion
The discussion so far leads us to the conclusion that the judiciary is 
indeed incapable of adjudicating social and economic rights. Yet, this is 
not because of any inherent institutional characteristic, as the argument 
from institutional competence would have it, but rather due to the 
extreme difficulties that the precise determination of the content of those 
rights involves. But this, as we saw in the previous chapter, affects any 
institution in charge of dealing with those rights. Courts are at no 
necessary comparative disadvantage, thus, in relation to legislatures and 
administrators.
It is unhelpful, therefore, to keep debating about the capacity, 
advantages and disadvantages of the courts in comparison with the 
political branches to adjudicate social and economic rights. As long as 
the difficulties we have discussed in this and the preceding chapter are 
not superseded, no institution is capable of performing this intractable 
task. We urgently need a method, thus, to tackle or circumvent those 
obstacles. In the next chapter I will analyse a proposal which has been 
growing in attention and popularity in international and domestic 
quarters, the so-called minimum threshold approach.
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C h a p t e r  6
T h e  M in im u m  C o r e  A p p r o a c h : g i v i n g  s o c i a l  r i g h t s  t e e t h ?
In the previous two chapters I discussed the standard institutional 
competence objection to the justiciability of social rights and concluded 
that it is inadequate. What makes courts incompetent to adjudicate social 
rights, I argued, is not any inherent institutional characteristic of the 
judicial process or the capacity of judges. It is rather the extreme 
difficulties of determining with some degree of precision what exactly 
those rights entail. That is, the lack of a clear standard through which to 
assess whether those rights have been respected or not. This, as we 
noted, is something that afflicts not only the courts, but rather any 
institution or official that embarks on the task of determining the content 
of social rights.
There is a clear need, thus, for a method of specification of the 
content of those rights if they are not just to become justiciable, but also 
if social rights debate (whatever the forum) is to proceed in a coherent 
and meaningful way.
In this chapter I analyse the most influential proposal that has 
been advanced to solve this problem, namely the so-called “minimum 
core approach”.
The minimum core idea
The idea that fundamental rights in general, or their corresponding 
obligations, have an essential or minimum core content is not new. It has 
been widely used in German constitutional law, for instance, where the
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1949 constitution expressly refers to such a core in article 19(2): “19(2) 
In no case may the core content of a constitutional right be infringed.” It 
is supposed to single out those elements of a particular right which are 
so important that, without them, we would not be able to describe it as 
that particular right anymore.
The practical relevance of such a concept for the German 
constitutional system has to do with fundamental rights’ limitation in 
cases of conflict of rights or between rights and other interests. In 
situations where it is impossible to fully guarantee all rights or values 
recognised in the constitution, the minimum core is thought to provide 
guidance for the required balancing procedure. The closer one gets to the 
core elements of a right, the more important the interests involved and, 
as a consequence, the greater the need to protect them.
Here, two possible interpretations of the function of the minimum 
core are available, an absolute and a relative one. In the former, the 
minimum core establishes an absolute threshold beyond which no 
further limitation is ever justified, whatever the importance of the 
countervailing interests at stake. It sets, thus, “final untouchable areas”, 
as put in a German constitutional case. In the relative interpretation, 
the core content does not impose an absolute threshold. It rather 
demands that any limitation to the minimum core must be justified by
177extremely hefty countervailing reasons.
Cases where the minimum core has been applied have usually 
involved conflicts between the right to privacy and the public interest. In 
a decision concerning secret tape recording of conversations, for 
instance, the German Constitutional Court, taking an absolute approach, 
decided: “even overwhelmingly important public interests cannot justify
176 See Robert Alexy, op. cit. 194.
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a limitation of the absolutely protected essential core of private life
»  178
The idea of a minimum core content seems to have been taken up
i n q
in the social rights literature from the late nineteen eighties onwards. It 
hasn’t been always used in a unitary way or with the same connotation, 
nor even referred to with the same terms. Some call it minimum 
thresholds, others minimum core rights or minimum core obligations. 
For some, as we shall see below, it should be used to entail justiciable 
subjective rights; for others only standards for the assessment of states’ 
compliance with their objective duties. The basic idea, however, is 
similar to that used in the context of classical rights. The closer one gets 
to the core elements of a certain right, the more important its protection 
becomes. As put by David Bilchitz in a recent defence of the approach, 
“[t]he recognition o f a minimum core o f social and economic rights that 
must be realised without delay attempts to take account o f the fact that 
certain interests are o f greater relative importance and require a higher 
degree o f protection than other interests. ,,18°
The practical relevance of the minimum core approach in the 
context of social rights lies also in the solution of conflict situations. That 
is, when it is impossible to fully guarantee a certain social right, the 
minimum core is supposed to take priority.
177 For a discussion of article 19(2) and its interpretation by the German Constitutional Court, 
see Alexy, op cit, at 192 ff.
178 BverfGE 34, 238 (245), apud Alexy, id. For South African cases involving privacy where 
the minimum core has also been applied see David Bilchitz, Towards, at 16-7.
179 For the article that seems to have first proposed it, see Andreassen Bard-Anders, Skalnes, 
Tor, Smith, Alan G., and Stokke Hugo. “Assessing Human Rights Performance in Developing 
Countries: The Case for a Minimal Threshold Approach to the Economic and Social Rights”, 
in Human Rights in Developing Countries 1987/88, A Yearbook on Human Rights in 
Countries Receiving Nordic Aid, Andreassen, Bars-Andres and Eide, Asbjom (eds.), 
Akademisk Forlag, 1988.
180 Id., at 14.
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It is not difficulty to see why the minimum or essential core idea 
has acquired such popularity among supporters of the judicial 
enforcement of social and economic rights. It seems to provide the 
answer to the chief hurdles we have discussed above: resource scarcity 
and indeterminacy (i.e. lack of precision) of social rights provisions. The 
minimum core is at the same time a method to partially specify the 
content of social rights and a way to avoid the traditional objection of 
resource scarcity. So, even if it is impossible to define the precise content 
of social rights, or, due to resource scarcity, to provide everyone with 
their full content (however defined), at least a basic minimum can be 
defined with a fair degree of precision and, most importantly, should not 
be impossible to guarantee to everyone within available resources.
But is the enthusiasm grounded? This is what we must appraise in 
this chapter.
Minimum core and resource scarcity
One of the alleged virtues of the minimum core approach, then, is to 
provide a solution to the problem of resource scarcity and resource 
allocation. The fact that the positive aspects of social rights are 
dependent on resources has always been an obstacle, as we saw, to the 
clear determination and scrutiny of the corresponding states’ duties. It 
has always been accepted, even by the most fervent advocates of social 
rights, that what is called their “full realisation” is impossible to achieve 
in the short term due to resource limitations. As a consequence, all that 
can be expected from states is that they adopt all possible measures 
within available resources aiming at the long-term achievement of the
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realisation of those rights. Their duty, in short, is one of “progressive
181realisation”, not immediate guarantee of those rights.
Once it is admitted that immediate “full realisation” is impossible 
and that “progressive realisation” is the standard, the obvious difficulty, 
as we saw in the previous chapters, is how to assess compliance with it. 
How to determine, that is, if the state is taking all possible measures 
within available resources to progressively achieve, as soon as possible, 
the ultimate objective of “full realisation”? The extreme difficulties of 
such an assessment threaten to deplete the state’s duties of any meaning.
It is here that the minimum core is meant to perform its role. It is 
supposed to establish a set of measures and goals that can be demanded 
from the state immediately, not in the vague future. This is how the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, who has adopted 
the minimum core approach, has explained it:
“... the Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to 
ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of 
each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for 
example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is 
deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of 
basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, 
prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant ”
The rationale, therefore, is this. Even though resource limitations 
are accepted as an obstacle to the immediate “full realisation” of social 
rights, this is not to deplete those rights of all their strength. The state is 
still under a duty to take immediate action in that direction within its 
possibilities. The minimum core is supposed to provide a criterion for
181 I have tried to show in chapter 2 that the idea of “full realisation” is based on a flawed 
conception of social rights (which I called basic needs conception). For the purposes of 
understanding and appraising the minimum core approach, however, we must assume that 
there is such a thing.
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182defining what measures should be taken first. It is a principle, thus, of 
priority: in the face of resource scarcity, priority should be given to what 
is most important, i.e. the minimum core, which is supposed to single out 
the most important elements of the right. Once the minimum core is 
guaranteed and more resources become available, then we can start to
183improve on it towards the full realisation of rights.
So far, we have a structural and functional definition of the 
minimum core. It is supposed to single out the most important elements 
of a right (structure), and establish a priority over scarce resources, 
imposing immediate duties on the state to protect the minimum core 
(function). We must turn our attention now to the difficult question of the 
substantive definition of the minimum core, i.e. what are these most 
important elements of social rights that should receive priority in the 
allocation of scarce resources? That is, how do we define the minimum 
core of a social right.
Minimum core and basic needs
The definition of the content of the core minima of social rights is 
traditionally done through the idea basic needs. As we saw in the 
Committee’s citation above, the minimum core is defined as “minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights”, that is “essential foodstuffs, ... 
essential primary health care, ... basic shelter and housing, ... the most
182 See Lucie Lamarque, “The Right to Social Security in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Core Obligations: Building a Framework for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Chapman and Russel (eds), Intersentia, 2002, pp 87- 
114, explaining the minimum core obligations as respecting “urgency for action, as well as the 
limited means of States.”, p. 103
183 See, for instance, Bilchitz, Towards, “The idea of a minimum core obligation suggests that 
there are degrees of fulfilment of a right and that a certain minimum level of fulfilment takes 
priority over a more extensive realisation of the right.” And G van Bueren, “Alleviating 
Poverty through the Constitutional Court” (1999) 15 South African Journal o f Human Rights 
52, at 59 (“a minimum core approach ... should be viewed as a springboard for further action).
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basic forms of education ...”.184 One commentator talks of needs we all
have “at a minimum, to be able to lead a decent life.”185 We all have a
vague, intuitive grasp of what is meant by basic needs. Yet the concept is
by no means a clear, uncontroversial one, as we have already discussed
in chapter 2. It can be restrictively interpreted, for instance, as those
1needs necessary to “ensure survival”, i.e. survival needs. Or it might 
be more broadly conceived as encompassing not only “survival needs”, 
but also “needs which we have by virtue of leaving in a given society”. 
In the latter interpretation, for instance, it is argued that a television set
1 o 7
should be considered a basic need in most developed countries.
I will not engage here in this debate on the precise scope or
appropriateness of the concept of basic needs, neither on the
1 88appropriateness of the concept in the first place. For my purposes in 
this chapter, I will be contented with the general, intuitive formulation of 
basic needs as those essential for someone to lead a minimally decent 
life. Whatever specification one derives from this abstract formulation, 
the problem is how to defend it in view of the function that the “basic 
needs-core minima” are supposed to perform.
The function to be exerted by the core minima, as we saw, is to 
establish a set of essential elements of each social right, which can be 
regarded as giving rise to immediate, and not merely progressive, state’s 
duties. They establish a priority claim, therefore, on the allocation of the 
scarce resources of a society. Two important issues then arise. Firstly, 
what if a country’s resources are still insufficient to afford even the core
184 For discussions of a social minimum based on needs see J Waldron, “John Rawls and the 
Social Minimum”, Journal of Applied Philosophy 3 (1986), pp. 21-33, David Copp, “The right 
to an adequate standard of living: Justice, Autonomy, and the Basic Needs”, Ethical 
Investigations, Rights and Duties, vol 5 (Welfare Rights and Duties of Charity), Carl Wellman 
(ed).
185 Fabre, op. cit. At 35.
186 Bilchitz, Towards, at 17.
187 Fabre, id.
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minima? Secondly, even if there are enough resources, why should we 
give total priority to the protection of those needs singled out in the core 
minima over other, less basic needs? I shall deal with each of those 
issues in turn.
In many developing countries, it is rather plausible that resources 
available would not be sufficient to guarantee even the core minima of 
social rights (however one defines them). This has not been ignored by 
the UN Committee in its general comment n.3, where it recognises that 
“any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its minimum core 
obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying within 
the country concerned....” It is clear, therefore, that the minimum core 
obligation is not absolute, that is, failure to discharge it is not 
automatically established by the mere fact that in a certain country the 
minimum core is not actually guaranteed to everyone. If resources are 
insufficient, the state cannot be held liable (“ought implies can”). What 
can be asked from the state, thus, is not that it guarantees the minimum 
core no matter what, but rather that it makes “every effort ... to use all 
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of
189priority, those minimum obligations."
Yet it must be inquired if this does not impair significantly the 
function that the minimum core was supposed to perform. Indeed, we 
saw that the minimum core was to entail immediate and clear obligations 
for the state, and that was supposed to solve the problem posed by the 
highly indeterminate standard of progressive full realisation. How can 
one determine if the state has made “every effort ... to use all resources 
that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, 
those minimum obligations"? If there are no sufficient resources for the
1881 have discussed this problem in greater detail in chapter 2.
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guarantee of the core minima, the issue is again the intractable 
polycentric one of how to distribute limited resources among numerous 
competing needs. But this is exactly the problem the minimum core was 
supposed to circumvent.190
We must conclude, then, that the minimum core approach 
represents no solution to the resource-dependence problem when not 
even they can be afforded by a certain state.191 But what about countries 
that do have sufficient resources to provide the minimum core? Are they
1 Q?really under an absolute duty to guarantee the core minima? This leads 
us to the second question I raised above: why should we give total 
priority to the protection of those needs singled out in the core minima 
over other, less basic needs?
The claim of priority made for the core minima, as I have already 
discussed in chapter 2 when I dealt with the idea of basic needs, has a 
strong intuitive appeal. Most of us are instinctively appalled by the fact 
that in our day and age so many people still die of malnutrition, lack 
simple medical treatment for diseases like tuberculosis and malaria, don’t 
have access to basic education etc. It seems quite appropriate to conclude 
that everyone should be guaranteed at least a basic minimum of those 
social goods which are so essential to enable a person to have a 
minimally decent life if there are enough resources in a given community
189 This is sometimes called an obligation of means (or conduct), as opposed to an obligation 
of result.
190 It is no solution to the distributive problem to claim that the minimum core can be relative, 
that is, specific to the country’s availability of resources, since the definition of this country 
specific minimum core would be precisely a distributive matter.
191 This was actually what happened in Grootboom, where the court expressly stated that in 
South Africa not even the minimum core was possible.
192 I am leaving aside for the moment the important and also intractable question of how to 
determine of a country has enough resources to guarantee the minimum core.
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for that purpose. The principle underlying this intuitive claim is
1 QO
sometimes referred to as the principle of urgency.
Now, despite the strong intuitive appeal of this principle, on 
further reflection it is not as straightforward as it seems at first. Indeed, a 
number of difficult issues arise, which are particularly relevant in the 
context of the less developed and developing countries (but also apply to 
developed ones).
A first, empirical hurdle, rarely tackled in the literature is related 
to the method and criteria to be used in the determining if a country has 
got enough resources to provide the core minima. How does one 
calculate, in other words, the amount of resources available in a given 
country to establish if they are sufficient to guarantee minimum core 
social rights to everyone?
I will leave the discussion of this empirical problem aside. For my 
purposes in this study, I will assume that it can be overcome, so that we 
can discuss two other issues, one political, another normative. In many 
countries, even if there were enough resources in society to guarantee the 
core minima to everyone immediately (however one calculates this), that 
would certainly not be possible without significant redistribution of 
resources among individuals and groups. This raises two important 
questions. What if such redistributions prove to be politically unfeasible? 
Can we still hold a state accountable for failing to provide the minimum 
core? Moreover, even if such large-scale redistributions were feasible, 
would they be always morally justified? An example might help us to 
illustrate and deal with those questions.
Imagine, for instance, a country in which available resources were 
sufficient to guarantee everyone with the core minima of housing, health
193 See, here, the classic paper by T. M. Scanlon. “Preference and Urgency”, The Journal o f  
Philosophy , Vol. 72, No. 19, Seventy-Second Annual Meeting American Philosophical
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care, education, food and other social rights (let us assume as the 
measure of a country’s resource availability, just for the sake of the 
argument, its Gross National Product - GNP)194. Let us suppose that the 
cost of guaranteeing the core minima to the whole population would add 
up to 40% of its GNP. So, according to the minimum core approach, a 
state would be in violation of its duties if it did not guarantee to everyone 
in that society the core minima. But would that be adequate? As I 
mentioned, two different problems have to be considered, one related to 
political feasibility, the other to moral justification. Let us discuss each in 
turn.
Let us assume, for instance, that the state’s total revenue (from 
taxes and other sources) amounts to 20% of the country’s GDP.195 If the 
state is to guarantee the core minima to everyone, it will have to impose 
further significant resource redistribution in society. That can be done in 
various different ways, such as direct taxation, tax incentives etc. But 
those means are not always, or rather very rarely politically available or 
effective, especially in developing countries.196 By that I mean that a 
government is often not able to adopt the measures needed in order to 
perform the redistribution required to guarantee the core minima, either 
for lack of parliamentary support, or fear that if they do they will not be
Association, Eastern Division. (Nov. 6, 1975), pp. 655-669. b
194 This is a problem rarely, if ever, discussed in social rights literature. What are “available 
resources”? I take GDP here as a stipulation. Should we not also count, however, private and 
public savings?
195 I chose 20% because this has been the mean average tax ratio in the world for the period 
between 1975 and 1998 according to a recent study. See Joweria M. Teera, “Tax 
Performance: A Comparative Study”, 2002, available at http://
www.bath.ac.uk/cpe/workingpapers/paperconferencebristol.PDF . For an interesting account 
of America’s political difficulties in raising social spending see Jeff Madrick, “Health for 
Sale”, New York Review o f Books, Volume 50, Number 20 • December 18, 2003, explaining 
that, despite being the developed country that taxes and spends least with social benefits, there 
is a widespread perception in the United States of America that taxes are too high and 
government spends too much.
196 Studies have concluded that “A higher per capita income reflecting a higher level of 
development is held to indicate a higher capacity to pay taxes as well as a greater capacity to 
levy and collect them”. Teera, id.
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re-elected, since the potential payers of increased taxes and other forms 
of redistributive measures are usually politically influential. Moreover, 
even if those measures are successfully passed through parliament, it is 
not certain that the desired results in terms of resource redistribution will 
ensue. To cite only one possible obstacle, tax evasion might prevent
• 197government from raising the amount of revenue required.
Now, although those problems are primarily of a pragmatic 
nature, they do have normative relevance, especially in light of the 
possibility principle (“ought implies can”). Would it be right to condemn 
a government for failing to implement the redistributive measures 
required for the guarantee of the minimum core even when they prove to 
be politically unfeasible, or would certainly result in severe damage to its
198electoral prospects?
For some this might be actually an extra reason for entrusting the 
judiciary with powers to enforce social rights by ordering public 
spending and resource redistribution. It would function as a corrective to 
the failures of the democratic process, and an opportunity for 
governments to blame unpopular measures on the judiciary.199 But it
197 One of the most common ways of evading taxes is to operate “underground”, or 
“informally”. The significant growth of the so-called informal sector, or “hidden economy” in 
development countries has a significant effect on their tax capacities. Terra, ibid.
198 What I am calling political unfeasibility might well be, under some circumstances, as a 
reluctance of government to tax the rich. Even if it is so, it is not an irrelevant factor. 
Governments depend on votes to stay in power. If they do take decisions that go contrary to 
what those with political influence want, they are likely to be taken out of power in the 
following elections and substituted by representatives who will certainly overrule their 
decisions. But it might also constitute a real impossibility to increase taxes because the 
majority of the population does not support it, or, which is rather usual in developing 
countries, because agreements with international financial institutions such as the IMF prevent 
governments to do so without breaching the agreement. See, on this last point, Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents 2002, at 80-84, pointing out that the IMF believes 
that poverty should be fought through economic growth and not distribution of existing 
wealth. This might be another justification for judicial review, as I say in the text. See also the 
discussion in page 87.
199 For an interesting example of such a use, see Scheppele, op. cit., at 1948, claiming that the 
Hungarian parliament took advantage of the constitutional court’s ruling to protect social 
rights to avoid even more austere measures imposed by the IMF than it actually had to comply 
with.
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could also lead to the risk of damaging public confidence in the judicial 
power if its decisions in that direction prove ineffective.200 
It is the second question, however, that is more crucial. Even if it were 
politically feasible for the state to pass all measures necessary to 
redistribute resources in order to guarantee the minimum core (with or 
without judicial interference), would that be necessarily morally 
justified? In other words, why should the core minima receive absolute 
priority over other interests and goals of individuals and society? I have 
tried to show above that it isn’t (see discussion in Chapter 2, especially 
that on justice and solidarity at page 64 and notes 77 and 78). Despite the 
strong feelings of moral regret evoked in most of us when some people 
do not achieve the core minima even in societies where resources would 
in principle be sufficient for everyone to enjoy them, I claimed that an 
adequate theory of distributive justice would not necessarily require, 
without more, that absolute priority be given to their universal guarantee. 
I argued that an adequate theory of distributive justice would take into 
consideration peoples’ choices in life before requiring any distribution 
from the better off to the worse off, even if the former were above the 
minimum threshold and the latter were below it.
A similar point is made by John Rawls, though in a slightly 
different context, when he deals with Amartya Sen’s argument that 
people’s different ends and tastes entail corresponding differences in the 
level of satisfaction they derive from an equal bundle of what Rawls calls 
primary goods. Against those who claim it would be “unreasonable, if 
not unjust, to hold such persons responsible for their preferences”, he 
claims that citizens should not be seen as “passive carriers of desires”. 
We must assume, on the contrary, that citizens have the “moral power to
200 As is usually argued, the judiciary, not having the power of the sword or the purse, has to 
rely on its respectability to have its voice heard, see Gerald Frug, The Judicial Power of the
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form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good ... 
adjusted ... over the course of their lives to the income and wealth and 
station in life they could reasonably expect.” As a consequence:
“ It is regarded as unfair that [some] should now have less in order to 
spare others from the consequences of their lack of foresight or self- 
discipline.” 201
It is not very clear, however, if Rawls means this to apply when 
the issue in question is a guarantee of the basic minimum, since he
seems to include those among the basic rights and liberties that are to be
202,held equally by everyone according to his theory of justice. In the 
restatement of his Theory o f Justice, moreover, he says:
"This principle may be preceded by a lexically prior principle 
requiring that basic needs are met, at least insofar as their being met 
is a necessary condition for citizens to understand and to be able 
fruitfully to exercise the basic rights and liberties.”203
To ascertain if my position differs significantly from Rawls's in 
that specific respect (that is, in the justification of the basic minimum), 
and if the minimum core approach could derive any support from Rawls’ 
theory, I would have to discuss in detail his two principles of justice (the 
principle of equal liberty and the difference principle), which would go 
far beyond the scope of my thesis. What is important to retain here are
Purse, University o f Pennsylvania Law Review, 1978, vol. 126, n.4.
201 Political Liberalism, at 186.
202 Id, at 230.
203 Theory of Justice: a restatement, p. 44. In p. 162 moreover, he writes that the difference 
principle should not be affirmed in the constitution, nor should judges have the power to 
enforce because 'this task is not one they can perform well". Then he adds: "What should be a 
constitutional essential is an assurance of a social minimum covering at least the basic human 
needs. For it is reasonable obvious that the difference principle is rather blatantly violated 
when that minimum is not guaranteed"
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his ideas on choice and responsibility, which are at the core of his cast of 
liberalism.
Now, there are many complex issues related to the ideas of choice 
and responsibility that need to be dealt with in a complete discussion of 
distributive justice.204 This restricted analysis is sufficient, however, to 
show that a principle such as that advocated by the minimum core 
approach is not adequate in that it overlooks those important moral 
considerations in the distribution of resources among individuals in 
society. This is not to say, of course, that redistribution from the better 
off to the worse off will be never justified, but only that it is not justified 
by the mere fact that the better off are above the minimum threshold and 
the worse off are below. It is necessary to see how they arrived at that 
situation.
The discussion above seems to lead to the conclusion, thus, that 
the minimum core approach does not actually solve, on reflection, the 
difficulties it was supposed to solve. It does not provide an adequate 
criterion for the allocation of scarce resources, and cannot supply, 
therefore, the clear standards needed for the meaningful debate and 
adjudication of social rights. This is true not only in societies where 
resources are clearly not sufficient to guarantee everyone with the core 
minima, but also in those that, in principle, would be wealthy enough to 
do so. Indeed, in the former, the definition of the minimum core will be 
just as difficult as the definition of the “full” right itself, that is, it will 
involve the intractable distributive issue the minimum core was supposed 
to avoid. In the latter, the minimum core will face obstacles of a political
204 I discussed this issue in more depth in Chapter 2, when I analysed the basic needs 
conception of social rights, on which the minimum core approach draws on. For a 
comprehensive discussion of those issues see Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, chapters 1 
and 2.
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nature (unfeasibility of redistributing resources) and a normative nature 
(unjustifiability of redistributing resources).
We can go back now to a question we raised above, whose 
discussion we postponed, on how to determine if a society has got 
enough resources to provide the core minima. It should be clear by now 
that, though perhaps important, it is not as central a question as it would 
be (despite being usually ignored) if the minimum core approach were 
adequate. Indeed, the correct question, missed in the minimum core 
approach, is not whether there are enough resources in a society for the 
guarantee of a minimum core to everyone. It is rather whether the 
available resources in that society have been justly distributed. This is 
because, as we saw, there might be nothing wrong (i.e. unjust) in a 
situation where some people have more than the core minima and others 
have less. If this is the result of free decisions made by people over their 
lives on how to spend their fair share of society’s resources, it seems to 
be perfectly legitimate.
We seem to be back, thus, to our original problem, that is, the 
extreme difficulties of determining the content of social rights, and the 
minimum core approach provides no solution. Are we to resign 
ourselves, then, to the fact that social rights cannot entail clear standards 
to enable a thorough assessment of states’ duties, but only generic goals 
whose pursuance by the state is almost impossible to scrutinise?
If we go by the current proposals we have been discussing this 
seems to be the unfortunate case. This state of affairs is backed, 
moreover, by what actually happens in most jurisdictions where those 
rights have been expressly recognised. Before we accept defeat, 
however, I wish to propose a different way of justifying the basic minima
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which might, I suggest, make them appropriate as clear standards for 
socials rights justiciability and debate.
As I have been claiming throughout this study, one of the main 
problems for the justiciability of social rights is the extreme difficulty in 
defining their content, which results from the intractable distributive 
justice issue it involves. Thus the appeal of the idea of a basic minimum 
that could circumvent the necessity of engaging in such intractable 
distributive calculus. As we saw in the preceding section, the minimum 
core was supposed to provide a standard which was at the same time 
clear and affordable by most states. I argued above, however, that the 
principle maintained by the minimum core approach, according to which 
the basic minimum should be guaranteed to everyone as a matter of 
absolute priority and irrespective of any consideration of choice and 
responsibility, cannot be morally justified. But could we not use the basic 
minimum idea in a way that is morally defensible? This is what I want to 
discuss in the remainder of this chapter.
Basic Minimum and the Presumption of Injustice
The chief problem with the minimum core approach, as we saw, is that it 
completely overlooks that differences in people’s abilities to satisfy the 
core minima are not necessarily unjust. It is the same problem, thus, I 
discussed in Chapter 2 when analysing the basic needs conception of 
social rights, on which the minimum core approach is actually based. 
The strict priority it requires to the guarantee of the core minima, as a 
consequence, cannot be morally justified by the sole fact that some
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205people have more and others have less than the core minima. This 
would demand, in many cases, an unreasonable sacrifice of other 
people’s individual interests and society’s collective goals. What should 
determine the moral adequacy of resource redistribution, I argued, is not 
deprivation of needs per se, but unjust deprivation. The redistribution of 
individual and society’s resources to guarantee the basic minimum, 
therefore, has to be justified by a demonstration that some people’s 
inability to satisfy that minimum is a result of an unjust distribution of 
resources.
Yet it would be extremely difficult and costly (if at all possible), 
to determine case by case if someone’s deprivation of the basic minimum 
is unjust (i.e. a result of his own choices in life rather than injustice, or 
bad luck).206 Moreover, it would defeat the whole purpose of the basic 
minimum idea, which is, as we saw, to circumvent the intractable 
distributive issues involved in the determination of the content of social 
rights.
But there is a way, I believe, in which we could use the idea of the 
basic minimum that avoids this intractable problem and is not subject to 
the criticisms we raised in the previous section. Instead of claiming that 
everyone in society should have a basic minimum guaranteed 
irrespective of their choices on how to lead their lives, we might argue
205 Unless we ground it on a kind of duty of charity instead of justice, which I discussed and 
rejected in Chapter 2. See, for such an argument for the “social minimum”, Charles Fried, 
“Distributive Justice”, 1 Social Philosophy and Policy (1983), pp 45-59.
206 This is mainly due to the unavailability of information, an unavoidable obstacle to the 
implementation of ideal theories of justice. In such cases, all we can do is settle for a “second- 
best”, as I will suggest below in the text. See, on this point, Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign 
Virtue, passim, but especially p. 78, note 5. But also to the problems derived from the fact that 
choice and circumstance (or luck) cannot be totally separated; on the contrary, they interact, 
creating what Dworkin calls the “strategic problem” of a distributive justice theory: “How ... 
should it draw the distinction between those influences [choice and circumstance] on an 
agent’s fate for which he must take responsibility and those whose influence the community 
has a responsibility to mitigate? How, in practice, is that distinction to be enforced?”, id., pp 
324-5.
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that, when some people do fall below a certain minimum, that must be
*)(X1the result of an unjust distribution of resources in society. That is, we 
might defend a sort of presumption o f injustice in the situation in which 
some people do not have enough resources to satisfy certain minimum 
needs.
Now for such a presumption to be plausible and morally 
defensible, it is clear that we cannot use a concept of absolute basic 
needs (as the minimum core approach does) to set the minimum levels of 
social rights. In very poor communities, for instance, it is more likely 
that someone’s inability to satisfy basic needs is due to the general low 
level of economic development than an unjust distribution of resources. 
A presumption of injustice grounded on basic needs would therefore be 
rather inappropriate. In rich communities, on the other hand, it might be 
quite defensible to ground our presumption on a higher level than mere 
basic needs. Given the necessary connection between social rights (and 
thus minimum social rights) and a just distribution of resources, for the 
presumption of injustice to work the basic minima have to be directly 
related to the level of economic development of the relevant community. 
In wealthy communities, thus, the minimum threshold should be set at a 
higher level than in poorer ones, and arguably even at a higher level than 
absolute basic needs.
It is of course true that some proponents of the minimum core 
approach do suggest that the core minima should depend on the level of 
economic development of the country at stake. Scott and Alston, for 
instance, distinguish between relative core minima (which are dependent 
on a country’s availability of resources), and absolute core minima 
(which are based on some absolute conception of basic needs), and claim
207 This idea is inspired on an unpublished paper presented by Anne Philips at the UCL 
Colloquium of Legal and Political Philosophy of 2002/2003, at the Centre for Law, Politics
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that the standard of compliance with social rights duties should be the 
former.208 But they seem to be still relying on the sufficiency principle 
we rejected as the ground for the state’s duty to guarantee social rights’ 
relative core minima. In my conception, the ground for such a duty is the 
presumption of injustice, that is, the likelihood that people’s inability to 
satisfy the core minima derive from an unjust distribution of resources.
The reason why in wealthy societies the minimum thresholds 
should be higher than in poor ones, hence, is not simply because they can 
afford it (as is the rationale in the minimum core approach on the relative 
version), but rather because we might be able to safely presume that, 
were resources justly distributed in that society, most people would 
certainly be able to satisfy their needs to a higher level than most people 
in a poor society under an equally just distribution.209
This is, I believe, the only adequate way of morally defending the 
duty of the state to guarantee a minimum level of social rights to 
everyone, since it justifies that duty (and the redistribution of resources it 
entails) on adequate principles of distributive justice, i.e. taking into 
account the essential consideration of individuals’ responsibility for the 
choices they make in life. Now, someone who accepts my criticisms of 
the minimum core approach might still find my alternative proposal 
unsatisfactory in that it makes use of a presumption to identify the 
element of injustice necessary to ground the duty of the state. He might 
argue that this will entail situations in which resources will be 
redistributed from their legitimate holders to undeserving beneficiaries, 
that is, to people whose situation can only be attributed to their own
and Society of the School of Public Policy, called “Defending Equality o f  Outcome
208 See Craig Scott and Philip Alston. “Adjudicating social priorities in a transnational context: 
a comment on Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootbroom’s promise”, in South African Journal 
on Human Rights, v. 16, 2000, pp 206-268
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choice, and not to any injustice. This is certainly not only plausible but 
also probable. Yet I can see no other option in the face of the 
indeterminacy of what a just distribution of resources would entail. So 
long as those cases are exceptional, I see no reason to discard my 
proposal. Indeed, if we have to err, it is certainly better to err on the safer 
side. By that I mean the following. Given it is virtually impossible to 
determine with accuracy when a particular distribution of resources is 
just, we have two options. We either provide no compensation at all for 
anyone, or we lower our standards of precision so as to allow some 
people (i.e. those who fall below the minimum) to be compensated. In 
both cases we are bound to make mistakes. In the former, some people 
(or rather a lot depending on the community) will fail to be compensated 
for real distributive injustice; in the latter case, some people will be 
rightly compensated, others will receive compensation without deserving 
it. I believe the latter case is by far more adequate.
This is my argument, thus, to show how the idea of a state’s duty 
to guarantee a minimum level of satisfaction of social rights could be 
morally justified. Now I need to turn to the difficult practical problem of 
how to determine with more precision what those levels are. I have 
already advanced in the preceding discussion that they will vary 
according to the level of economic development of the relevant country. 
But this is obviously still too vague. I must try to show now how this 
could be furthered specified.
The question we are trying to answer is this. What minimum level 
of satisfaction of basic social goods we can confidently presume that, 
were resources in our society justly distributed, most people would be
209 I am not sure if my approach and the relative core minima approach would lead to very 
different levels of core minima. I touch on this point in the text further on. My point here is
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• 210  •able to enjoy? This is not, as it is apparent, a simple question. But it is 
not as difficult, I believe, as that of determining what precisely a just 
distribution of resources would require in each individual situation. One 
plausible way of going about it is to follow what Ronald Dworkin termed 
the “prudent insurance ideal”. In the next chapter I try to explain it and 
show how it could be applied to our problem of defining the basic 
minima.
purely of justification for the duty to provide core minima.
210 I must admit at this point that the absolute version of the minimum core approach has a 
clear advantage on this matter. Indeed, the concept of absolute basic needs, although not 
totally unambiguous or uncontroversial, provides nonetheless a reasonably clear standard for 
the determination of the core minima. It is not impossible to specify with some degree of 
precision, as the Committee has been doing for quite some time now, what levels of goods and 
services people require to be able to satisfy their most essential needs. But, as I claimed above, 
this method will not be available for all countries, especially those with lower levels of 
economic development. It might be possible to use basic needs core minima in developed 
countries, where the presumption of injustice would be quite plausible. Some might complain, 
however, that the minimum would be then too low.
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C h a p t e r  7 
S o c i a l  R i g h t s  a s  I n s u r a n c e
In the previous chapter I appraised and rejected the so-called “minimum 
core approach” - adopted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (“the Committee”) and favoured by most human rights’ 
academics. I concluded that it is no solution for the main obstacle to 
social rights justiciability, i.e. the extreme difficulty of determining the 
content of those rights. I claimed, on one hand, that when countries do 
not have sufficient resources to guarantee those rights to everyone it 
faces the very same problem the minimum core was supposed to avoid, 
i.e. how to allocate scarce resources among the competing needs of the 
population. On the other hand, when there are in principle sufficient 
resources so as everyone in a community could enjoy the minimum core, 
I maintained that the imposition of the minimum core as an absolute 
priority lacks moral justification.
An adequate theory of distributive justice has to be sensitive, I 
claimed, to our basic intuitions that people should bear some 
responsibility for what we have called the free choices they make in life 
(even when they are somehow determined by traits of their personality 
which they have not chosen). This is a corollary not only of our 
fundamental conviction that human beings are endowed with free will, 
but also that it would be unfair to place certain burdens on some people 
that result from others’ free choices. On the other hand, we consider 
unfair that disadvantages not resulting from free choices but from what 
we called circumstances be totally bome by individuals. An adequate 
theory of distributive justice, thus, should seek to minimise inequalities 
derived from circumstance, not choice. The failure to take this 
fundamental principle into consideration, I claimed, is the main flaw of
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the minimum core approach and, as I discussed at more length in Chapter 
2, of the basic needs conception of social rights to which the minimum 
core is closely related.
Yet this should not lead us to dismiss the possibility of using a 
“minimum levels” strategy as a tool to overcome the difficulties of 
determining the content of social rights. So long as we do not determine 
and justify them with the concept of basic needs, but rather by what I 
called a “presumption of injustice”, we might still employ standard 
“minimum levels” as a useful and adequate device. The idea, as I put it in 
chapter 2 and the end of the previous chapter, is this. What justifies a 
person’s claim on society’s resources to enable her to satisfy a certain 
minimum level of needs is not simply the fact that this person is below 
that level at the moment of the claim. It is rather that the reason why that 
person is below that level is very likely to be unjust, i.e. not morally 
justified. It is possible to use standard minimum levels to specify 
immediately claimable social rights (i.e. subjective rights), therefore, if 
we set those minimum levels in a way that allows us to confidently 
presume that, but for some injustice, most people would be certainly able 
to satisfy the specified minimum levels of needs.
In this final chapter I try flesh out this basic idea and discuss its
problems. In that effort, I adapt and use an idea put forward by Ronald
Dworkin in his classic essay “Equality of Resources” and further
developed in later essays, namely the employment of a hypothetical
insurance scheme as a device to work out what redistributions a just
society would perform in order to compensate individuals for
1 1disadvantages resulted from circumstance and not choice. I should
211 The main essay was originally published in Philosophy and Public Affairs in 1981. Here I 
use the version published in Sovereign Virtue, The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard: 
2000), chapter 2, where the other essays I mentioned in the text were also published. They are 
“Justice and the High Cost of Health Care”, and “Justice, Insurance, and Luck”.
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perhaps mention that Dworkin never speaks of social and economic
212rights in those essays, and has rarely done so in his work in general. 
The possibility of applying his proposal for the specification of minimum 
level social rights, thus, is my exclusive inference, which I now proceed
91^to explain and argue for.
Dworkin’s Hypothetical Insurance Scheme
An adequate theory of distributive justice, as I argued in chapter 2, has to 
be sensitive to the principle that distinguishes choice and circumstance as 
reasons to make people responsible for their fate or to compensate them 
from disadvantages. An obvious difficulty, however, is that choice and 
circumstance are often extremely hard to distinguish (they often interact 
with each other), which poses what Dworkin calls the “strategic 
problem”.214 How to apply that distinction in the enforcement of 
redistributive measures required by justice? That is, how to determine if, 
and to what extent, a particular inequality is due to circumstance or 
choice, so as to adequately compensate individuals for their unjust 
disadvantages?
212 A notable exception can be found in Taking Rights Seriously, Appendix: A Reply to 
Critics, at 364 ff where Dworkin maintains that his theory of rights as trumps is not 
incompatible with the idea of welfare rights, contrary to what Joseph Raz claimed in 
“Professor Dworkin’s Theory of Rights”, XXVI Political Studies 123 (1978). It is not clear, 
however, if he would derive those rights from his own substantive theory. I believe that he 
would recognise at least a moral right to equality of resources.
213 More recently, Dworkin has directly tackled the issue of social rights’ justiciability and 
concluded that courts should not try to define the contents and enforce those rights. The role of 
the courts, he claims, is simply to make sure that, once the political branches have defined 
what social rights are, everyone is treated equally. He does not explain, however, why courts 
should not define themselves the contents of those rights when the political branches omit 
themselves. I believe his reason would run along the lines of the institutional capacity 
objection I discussed in chapter 4. See “Response to Overseas Commentators”, The 
International Journal o f Constitutional Law, vol. 4, issue 1, pp 651-662. See also my 
discussion of his argument in Chapter 5 above.
214 Op. cit. At 324-5.
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One familiar option is to make presumptions about causal 
responsibility and accept deviant cases as a necessary evil. It can be done 
in two opposite directions. Some people (Dworkin calls them 
“conservatives”), for instance, will insist that choice is by far the 
dominant factor, which enables us to presume that, in most cases, failure 
to achieve a certain level of basic needs satisfaction is a person’s own 
responsibility. No redistribution of resources is justified, therefore, save 
perhaps in cases where individuals can overwhelmingly rebut that 
presumption. Others (i.e. “liberals”) will usually make the contrary 
presumption, that is, that peoples’ failure to achieve a certain level of 
welfare can almost always be attributed to circumstance, not choice, and 
thus will claim that redistributions are always justified. Both propositions 
are inadequate for Dworkin, however, in that they are both reliant on 
“controversial psychological presumptions”, which might explain to
some extent the appeal of theories of justice that make no use of the
216distinction between choice and circumstance (the classic example is 
equality of welfare, of which the basic needs conception is a strand).
But Dworkin thinks that is possible to construct an alternate 
strategy that does not rely on such psychological presumptions of causal 
responsibility. We can make use of a hypothetical insurance scheme, he 
claims, to determine not only when redistributions are justified, but also 
at what specific level they are so. To put it very succinctly, his argument 
is this. We should compensate those disadvantages which, given the 
opportunity under equal conditions, most individuals in a given 
community would have insured against. By equal conditions Dworkin
215 That would lead either to a total denial of social rights, or, at the very best, to the 
establishment of the minimum levels at a very low rate. This seems to be the prevalent opinion 
in the United States of America, which has the least generous welfare system of the developed 
nations. See Jeff Madrick, “Health for Sale”, New York Review o f Books, Volume 50, Number 
20 • December 18, 2003.
216 Id, pp327-328
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means two things. Firstly, that “wealth and other opportunities have been 
fairly distributed” in that community. So everyone has roughly the same 
economic power to buy insurance, i.e. no-one would choose a less 
generous level of coverage for unjust lack of purchasing power. 
Secondly, “insurance is offered ... at the same premium for the same
9 1 7coverage package for everyone”.
We will see in a moment what risks and at what level of coverage 
Dworkin believes people in the United States of America would choose 
to insure. But before that we must be clear about why the upshot of such 
a hypothetical exercise should be accepted as an adequate guide for a just 
resource redistribution. Where lies the moral appeal, that is, of the 
hypothetical insurance scheme? According to Dworkin, it lies not only in 
the fact that such a device “is sensitive to choice but not to 
circumstance”, but also in that
“[i]t would leave scope for the play of personal choice, the influence of 
character, and the attraction and utility of gambles. It would not (as 
more drastic egalitarian suggestions would) squeeze the differences out 
of persons and lives. It would not dampen initiative or flatten society or 
compromise any sensible conception of liberty. ... It is, moreover, a 
realistic scheme. Since its calculations are modeled on hypothetical 
decisions of actual people choosing among various calls on their 
resources, those calculations would never require a community to spend 
more on welfare benefits than it should given its responsibilities to 
provide other services essential to its members’ lives. Since income 
taxes would be modeled on assumed premiums in that market, those 
taxes would be both fair and feasible.” 18
Now, let me try to clarify those various and complex claims. It 
might be helpful to remind ourselves, firstly, of the basic problem 
Dworkin is trying to avoid with the use of the hypothetical insurance
217 id., p. 332. In a real market this would only be possible if the risk insured was the same for 
everyone.
218 Id., p. 334.
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scheme. As we saw, first and foremost he wants to escape the need to 
ground a just redistribution scheme too strongly on “presumptions about 
causal responsibility”, that is, on presumptions about whether peoples’ 
disadvantages are a result of choice or circumstance. With the insurance 
scheme he succeeds in that respect because the focus of our attention is 
shifted from what caused a particular disadvantage (choice or 
circumstance, or both) to the r is k  of suffering such disadvantage and the 
decision to insure against it. If we can confidently assume that most 
people would have bought insurance at a certain coverage level for 
certain types of disadvantages with their initial fair share of society’s 
resources, “no one could justly complain that [someone] ought not to be 
compensated because his character had contributed to [the insured 
disadvantage]. ”219
The other virtues of the insurance scheme hailed by Dworkin in 
the passage quoted above depend on the level of coverage he assumes 
most prudent people would choose if offered the insurance under the 
stipulated conditions. Let us see, then, what those levels would likely be. 
Unlike it might at first appear, he claims, prudent people would not 
pursue a “maximin” strategy, that is, “a strategy that would set the floor 
of their prospects as high as possible”. On the contrary, given that 
insurance is in a sense always a “bad buy” (i.e. “premiums must ... 
substantially exceed the expected return” for it to be attractive for the 
insurer), prudent people tend to insure only against “sufficiently serious”
risks, i.e. those that justify “a technically bad investment to avoid any
221chance of it.” He concludes, then, that most prudent people would 
“attempt to buy coverage that would at least enable them to maintain life
2X9 Id. P. 333.
220 Id. P 334.
221 Id. P 335 ,1 reversed the order of the last two sentences.
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with some dignity -  provide food, decent shelter, and a minimum level of
999medical care for themselves and their family.”
Now the virtues of his proposed insurance scheme should be 
apparent. Being limited to this minimum level that prudent people would 
supposedly choose, the required redistributions will not be so great as to 
entail the undesired consequences that more radical egalitarian theories 
would produce, such as “squeeze the differences out of persons or lives”, 
“flatten society”, “compromise liberty” etc.
But this, one might argue, sounds too little. If the aim commanded 
by our distributive justice theory is the elimination of any inequalities 
resulted from circumstance (i.e. luck), then the insurance scheme clearly 
under-compensates for those inequalities, since people disadvantaged by 
circumstance and not choice will still have much less resources than 
others, even after they receive the insurance coverage.
Dworkin agrees that this is indeed the outcome of the insurance 
scheme, and expectedly so, since its “strategy is not to eliminate the 
consequences of brute bad luck ... but only to mitigate it to the degree 
and in the way that prudent insurance normally does. The strategy aims 
to put people in an equal position with respect to risk, rather than to
9 9 0
negate risk altogether.” But he denies that this would be unjust, or fail 
to show equal concern to those under-compensated. To make his 
argument, he uses an example from the field of health care. His insurance 
scheme, as we saw, would demand redistribution of resources only to the 
point that is enough to pay the coverage which prudent people are 
expected to choose if offered insurance, which, in Dworkin’s opinion, 
would be limited to a minimum level of health care. An alternate popular 
principle of distribution, however, would demand much more than that.
123 id, 341.
161
It would require that people be offered medical treatment, however 
speculative or expensive, that increases, no matter how marginally, a
224patient’s life expectancy (he calls this the “rescue principle”). But 
such a principle, he points out, would be impossible to redeem without 
crippling society, since it “would have to spend so much on medical care 
that it would have nothing left with which ... to make the lives of its 
members good as well as long.”225
Now, this is certainly not an attractive outcome, and it shows that 
elimination of all inequalities not resulted from choice cannot be an 
unconditional aim in an adequate theory of distributive justice. Some 
disadvantages are so severe that not even if all resources of society were 
diverted to that purpose that aim would be achieved. Moreover, even 
when it is possible to achieve that aim, it is so only at an extremely 
demanding cost to others which can hardly be thought of as requirement
0 0  f \of justice. There must be limits, therefore, to what an adequate theory 
of distributive justice would require in its aim to compensate 
disadvantages resulted from bad luck (i.e. circumstance). James Griffin 
forcefully made this point in a recent article as follows:
224 Ibid. A longer and more developed version of that discussion appears in Chapter 8, “Justice 
and the High Cost of Health”.
225 Ibid.
226 “Suppose that the welfare (on any interpretation) of an entirely paralysed but conscious 
person is vastly less than the welfare of anyone else in the community, that putting more and 
more money at his disposal would steadily increase his welfare but only by very small 
amounts, and that if he had at his disposal all the resources beyond those needed simply to 
keep the others alive he would still have vastly less welfare than they. Equality of welfare 
would recommend this radical transfer, that is, until the latter situation was reached.” 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 61. See also “Equality, Luck, and Hierarchy”, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 31, n.2 (2003), where he makes clear that his theory does not require that all 
disadvantages resultant from bad luck be compensated, and that the insurance device is not a 
second best, at 191. The same point is made by Charles Fried, Right and Wrong, p. 128. It is 
interesting to note that Fried also discusses, in this book, insurance as a possible way of 
determining positive rights, yet, as we will see later in the text, he seems to abandon the idea 
in the later article “Distributive Justice”. In Right and Wrong he raises this interesting point, 
which I discuss in Chapter 6: “But if we have a clear notion of what is a fair share of income, 
then why not just provide the measure of income itself.”, p. 128 I do think that this might be 
an option, but cannot discuss it here.
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“There are limits ... to what one can demand of the sort of persons one 
would want there to be. Such persons will sacrifice themselves and their 
families only up to a point. Those limits would be difficult to place 
exactly, and anyone who tries to place them will have to put up with 
much roughness and arbitrariness. But these are, or at least should be, 
familiar problems in ethical life. This implies that there are limits to 
what any redistributive welfare programme can require. Its demands 
must stay within the capacities of the sort of people the society should 
want there to be.”227
It seems clear, thus, that the rescue principle, or any other form of 
equality of welfare, is inappropriate not only because it would demand a 
level of redistribution which is unjustified, but also one that might often 
prove impossible. What exact level of redistribution would be justified, 
that is, how much sacrifice can be demanded from “lucky people” to 
benefit the unlucky, as Griffin rightly puts it, is difficult to determine. It 
is precisely for that reason that Dworkin’s insurance scheme seems to me 
so appealing. It reduces the “roughness and arbitrariness” that Griffin 
speaks of to a very acceptable degree. Indeed, if it is unfair, on one hand, 
not to give any compensation to disadvantages resulted from 
circumstances, and on the other hand, to impose too heavy a burden on 
society for the sake of mitigating those disadvantages, the insurance 
scheme seems to be the ideal way to show equal concern for all. It allows 
everyone to insure on the same terms, in a manner pmdent people would 
likely do when making decisions on how to spend their resources in their 
own lives.
Dworkin was careful to note, however, that his insurance scheme 
did not exclude the possibility of us finding a different analytical tool
227 James Griffin, Welfare Rights, The Journal o f Ethics 4: 27-43, 2000, at 36 See also, for this 
argument, Charles Fried, Right and Wrong, arguing: “But we cannot draw the conclusion that 
a person has a positive right to the fair satisfaction of his needs without regard to the burden 
this puts on others. ... Just when the interference becomes excessive is, of course, the cmcial 
question.”, p. 123.
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228that would justify greater compensation without extrapolating the 
“sacrifice threshold”. In the absence of such a device, however, the 
insurance scheme gives us the confidence that at least that level of 
redistribution it recommends is justified.
Social Rights as Insurance
In the previous section I tried to explain and defend Dworkin’s insurance 
scheme as an adequate way for implementing our favoured distributive 
justice theory and thus mitigate those disadvantages among people which 
result from circumstance and not their free choices. I must try and show 
now in more detail how his scheme could be used in order to determine 
the content of social rights.
As I claimed in the previous chapter, the adequate way to justify 
the imposition of a duty on States to guarantee a minimum level of social 
goods to everyone is by demonstrating that a failure to do so is certainly, 
or very likely unjust. I rejected the so-called minimum core approach 
precisely because it fails to make that case. It is not sufficient, I claimed, 
to point out to the outcome (i.e. people falling below the minimum level 
- however one establishes it) to prove injustice. We still have to 
determine if that outcome was a result of choice (in which case it would 
not be unjust), or circumstance (in which case it would). Moreover, by 
defining the minimum levels through the concept of basic needs, the 
minimum core approach runs into the obvious problem that some poor 
countries would not be able to guarantee even those minimum levels. 
The minimum core approach has to be rejected, thus, because it entail 
duties which would be sometimes unfair, sometimes unfeasible, often 
both.
228 Id, 341 .
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The insurance approach, on the contrary, provides a solution 
which is at the same time fair and feasible. Indeed, by defining the 
minimum levels as what prudent people would choose to insure against 
in a given community where they all have the same risk to suffer 
disadvantages and resources are fairly distributed, we can be confident 
that those levels will never be more than a community could afford or 
should provide as a matter of justice. That is, the minimum levels will 
be always connected to resource availability and adequate principles of 
distributive justice.
But we still must try to see if this ideal insurance scheme could 
yield practical, i.e. manageable standards for the debate and protection of 
social rights, especially through courts. Before I move on to that, 
however, a note of caution. As Dworkin and other philosophers are 
always eager to warn, “it would be foolish to expect any philosophical 
theory to answer [the difficult practical questions they try to address] in 
detail, and even more foolish to expect it to provide answers that 
everyone in the relevant political community would accept.” What they 
can do, however, is to “provide a structure within which a public debate 
could usefully take place, a structure that both sets the terms of argument 
and provides limits to the range of answers that any side could in good 
faith take to be plausible.”230
I do not claim, therefore, that the insurance scheme can provide a 
clear and uncontroversial definition of minimum level social rights easily 
manageable by courts, but rather a much better and adequate guide than 
the minimum core approach in this admittedly difficult task.
229 Dworkin makes the same claim in Sovereign Virtue, at 334.
230 Id, p. 322. Note, however, that some philosophers are completely sceptical of, and 
sometimes against, the claim that philosophy might be useful to the solution of practical 
matter in any ways. For the first view, see Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions, Introduction, for 
the second view, see Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, op. cit.
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So, what would the insurance scheme have to say about the level 
of food, housing, health care etc the State has a duty to guarantee to all 
its citizens? As it is clear from the discussion above, this is a question to 
be answered differently according to the specific circumstances of the 
community in question. This is because differences in economic 
development, people’s attitudes, tastes and preferences, will all have a 
significant impact in the outcome of the hypothetical insurance exercise. 
What I will aim to do, then, is test the insurance approach in a couple of 
real situations where we have a reasonable idea of those factors to see 
how it might work. Let us take again, for that purpose, the South African 
cases concerning the right to health care which we have already 
discussed in previous chapters.
Take Soobramoney first, a case in which the plaintiff, a 41 year 
old unemployed person suffering from kidney failure claimed that his 
constitutional right to health care should entitle him to renal dialysis. 
Let us speculate, first, how the alternate approaches we have rejected 
would have dealt with this case. If the courts followed the “rescue 
principle”, which we will see in the appendix is the prevalent approach in 
Brazil and other South American countries, Mr Soobramoney would 
have won his case without any difficulty. In fact, all the court would 
have to say is that the constitutional right to health care demands that the 
State provides any treatment required to everyone, no matter how 
expensive or efficient. We saw already how such an approach, when not 
totally unfeasible, would lead to consequences that can be hardly 
regarded as just. Let us turn, then, to the minimum core approach. Would 
Mr Soobramoney win or loose his case? That depends on whether renal 
dialysis is defined as part of the minimum core or not. As we saw, there 
are two different versions of the minimum core, which we called
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absolute and relative above. On the absolute version, the minimum core 
is defined independently of the issue of resource availability. It is based 
purely on basic needs. So, if the court followed that version of the 
approach, it would have first to decide whether renal dialysis is a basic 
health care need. If so, the duty of the State to provide it, and as a 
consequence the corresponding right of Mr Soobramoney, would have 
been established. It might still turn out, however, that available resources 
(however defined) are not sufficient to fund such a right to everyone. 
Here, as we saw, the minimum core approach has to rely on the counter­
intuitive claim that some rights might be impossible to fulfil at a given 
moment, or on the unhelpful concept of progressive rights which I have 
criticised in Chapter 2.232 But let us assume, for the sake of the 
argument, that there are enough resources (however one defines that) to 
provide everyone with renal dialysis and all other social rights defined 
according to the absolute version of the minimum core. The prima facie 
right of Mr Soobramoney would then become a definitive right, and the 
court would have to order the State to provide him with renal dialysis. 
But that, as I argued, would completely overlook one of the basic 
principles that any adequate theory of distributive justice has to respect, 
namely that which makes people responsible for their own choices in 
life. Indeed, what if Mr Soobramoney, for instance, has spent all his 
resources in heavy drinking, which caused not just his kidney failure but 
also his incapacity to pay for the treatment he now needs? Would it be 
fair to ask others to sacrifice some of their non-basic yet also important 
needs in order to give him treatment? In the minimum core approach this 
question doesn’t even arise. Moreover, even if it was clear that Mr 
Soobramoney’s current condition was due exclusively to circumstance,
231 See the Appendix for a different discussion of this case.
232 See discussion in Chapter 2.
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that would not automatically establish his right to have his disadvantage 
completely eliminated. As I tried to show, the aim of justice cannot 
possibly be to eliminate all disadvantages resulting from circumstance, 
but rather mitigate them in a way that doesn’t cripple society or takes 
from everyone else’s what is essential not just for surviving, but to lead a 
fulfilling life. We must discard, thus, as we had already shown, the 
absolute version of the minimum core approach. But thus the relative 
version fare better? It would surely avoid the counter-intuitive claim of 
proclaiming rights which might turn out to be impossible to guarantee. It 
would not be immune, however, to the other flaws of the minimum core 
approach. Indeed, it doesn’t offer any help in defining what is actually 
required from the State when the core minima cannot be guaranteed due 
to lack of resources (however this is determined).
Let us speculate now, then, how the insurance scheme would deal 
with Soobramoney. The judges would have to imagine what level of 
coverage prudent people would choose to insure for if everyone had the 
same risk of suffering from the same medical conditions and, equally 
important, resources in South Africa were fairly distributed. As I have 
admitted above, this is not an easy task, and its outcome would not be 
uncontroversial. That is, different reasonable people engaging in it would 
probably come up with different results. It should not be impossible to 
come up with a range of outcomes, though, within which most 
reasonable people’s opinions would fall. So, the crucial question in 
Soobramoney is: would renal dialysis be covered by such hypothetical 
insurance? If so, in which cases, i.e. for people of what age, for how 
long, under which conditions etc?
Now, the first thing to take into account, as we saw, is the 
economic capacity of the relevant community. Since the insurance 
approach is strongly reliant on actual people’s hypothetical choices, we
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have to speculate what level of coverage prudent people would actually 
choose, not ideally wish for. Our point of departure, thus, is a fair 
distribution of the relevant community’s actual resources. It seems 
plausible, hence, to take income per capita as our rough guide to what a 
initial fair distribution of resources would be, based on which people 
would make their choice of insurance coverage. In communities with 
more resources, and therefore a higher income per capita, the chosen 
coverage would probably be higher than in poorer communities. That is 
what, incidentally, drives our moral instinct when we feel more outraged 
with poverty in societies with plenty of resources than in poorer ones.
Let us analyse, thus, some basic information about South Africa’s 
economy to shed some light into our speculative exercise. Its gross 
national income per capita is, according to the latest survey of the World 
Bank, US$ 2,820 which, in purchase power parity (ppp)233, goes up to 
US$ 10,910. This qualifies South Africa as a high income country (US$ 
9,206 or more), placing it above European countries such as Russia (US$ 
6,880) and Poland (US$ 9,370), and just behind Hungary (US$ 
11,990).234 This information should provide the basis for the hypothetical 
insurance exercise. What sort of coverage would a prudent person, whose 
fair initial share of resources were US$ 10,910 be likely to buy, taking 
into account local circumstances such as the prevalent diseases, social 
attitude towards them, other important interests of individuals and the 
community etc? For our specific purposes in dealing with Soobramoney, 
would the likely chosen coverage include renal dialysis in Mr 
Soobramoney’s circumstances?
As I said, it is foolish to expect the insurance scheme to provide a 
clear and uncontroversial answer to these difficult questions, but it can
233 i.e. the equivalent purchase power to American dollars in the US economy.
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surely provide an approximate answer. Taking into account the real 
economic situation in South Africa, that is, a high income country (i.e. 
income per capita of US$ 10,910), it would be impossible to maintain, 
for instance, that the minimum level could not cover even fairly basic 
procedures and treatment such as those usually described as primary 
health care (e.g. consultation with a general practitioner, basic medicine 
such as antibiotics, basic preventive measures such as simple information 
on how to prevent common diseases etc). On the other hand, it could also 
be confidently ruled out of the minimum level very expensive or 
speculative procedures such as life maintaining and enhancing treatment 
for the very old. Now, it is important to re-emphasise that this is not 
simply because South Africa, or any other country at a similar level of 
economic development, would be able to afford the former but not the 
latter (that would be the rationale of the minimum core approach which I 
have rejected). Rather, it is for the normative (i.e. morally determined) 
reason that prudent people with that level of resources would certainly 
buy insurance for the former but not for the latter conditions.
This is certainly still too vague to provide any useful guidance in a 
case such as Soobramoney. But it would be quite sufficient in other 
cases, such as TAC (which we will discuss shortly) and is rather helpful 
to make us see the real flaw in statements such as the following, made by 
Chaskalson CJ in that case:
“[35]A purposive reading of sections 26 and 27 does not lead to any 
other conclusion. It is impossible to give everyone access even to a 
"core" service immediately. All that is possible, and all that can be 
expected of the state, is that it act reasonably to provide access to the 
socio-economic rights identified in sections 26 and 27 on a progressive 
basis.”
234See World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2003, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2003/index.htm.
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In Grootboom the relevant context in which socio-economic
rights
need to be interpreted was said to be that
"[millions of people are living in deplorable conditions and in great 
poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, inadequate social 
security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate 
health services. These conditions already existed when the 
Constitution was adopted..."
Chaskalson J is clearly focusing on the fact that millions of people 
in South Africa are deprived of even basic needs, so that immediate 
satisfaction of those needs would require a vast amount of resources 
which, he claims, would be impossible for the South African government 
to afford. Now, impossibility can be interpreted in many different ways. 
If what Chaskalson CJ is claiming is that South Africa is too poor a 
country to be enable everyone to satisfy basic needs, he is clearly wrong, 
as we have just seen. US$ 10,910 per capita (ppp) a year would be 
evidently sufficient for people not to fall below a basic needs threshold. 
What makes millions of people unable to do so is the distribution of 
resources prevalent in South Africa. That fact alone, however, though 
morally relevant, has to be analysed in more depth from the perspective 
of distributive justice. When we claim, for instance, that the distribution 
of resources that deprives millions of South African people of basic 
needs is itself unjust and demonstrate this through the insurance 
approach, then we show not only that Chaskalson CJ’s claim is wrong 
(i.e. that it is not impossible to guarantee basic needs to everyone), but
235also that this is morally required.
235 Not surprisingly, however, along with countries such as Brazil, and Guatemala, South 
Africa is one of the countries in the world with the most unequal income distribution. Income
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But we must return, now, to Soobramoney, which represents a 
greater challenge to the insurance approach. Indeed, it is easy to see that 
very basic treatment would certainly feature in the insurance policy 
chosen by prudent people with an initial annual income per capita of 
US$ 10,910. But what of renal dialysis, would that be chosen? In what 
cases? We should not overstate, however, the difficulties of this inquiry, 
especially in countries like South Africa where there is an actual and 
reasonably developed private health insurance sector that can serve as a 
paradigm. We might well look at what private health care insurers 
would charge to cover for renal dialysis, for instance, to help us consider 
whether that would likely feature in our prudent person’s choice of 
insurance in the hypothetical scheme. One of South Africa’s main 
providers of health care insurance, for instance, offers three difference 
choices of policies, ranging from R565 to R2265. Now, since all of them 
cover the total cost of renal dialysis treatment, we can take the cheapest
237one (at R565) as our paradigm of comparison. That is the equivalent 
of US$ 80 a month, which adds up to US$ 960 a year.238 The question 
we have to ask, thus, is this: would a prudent person whose annual 
income was around US$ 10.910 be likely to choose a policy covering for 
health care and including the risk of needing renal dialysis treatment at
distribution among the population is usually measured through the GINI coefficient, which 
goes from 0 to 100. Since 0 represents absolute equality (i.e. everyone gets the same amount 
of income) and 100 total inequality (i.e. one person in a country gets all the income) the closer 
to 0 the more equal a country’s income distribution is and vice-versa. On the study I have 
used, the South African GINI index was 58.4, losing only to Brazil (63,4) and Guatemala 
(59,6). see Tatyana P. Soubbotina , Katherine Sheram, Beyond Economic Growth: Meeting the 
Challenges o f Global Development, World Bank, 2000. Table 1, pp 110-121.
236 Out of the 44 million population of South Africa, 7 million benefit from some form of 
private health insurance.
237 This data is available at the website of the private insurance company Protector Health 
(www .protectorgroup.co.za/h index. asp). The different policies available are called, from the 
most expensive to the cheapest, “Flexicare plus”, “Flexicare”, and “Xtreme Care”, all of them 
covering renal dialysis at “100% of Recommended Scale of Benefits tariff’ and subject to pre­
authorisation.
238 Exchange rate of 10.10.2003, according to the webpage www.xe.com .
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the cost of US$ 960 a year, that is, roughly 10% of her annual 
income?239
Now, this would again vary from country to country, since what a 
person would be able to do with the remainder 90% of her annual 
income, and what are the things she would have to sacrifice in order to 
pay the insurance premium would certainly vary according to economic, 
social and cultural factors prevalent in the relevant community. To take 
an extreme example, it might well be the case, for instance, that to 
accumulate as much gold as one can during one’s life span (no matter 
how long it is) is perceived as infinitely more important in a certain 
community than having a reasonably long and healthy life. In such a 
community, it would be plausible to infer that the extra costs of insuring 
against the risk of needing renal dialysis treatment would impact so 
much on this other, more important need, that prudent people would not 
choose to insure against that risk. In most societies, however, it seems 
more plausible to assume that most prudent people would not miss the 
opportunity to insure against such a debilitating and lethal risk if it can 
be done at the cost of a small percentage of one’s annual income. Further 
evidence to that is the fact that, as we saw, all policies available in the 
market, including the cheapest, most basic one, does cover for renal 
dialysis.
I believe it would be fair to conclude, thus, that the insurance 
approach would probably recommend a different decision in 
Soobramoney. If I am right to assume that the cost to insure against renal 
dialysis is such that most prudent people would purchase such insurance 
if resources were justly distributed in South Africa, then renal dialysis
239 It is important to notice that the price of health care insurance covering renal dialysis in the 
ideal insurance scheme would likely be much lower than that offered in the South African 
private market. This is because the pool of insurable people would be 44 million and not just 7 
million.
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could be confidently regarded as encompassed in the social right to 
health care. It should be clear, after this discussion, that the insurance 
approach would also recommend judgement for the plaintiffs in the TAC 
case.240 It is actually hard to imagine a case in which the insurance 
scheme would provide a clearer answer. The consequences of not 
receiving treatment are so dreadful in that case (i.e. passing HIV on to 
your baby), and the costs of the treatment so insignificant, that no 
rational prudent person would consider not taking the insurance.
In the light of the discussion above, I think it is possible to 
conclude that the insurance approach would require a different decision 
in Soobramoney and provide a better justification for the decision in 
TAC.
In the final section of this chapter I want to discuss another 
different approach to the justification and determination of the social 
minimum, put forward by Charles Fried in his famous book Right and 
Wrong, and developed further in a well known article called 
“Distributive Justice”.241 The reason why I think this is necessary is that 
Fried’s proposal, as we shall see, shares the belief we have been 
defending in this study against the minimum core approach, i.e. that an 
adequate theory of distributive justice should be sensitive to the principle 
of individual responsibility, and yet bases the social minimum on a very 
different argument to the one I have just defended.
240 See chapter 6 for a description of the case.
241 See Social Philosophy and Policy, 1 (1983), 45-59.
Duty of Beneficence
I have claimed so far in this chapter that the minimum core approach is 
to be rejected in favour of the insurance approach because it fails, 
contrary to the latter, to provide an adequate moral justification for the 
resource redistribution it demands. My main arguments to that effect 
were that the principle of distributive justice on which the minimum core 
approach relies (i.e. equal basic needs satisfaction) is insensitive to one 
of our most basic moral intuitions (that people should bear responsibility 
for their free choices in life) and would demand, if seriously followed, 
redistributions which would not only be often unfeasible, but also impose 
an unfair sacrifice on society, infringing the most fundamental principle 
of justice, that is, equality in the sense of equal concern and respect.
We must consider now, thus, an alternate approach which 
purports to take into account that basic intuition and fundamental 
principle, but, unlike my favoured approach, maintains that distributive 
justice has got nothing to do with equality of resources. I take Charles 
Fried’s “Distributive Justice” as an academic illustration of such 
approach, but I think it might appeal to many people.
The argument goes like this. Even though disadvantages resultant 
from circumstance (e.g. lack of talent), are certainly regrettable from a 
moral perspective, they are so not because of the inequality that ensue 
between the unlucky and the lucky. There is nothing morally wrong, he 
claims, in the fact that wealth-talented people do better in comparison 
with non-talented ones. Talent, for Fried, is part of a person, and so 
should be the fruits of that talent. In his own words:
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“I am entitled to them [his talents] as I am entitled to my two kidneys.
... But if I am entitled to what I do not deserve -  i.e. my talents - it is no 
long step to conclude that I am also entitled to what I acquire by those 
talents, at least if I do so without depriving anyone else of what he may 
have had but for my activity.”242
He doesn’t claim, however, that no redistribution is therefore 
morally required from talented and able people to non-talented and 
disabled ones, but only that the justification for redistribution is not in 
what Rawls and Dworkin call morally arbitrary inequalities (those not 
derived from choices). Rather, he maintains, it is grounded on a duty of 
beneficence based on the sympathy we must display towards our fellow 
citizens without which we “would devalue in others what gives us moral 
worth.”243 In short, it is not equality that imposes on us a duty to help the 
needy, “it is the need itself, the misery itself, which makes the claim 
upon us for our sympathetic concern as fellow human beings.”244 
He concludes, then, that
“A person has a claim on his fellows to a standard package of basic or 
essential goods -  housing, education, health care, food; i.e. the social 
(or decent) minimum -  if by reasonable efforts he cannot earn enough 
to procure this minimum for himself.”245
Fried’s proposal might seem quite similar, at first sight, to the 
minimum core approach I rejected in the previous chapter. Like that
242 Id., p. 50.
243 “To proclaim indifference in the fact of misery is to devalue in others what gives us moral 
worth.” op cit, p. 51. This supposedly follows Kant’s fourth example in The Groundwork o f  
the Metaphysics o f Morals Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp 33 and 39. (duty of 
beneficence). Kant derives a duty to help from his categorical imperative “Act as if the maxim 
of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.” He claims that no-one 
could will that a maxim that left needy people to their own devices became a universal law, 
“since many cases could occur in which one would need the love and sympathy of others and 
in which, by such a law of nature arisen by his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of 
the assistance he wishes for himself.”, p. 33.
244 Id., p. 52.
245 Ibid.
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approach, for instance, he takes the idea of needs as the crucial element 
in distributive justice. It is important to notice the following fundamental 
differences in both approaches, however, in order to duly evaluate 
Fried’s proposal. Firstly, it is not clear in the minimum core approach if 
an individual’s entitlement to the resources necessary to the satisfaction 
of basic needs is dependent on his reasonable efforts to “earn enough to 
procure this minimum for himself.” I interpreted the minimum core as 
being insensitive to choice, and this should include, I believe, the choice 
not to work. Secondly, the decent minimum, for Fried, is actually the 
maximum an individual can claim in the name of distributive justice from 
his fellow citizens, whereas in the minimum core approach it is just a 
part of a much larger claim to the full satisfaction of needs (and not just 
basic needs), provisionally on hold due to resource scarcity. Finally, 
whilst Fried’s proposal denies the role of any idea of equality in his 
distributive justice theory, the minimum core approach is reliant on a 
particular version of that idea (equality of welfare).
Though apparently similar, therefore, those approaches are 
actually radically different. I have already discussed the flaws of the 
minimum core approach. Now I must show why the insurance approach 
I defended is superior to Fried’s proposal as well.
His main contention, then, is that equality plays no role in the 
principle of distributive justice that should determine the decent 
minimum. What really matters is the fact that some people are in dire 
need. To deny them help, thus, would display a lack of recognition in 
others of the worth which we, as human beings, all have. Now, this 
might strike many as intuitively right. Most of us are deeply bothered by 
the mere thought that some people have less than what we think is 
necessary for anyone to lead a minimally decent life, without necessarily 
knowing how they compare with other people in their communities. That
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might well indicate, one could argue, that what underlies our moral 
feelings is, as put by Harry Frankfurt in a well known paper, “not the 
fact that some of the individuals in those situations have less money than 
others, but the fact that those with less have too little”246 He calls this 
the “doctrine of sufficiency”.
I certainly agree, as it should be clear by now, that what bothers 
most of us, or should bother us, is not the fact that some people have 
more money (or resources in general) than others. That would be 
condemned only by a radical theory of equality of outcome in wealth 
(economic equality in Frankfurt’s terminology), which I have dismissed 
above as inadequate and utterly unappealing. But, as I also tried to show 
above, what is morally relevant in terms of distributive justice is not 
simply that some people have too little, irrespective of what brought that 
situation about. The causes of deprivation are not only important, but 
actually essential for the adequate moral assessment of the issue. If 
someone has too little now because of free choices he made in the past 
(say, to spend all his resources in leisure rather than saving), we might 
still feel sympathy for his current predicament, and even feel compelled 
to give some of our resources to minimize his plight. But we will 
certainly not regard that person as having an entitlement to our help 
based on any idea of distributive justice. This would become even more 
clear if, to help that person, we had to sacrifice some of our non-basic 
but still very important needs. Imagine, for instance, that I have saved 
for a long period of my life so as to buy a good piano, which will satisfy 
my important (but arguably non-basic need) of practising at home in 
order to become a better piano player. Just when I am about to buy that 
piano in the shop, I leam that with the same amount of money I could 
save Mr Soobramoney by paying for him to have his badly needed
246 See, H Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal”, Ethics, 98 (1987), pp. 21-43, at 32.
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dialysis in a private hospital. Now, should I be under a moral duty based 
on justice to give up buying the piano and transfer my money to Mr 
Soobramoney? Now, it is clear that this question cannot be properly 
answered without a host of information such as why the state hasn’t got 
enough resources to provide Mr Soobramoney with dialysis, whether 
other people besides me are also in a position to help Mr Soobramoney 
etc. An even more crucial piece of information, however, would be the 
reason why Mr Soobramoney is now incapable of affording the renal 
dialysis he needs whilst I can afford a new piano. If, for instance, despite 
having had a real opportunity to use his fair share of society’s resources 
to protect himself against such situation, say by buying medical 
insurance, he nonetheless decided not to do so, it is inappropriate to 
claim that I am under a duty now to give up my non-basic need for a
247piano in order to rescue Mr Soobramoney.
This is enough to show, I believe, how the doctrine of sufficiency 
is inadequate. Just as the minimum core approach, it fails to take into 
account our moral basic intuition that the personal responsibility for our 
own choices is to be included in any adequate principle of distributive 
justice. But Fried’s proposal, as you will remember, is different from the 
minimum core approach in this fundamental way: it does take into 
account the principle of personal responsibility. In fact, as we saw, it 
conditions the entitlement to the decent minimum on the reasonable 
effort of the individual to procure the minimum for himself. This reveals 
an inherent tension in Fried’s proposal. Indeed, he seems to want to avail 
himself of the doctrine of sufficiency, which places basic needs at the
247 It is important to remember, at this point, that the insurance approach would most likely 
lead to the conclusion that renal dialysis should be included in the decent minimum in a 
society with the economic strength of South Africa. In that case, however, it would be also 
likely that I, as a citizen of that country, would not have to give up my piano need in order for 
Mr Soobramoney to have his dialysis. My example now is meant to show only how the 
doctrine of sufficiency is flawed for not being sensitive to choice.
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core of a distributive justice theory, without ignoring, however, the 
principle of personal responsibility. Does he succeed? I don’t think so.
The very appeal of the doctrine of sufficiency, as we saw, draws 
on our intuitions that it matters when people are unable to satisfy their 
basic needs. Once we complement those intuitions with the principle of 
personal responsibility, however, it becomes clear that basic needs per 
se cannot provide a metric for just resource distribution. It might be 
absolutely fair, as we showed, that some people have more than what is 
necessary for the satisfaction of their basic needs whilst others have not. 
But what justifies such conclusion is precisely the idea of equality 
(interpreted as equal concern) that Fried wants to reject. In fact, the very 
principle of personal responsibility that Fried tries to capture in his 
condition for the decent minimum entitlement can only be explained by 
that idea. That is, we do not impose transfers from the better off to the 
worse off when the latter’s predicament is exclusively resultant from 
their free choice because that would entail treating the better off unfairly 
(i.e. without equal concern).
To justify why some people are entitled to the decent minimum 
whilst others are not, therefore, Fried cannot do away with the idea of 
equality. For that he would have to embrace the doctrine of sufficiency 
without conditions, but then be open to the criticism made above (which 
he clearly does not want to do). But once the idea of equality is seen as 
essential for an adequate theory of distributive justice, the other flaws of 
Fried’s proposal become apparent. It becomes clear that his decent 
minimum might be too much at times, and too little at others and, 
perhaps most importantly, that his justification for the decent minimum 
entitlement is inadequate. Let us see this in more detail.
I have tried to show above that a basic minimum determined 
through the idea of basic needs would yield results that might not only
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be unfair, but also unfeasible. The classic example, as we saw, is that of 
the severely handicapped person. To bring that person to the level of 
basic needs satisfaction might be simply impossible, or possible only 
through demanding a huge sacrifice from society which would display a 
lack of equal concern to those required to make such sacrifice. That is 
why one of the great qualities, I maintained, of the insurance approach. 
It aims at minimizing disadvantages by giving to people an equal 
opportunity to insure against them at a prudent level, not at eliminating 
the risk of disadvantage itself. Fried’s proposal, on the contrary, would 
demand the impossible, or such huge sacrifice from society, because the 
only test imposed for the entitlement to the decent minimum is that the 
person makes a reasonable effort to earn the decent minimum, a test 
which we might assume the severely handicapped would automatically 
pass.
But let us assume that this problem can be solved by adding an 
extra condition to the decent minimum entitlement. Let us say, for 
instance, that “a person has a claim on his fellows to a standard package 
of basic or essential goods -  housing, education, health care, food; i.e. 
the social (or decent) minimum -  if by reasonable efforts he cannot earn 
enough to procure this minimum for himself’, and (my addition):“to the 
extent that this is not unfeasible and does not impose an excessive 
sacrifice on society.” Now the obvious question would be how to 
determine what represents an excessive sacrifice on society, and the 
metric of basic goods or needs would be totally unhelpful.
This points out to the other, opposite problem that Fried’s 
proposal faces. Why is someone’s entitlement restricted to his basic 
goods decent minimum? Why, for instance, in a rich society distributive 
justice would recommend redistribution only to this maximum limit of 
the decent minimum? Fried’s explanation combines two elements. The
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decent minimum is supposed to satisfy the moral demand of sympathy to 
others’ misery but only up to a level that does not impinge excessively 
on liberty. I have just showed how this second concern is not totally 
cared for in Fried’s proposal, especially when applied to poor 
communities. But now we are dealing with the opposite objection, that 
is, that the decent minimum might be too little when applied in rich 
communities. The extent to which liberty is infringed, as I claimed, is a 
normative question, which is dependent (and not autonomous) on the 
broader question of justice we are dealing with. That is, if it is just that 
resources are redistributed from the better off to the disadvantaged, there 
is no loss to liberty. What we must try to determine, then, is when that 
transfer is recommended by justice. Fried’s proposal here seems to me 
completely implausible in trying to replace beneficence, or sympathy for 
equality.
He suggests that there is nothing inherently wrong in the fact that 
some people, due to their talents (or wealth-talent to be more accurate), 
end up having a bigger share of society’s resources than others, who 
happen to lack those talents, or whose talents are not wealth-talents 
during their life span. He rejects the claim, in other words, that 
inequalities derived from circumstance and not choice are morally 
arbitrary and should therefore in principle be mitigated. But he doesn’t 
want to go as far as radical libertarians and claim that no redistribution is 
therefore morally justified because it would entail a violation of people’s 
liberty. His strategy is thus to defend what he claims is an independent 
ground for the justification of redistribution: a duty of beneficence. I 
have tried to show above that this is not really an independent ground for 
redistribution (i.e. independent from equality), because Fried’s other 
claim that only those who make a reasonable effort to procure the decent 
minimum for themselves but fail are entitled to receive it from others is
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better explained by the idea of equality as equal concern. It would 
display a lack of equal concern for those who did make reasonable 
efforts and succeeded to take their resources to rescue those who did not 
even make a similar effort. What I want to ask now, then, is if this idea 
of beneficence, or sympathy, has any supplementary value in a theory of 
distributive justice. On one hand, the idea of beneficence has the 
connotation of someone helping another out of a concern for that 
person’s predicament and nothing else. It doesn’t matter what brought 
the predicament about. Fried is right, then, to describe this duty as 
flowing from “the need itself, the misery itself ...” as an appeal to “our
248sympathetic concern as fellow human beings.” On the other hand, 
beneficence implies help that demands from the helper a sacrifice in the 
sense of giving away something that is rightly his and, as a consequence, 
is right of him to keep beyond the very restricted limits of his duty of 
beneficence. It is closely related, thus, to the idea of charity. Fried’s 
proposal seems to be clearly contradictory as to the former aspect of 
beneficence. If what matters for beneficence is the need itself, and not 
how it came about, it is plainly irrelevant (from the perspective of 
beneficence) if someone made reasonable efforts or not to avoid his 
predicament. The major flaw in his argument, however, is related to the 
second aspect of beneficence. Indeed, his argument to restrict 
redistribution to the decent minimum works only if we accept his 
contentions that wealth-talents are “part of a person” and that, as a 
consequence, the fruits of wealth-talent are like a person’s kidneys, that 
is, something to which they are entitled. If this were correct, then he 
would be right in his claim that the only justification for redistribution is 
beneficence, and beneficence, as we saw, tends to be rather restricted.
248 Id., p. 52.
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But Fried is not right, I believe, in his position regarding wealth- 
talents. Even if we go along with him in the metaphysical claim that they 
are “part of a person”, we are still not committed to agree that they are 
therefore like our kidneys in the sense that we are entitled to them. To 
the extent to which we can classify wealth-talent as a matter of 
circumstance, or at least partially so, (i.e. of having the right talents at 
the right place and the right time), there is no compelling moral 
argument to justify our full entitlement to the fruits we are able to amass 
with them. Moreover, to claim that someone is entitled to the fruits of 
his wealth-talent is tantamount to claim that he is also entitled to the 
system in which his wealth-talent bears those fruits. But this is plainly 
absurd.
He seems to confuse a matter of distributive justice with charity. 
People are entitled to a certain minimum of social goods not because of 
others’ sympathy, or duty of beneficence, but rather because they own a 
fair share of society’s resources which would enable them, in a just 
society, to achieve that minimum through their own means.
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C o n c l u s io n
I appraised in this study the controversial question of the judicial 
enforcement of so-called social and economic rights (social rights 
justiciability), specifically the rights to health care, education, housing 
and food. I reviewed the main arguments usually raised against 
justiciability, namely that courts lack legitimacy and institutional 
capacity to deal with the issues involved (i.e. resource allocation issues).
I rejected, like others have done, that the judicial enforcement of 
social rights would necessarily entail usurpation of political powers by 
the courts. I did not contend with the argument that courts should never 
adjudicate rights, whether civil and political or social and economic. 
That is, the view that judicial review is irreconcilable with democracy 
and therefore always illegitimate, though I disagree with it. Rather, I 
claimed that once judicial review to protect rights against the 
majoritarian will is accepted as a legitimate practice in a given 
community, as it is the case in most countries that have recognised social 
rights in their constitutions, then there are no grounds for distinguishing 
between civil and social rights in terms of legitimacy. The enforcement 
of social rights entails no different interference than that of civil and 
political rights.
I was less ready to dismiss the argument from institutional 
capacity, however, than many partisans of social rights justiciability. I 
admitted (and provided concrete examples in the appendix) that courts 
are not used to deal with those types of problems that Fuller famously 
called polycentric (those in which a decision has direct effects far 
beyond the parties to the lawsuit). They have a tendency to see the
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lawsuit as a bilateral dispute with no effects on the wider community in 
which the decision is made.249 Given the prominent allocative effects of 
decisions concerning social and economic rights, this lack of insight can 
have inauspicious consequences. If this were the only obstacle, 
however, it could be easily overcome. Indeed, the judicial process could 
be adapted (and actually has already been to some extent in various 
countries) to deal with polycentric issues in a more adequate manner.
But the most difficult problem for justiciability, I claimed, is not 
that courts might be at an institutional disadvantage against the political 
branches to deal with polycentric issues. It is rather that the type of 
polycentric issue in question, i.e. the allocation of resources among 
competing individuals and social goods, involves an intractable 
normative problem of distributive justice which no institution can claim 
expertise over.
This point has been often overlooked in the debate, I argued, due 
to an inadequate conception of social rights usually assumed as correct, 
which I called the basic needs conception. According to that conception, 
which I discussed in detail in chapter 2, social rights are rights to the 
satisfaction of those needs, which can be deemed basic in the sense that 
human beings cannot survive (or lead a dignified life in a broader 
conception) without them. I left aside as not fatal to that conception 
objections related to the difficulties of defining basic needs. I claimed 
that we might well be able to reach some definition of basic needs 
which, though not accepted by everyone as correct, can be accepted as 
plausible by most people. The problem with the basic needs conception, 
I argued, is elsewhere. It is in the very justification of social rights to 
basic needs. Why, that is, is everyone in a given community entitled to
249 Even more so judges of civil law jurisdictions, since their decisions have no binding force 
on other courts.
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have their basic needs satisfied, no matter how wealthy that community 
is, or how differently individuals of that community behave?
As to the first point, given that, according to basic needs 
conception, social rights are defined according to needs alone, resource 
scarcity is wrongly seen as a contingent problem, not a constitutive one 
to the definition of the contents of social rights. That is, no matter how 
wealthy a community is, everyone has an abstract right to the 
satisfaction of basic needs. If it turns out that the community in question 
does not have enough resources which, if  evenly distributed, would 
enable everyone to satisfy their basic needs (however defined), then that 
abstract right cannot be immediately realised. All attention, thus, is 
focused on an ideal future, when resources will be sufficient for the full 
guarantee of social rights. Whilst that day does not come, we are told 
that social and economic rights are not immediately claimable, but rather 
“progressively” so, as resources allow. As I claimed in this study, this 
creates not only a conceptual problem for the basic needs theory (how 
can we call rights something which cannot be immediately claimed?), 
but highlights the flaw in its justification.
Indeed, even when that day arrives when a community has 
enough resources so that everyone could in principle have their basic 
needs satisfied (as it has for many developed countries), it is not clear 
why that community would be under a duty to fully guarantee 
everyone’s basic needs before furthering other common interests it 
might wish to pursue, and before anyone else in that society can afford 
satisfying more than basic needs. If we accept that equality in the sense 
of equal concern and respect is a fundamental principle of a democratic 
community, we are bound to conclude that, even when resources are
250 See the discussion in the appendix about the Brazilian cases.
187
sufficient to satisfy everyone’s basic needs in a given community, that 
does not necessarily mean we have a duty to do so at the cost of all other 
interests and needs we have as individuals and collectively.
To illustrate this point I built a “two-person model” community in 
which one of them, Carlos, was hard working and thus managed to 
produce enough resources so as to be able to satisfy his basic needs and 
more, whilst the other, Ana, was rather lazy and therefore unable to 
satisfy her basic needs through the resources she managed to produce. 
This simple but powerful example, which emulates, of course, Aesop’s 
famous fable, is sufficient to highlight the major flaw of the basic needs 
conception. Indeed, it would be very implausible to argue that Ana is 
entitled to demand from Carlos that he transfers to her all the resources 
she needs to be able to satisfy her basic needs even if he has enough to 
do that and still satisfy his own basic needs. This is because a just 
distribution of resources has to be sensitive to the choices people make 
in their lives, as I discussed in detail in chapter 2 when adopting Rawls 
and Dworkin choice-circumstance dichotomy as a basic tenet of 
distributive justice. I was careful to make clear that I do not discard the 
plausibility that Carlos might be under a duty to help Ana. Yet such a 
duty, I claimed, would be based on the value of humanity, solidarity, or 
beneficence, and not on a corresponding right of Ana grounded on the 
principle of justice.
Whatever the level of resources available in a community, 
therefore, the definition of the content of social and economic rights will 
always involve an intractable normative problem of resource 
distribution. This is because, as we saw, social and economic rights are 
not rights to the satisfaction of a determined level of basic needs. They 
are rights to a fair share of society’s resources which might well vary
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from individual to individual, enabling some to satisfy basic needs and 
more, and others not to satisfy basic needs.
The definition of what level of health care, food, housing etc an 
individual is entitled to as a matter of right collapses into the daunting 
distributive justice question of how much resources that individual is 
entitled to have. When a court is called upon to decide whether 
someone’s right to health care, or any other social right, has been 
violated, it has to tackle this intractable distributive justice issue.
The usual argument that courts lack institutional capacity to deal 
with polycentric issues, therefore, has to be qualified in the light of this 
correct conception of social rights, which I call the distributive 
conception. Indeed, if the basic needs conception was correct, then 
courts might well have been in a much more disadvantaged position, as 
compared to the executive, so as to allocate resources among all areas of 
basic needs. Indeed, in a democratic society, the executive has at least a 
prima facie institutional advantage in that matter, given the host of 
departments and personnel it maintains in each of those areas. It could 
be consistently argued, then, that the judiciary should refrain from 
interfering but for in those cases where it is clear that resource allocation 
is discriminative of certain groups or needs.251 Once it is clear that the 
social rights are not rights to basic needs, but rather rights to a fair share 
of a community’s resources, then the argument from institutional 
competence loses a great deal of its appeal, since it is rather implausible 
to claim that the executive or the legislature are better equipped than the 
judiciary to answer this intractable normative problem.
The sheer difficulty of the problem could certainly induce a 
sceptical stance towards social rights justiciability. One could claim, for
251 The South African decision in Soobramoney, which I discuss in the Appendix, would be a 
perfect model if the basic needs conception was correct.
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instance, that, given there is no right answer to this question of 
distributive justice, judges should better refrain from making decisions 
on social rights, leaving them for the political, representative institutions 
of society. This is not because, as I have just said, those institutions have 
more expertise on the matter. Rather, since no institution has an 
expertise advantage, it would be better that every citizen participated in 
those decisions, and not just a few.
But this would entail an abrogation of power by the judiciary that 
might be very dangerous. For one thing, given the shortcomings in 
representation to be found in any political institution, it might well be 
the case that judicial restraint curbs rather than enhances participation 
for many citizens, namely those whose financial condition exclude them 
of the political game. In the specific case of social rights, which benefit 
mostly the economically vulnerable, this is quite a real danger. Courts 
might well be the only channels of participation they can afford against 
an insensitive legislature. Moreover, even when the representative 
institutions do work properly (i.e. guaranteeing participation to 
everyone), there is a real risk that majoritarian rule keeps producing 
outcomes which will consistently ignore the interests of some minorities.
Those dangers of abrogation have to be taken into account and 
balanced against the danger of entrusting judges with controversial 
decisions such as those involved in the definition of the content of social
9 S Trights. It is in this more restricted sense , thus, that social rights 
justiciability poses a dilemma. If judges try to enforce them, they might 
be criticised for imposing their own view on issues that people fiercely 
disagree about. If they recoil from the task, however, the view of the
252 A philosophical defense of this argument as regards rights in general (not just social rights) 
can be found in Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, (Oxford, 1999).
253 As opposed to the broad sense described by Michelman in the passage I quote in the 
Introduction.
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political majority of the day will prevail and, quite arguably especially in 
developing countries, the most vulnerable will have their social rights 
systematically ignored.
It seems quite arguable, thus, that given the special position of the 
judiciary as protector of rights and minorities in a constitutional system 
that accepts judicial review, and the institutional constraints that apply to 
the judicial decision making process (namely the need to base their 
decisions on principles rather than policy grounds), they might be more 
suitable, in principle, to adjudicate social rights, even if the issue 
involved, distributive justice, is highly controversial.
Whatever institution takes up the task of defining social rights 
correctly understood as distributive rights, i.e. rights to a fair share of 
community’s resources, it will face the impossibility of applying the 
choice-circumstance criterion on a individual basis and with total 
precision. It will be rarely possible to determine if someone’s 
predicament as regards his ability to satisfy basic needs is traceable to 
the free choices he made in his life or to circumstances beyond his 
control. Most likely, it will be a combination of both, and the impact of 
each in the final outcome will be impossible to determine.
There is a need, therefore, to make use of some kind of 
presumption to circumvent this problem. That is, we must determine a 
level of social rights satisfaction below which we can safely presume 
that, most individuals, having had a fair opportunity to participate in the 
resources produced in that community, would not fall. I considered the 
possibility of using basic needs in that manner, that is, as this 
presumptive minimum level. It would rescue the basic needs conception 
from the inconsistency I claimed it has. But it would be too arbitrary to 
elect basic needs as that minimum presumptive threshold. Indeed, it
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would certainly be too high at times, especially in poorer countries, and 
too low at others, especially in richer ones.
I suggested, thus, a model inspired on Ronald Dworkin’s theory 
of distributive justice (equality of resources), and his strategy (the 
prudent insurer ideal) to render it applicable in the real world. I discuss 
that model in detail in chapter 7. According to that model, to reach a 
minimum threshold of resources below which most people would not 
fall save for some likely unjust reason (i.e. factors related to 
circumstance rather than choice), we should perform a counter-factual 
judgement in the following way. What level of health care, food, or 
resources in general, would someone insure against the risk of not being 
able to command, if certain ideal conditions obtained? Those conditions 
are the following: everyone has the same initial share of the 
community’s resources, everyone has the same antecedent risk of not 
being able to command those resources, and everyone can buy insurance 
against it with the same policy structure. The answer to that question, i.e. 
what level of coverage would the reasonable person purchase in that 
ideal insurance market can serve as the presumptive minimum threshold 
we need to determine the contents of social rights. The appeal of such an 
insurance model is that, unlike basic needs, it is inextricably linked to 
the actual resource availability of a community. In poorer communities, 
the minimum level will be certainly lower than in richer ones. Moreover, 
it circumvents the problem of identifying the input of choice- 
circumstance in a person’s predicament in a highly defensible way. 
Indeed, it is quite plausible to argue that most people, when able to 
command a fair share of resources in the beginning of their lives, would 
choose to set aside a certain, reasonable part of those resources to insure 
against the risk of not being able to command a certain minimum of 
social goods in future. We can safely presume, therefore, that those who
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fall below that minimum in our community are likely victims of 
circumstance, not choice, and are entitled, therefore, to that minimum as 
a matter of justice.
As I said in the final chapter, I do not expect that such a model 
could be easily adopted in the courts. I do believe, however, that it can 
shed some light on the debate on justiciability.
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A p p e n d ix
C a s e  A n a l y s is  -  A  c o m p a r a t iv e  s t u d y
I have argued in this study that the debate on justiciability has 
been unhelpfully focused on the alleged structural differences between 
civil and political rights at one side, and social and economic rights at 
the other. As a consequence of that, the most important issue for 
justiciability, namely the determination of the precise content of social 
and economic rights, has received little attention. I discussed different 
possible conceptions of social rights in chapters 2, 5 and 6, and 
maintained that the greatest obstacle to justiciability lies in the 
intractable problem of distributive justice that the correct determination 
of their precise content involves.
In this appendix I intend to look in some depth at real cases 
involving social rights (some of which I mentioned in passing in the 
thesis), to see how courts already entrusted with social rights 
adjudication have coped with the obstacles I discussed above. The bulk 
of cases I analyse are from South Africa and Brazil, which have 
expressly recognised social and economic rights in their constitutions, 
yet take a very different approach to justiciability. They provide an 
interesting and fruitful opportunity for a comparative analysis. I do 
discuss other cases incidentally, though, mainly from other countries in 
South America (whose approach is similar, if not identical, to the 
Brazilian approach) and from the United States of America which, 
despite not recognising social rights in their federal constitution, have 
developed an interesting caseload on the right to education at the states’ 
constitutional jurisdiction level.
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Two Opposite Judicial Approaches
South Africa and Brazil provide an interesting case for a 
comparative analysis of social rights justiciability for many reasons. 
Both countries have adopted constitutions that expressly recognise social 
and economic rights soon after the ending of authoritarian regimes. 
Brazil came first, with the Constitution of 1988, nicknamed the “Citizen 
Constitution”, which brought back direct democratic elections for the 
President of the Republic, among many other democratic changes, and 
consolidated the end of the military regime that lasted for 21 years, until 
1985. South Africa’s constitution was adopted in 1996, with the end of 
the apartheid regime. In both countries, however, democracy in the form 
of political and civil rights wasn’t perceived as the single goal to be 
pursued through law reform at the end of the dictatorial regimes. The 
abject poverty of large parts of the population was also regarded as a 
matter for the legal system to amend. This certainly has something to do 
with the fact that South Africa and Brazil are both assiduous occupants 
of the unenvied top of the world table of income inequality in the among 
citizens. As a consequence of this inequality, even though neither 
country can be regarded as a poor country in terms of GNP per capita, 
large parts of the population, as I mentioned, live in poverty and are thus 
unable to satisfy their most basic needs to health care, education, 
housing, food etc.
That might explain to some extent why those countries have 
decided to constitutionalise social and economic rights. It was clear that 
their political systems had completely failed to deliver the distributive 
justice necessary to curb poverty in resource plentiful countries. The
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hope that the constitution and its enforcement could amend the situation 
was high during the redemocratisation period.
After 8 years in South Africa and 16 years in Brazil, the effects of 
the constitutionalisation of social rights are anything but auspicious in 
either country. They continue to top the table of the most unequal 
countries in the world and poverty, as a consequence, remains at 
shameful high levels. If the constitutional hope was hollow, to 
paraphrase the famous title of Gerald Rosenberg’s well-known book, is 
beyond the scope of this study to say, and actually almost impossible to 
ascertain.254 What I can and will try to do in this appendix is to see how 
the courts in these two countries have tackled cases grounded on the 
constitutional provisions recognising social rights.
The Constitutional Provisions 
Brazil
It seems appropriate to start by analysing the wording of the 
constitutional provisions that recognise social and economic rights in 
both countries. In Brazil, a whole chapter (chapter II, Title I) of the 1988 
Constitution was dedicated to social rights (“Dos Direitos Sociais”). 
Article 6 is the most relevant for our purposes:
“Art. 6 -  Education, health, work, housing, leisure, safety, social 
security, protection of motherhood and childhood, assistance to the 
destitute, are social rights in the form of this Constitution.” ^Art.6° - 
Sao direitos sociais a educagao, a saude, o trabalho, a moradia, o
254 The Hollow Hope: Can courts bring about social change?, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991, where he argues, based on empirical information about the desegregation cases in 
the United States, that litigation has played no significant role in the advancement of social 
change
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lazer, a seguranga, a previdencia social, a protegao a maternidade e a 
infancia, a assistencia aos desamparados, na forma desta 
Constituigao. ”)255
Further down, in Title VIII of the 1988 Constitution, named “Of 
The Social Order” (“Da Ordem Social”), each of those rights is further 
specified. Article 193 establishes the general principles of the social 
order in the following manner:
“ Art. 193 -  The social order is founded on the primacy of work and 
aimed at social well-being and justice.” (Art. 193 - A ordem social tern 
como base o primado do trabalho, e como objetivo o bem-estar e a 
justiga sociais.)
The following articles specify further how social security shall be 
financed and organised, and then comes article 196, which details the 
right to health established generically in article 6 quoted above:
“ Art. 196 -  Health is a right of everyone and a duty of the State, 
guaranteed by social and economic policies aimed at reducing the risk 
of illnesses and other hazards and at universal and equal access to the 
actions and services for its promotion, protection and recovery.” 
{Art. 196 - A saiide e direito de todos e dever do Estado, garantido 
mediante politicos sociais e econdmicas que visem a redugao do risco 
de doenga e de outros agravos e ao acesso universal e igualitario as 
agoes e servigos para sua promogao, protegao e recuperagao.)
In the following articles, the Constitution establishes how the 
health care system is to be organised (through the Unified System of 
Health -  “Sistema Unico de Saude — SUS) and financed. As to the 
former, it is important to highlight article 198, II, that guarantees 'full
255 An English version of the Brazilian and other constitutions can be found at the webpage of 
the International Constitutional Law Project, at
http://•www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/brOOOOO .html. Note, however, that it is not fully updated.
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service” in the health care system, at the same time as it establishes 
priority for preventive activities, (art. 198 - Public health actions and 
services are part of a regionalized and hierarchical network and constitute a 
single system organized according to the following guidelines: ... II. full 
service, priority being given to preventive activities, without prejudice to 
assistance services”.)256
As we shall see later, such a provision runs the risk of being 
misinterpreted as demanding from the state all treatment whatsoever 
needed by a citizen, whatever the costs, which is obviously impossible to 
provide everyone with in a situation of resource scarcity.
As to the financing of the health care system the constitution 
brings an interesting and, so far as I know, pioneering and unique 
provision, establishing minimum percentages of the budget to be 
compulsorily applied in health:
“§ 2° - The Federal Government, the States, the Federal District and the 
Municipalities shall apply, yearly, in health actions and health public 
services, a minimum of resources calculated as a percentage of: 257
256 The official Portuguese text reads as follows: 198, II - atendimento integral, com prioridade 
para as atividades preventivas, sem prejuizo dos servifos assistenciais;)
‘57 This whole provision wasn’t in the original constitution promulgated in 1988, but rather 
included through the Constitutional Amendment 29/2000, at the end of year 2000. ( Emenda 
Constitucional 29/2000 - D.O.U. 14.09.00)
“§ 2° - A Uniao, os Estados, o Distrito Federal e os Municipios aplicarao, anualmente, em 
a^oes e servi^os publicos de saude recursos mmimos derivados da aplica9§o de percentuais 
calculados sobre: I - no caso da Uniao, na forma definida nos termos da lei complementar 
prevista no § 3°;
II - no caso dos Estados e do Distrito Federal, o produto da arrecada9ao dos impostos a que se 
refere o art. 155 e dos recursos de que tratam os arts. 157 e 159, inciso I, alinea a, e inciso II, 
deduzidas as parcelas que forem transferidas aos respectivos Municipios;
III - no caso dos Municipios e do Distrito Federal, o produto da arrecada9ao dos impostos a 
que se refere o art. 156 e dos recursos de que tratam os arts. 158 e 159, inciso I, alinea b e § 3°. 
§ 3° - Lei complementar, que sera reavaliada pelo menos a cada cinco anos, estabelecera:
I - os percentuais de que trata o § 2°;
II - os criterios de rateio dos recursos da Uniao vinculados a saude destinados aos Estados, ao 
Distrito Federal e aos Municipios, e dos Estados destinados a seus respectivos Municipios, 
objetivando a progressiva redu9ao das disparidades regionais;
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A fairly complicated system follows for the calculation of those 
minimum resources which is not necessary to explain in detail here. 
What is important to highlight is that government at all levels (federal, 
state, municipal) are bound to follow those minimum levels. As we will 
see later, this enables some kind of judicial enforcement of social rights 
that does not present the obstacles discussed in the thesis.
It is important to note that this minimum investment requirement 
established for the guarantee of the right to health was not the first of 
that sort determined in the constitution. On the contrary, the original text 
of 1988 had already adopted such a guarantee in relation to the right to 
education, which receives perhaps the most extensive specification of all 
constitutional social rights. It is worth quoting the constitutional 
provision in full:
“Section I Education
Article 205 [Education, Duty and Right]
Education, which is the right of all persons and the duty of the State and of the family, 
shall be promoted and encouraged with the cooperation of society, aiming at full 
development of the individual, his or her preparation to exercise citizenship, and his or 
her qualification for work.
Article 206 [Fundamental Principles]
Education shall be provided on the basis of the following principles:
I. equal conditions for access to and remaining in school;
II. freedom to learn, teach, research, and express thoughts, art, and knowledge;
III. pluralism of ideas and of pedagogical concepts and coexistence of public and 
private teaching institutions;
IV. free public education in official schools;
V. appreciation of teaching professionals, guaranteeing, pursuant to the law, a career 
plan for public teachers, with a professional minimum salary and admittance 
exclusively by means of a public competitive examination of tests and titles, and 
ensuring s single legal regime for all institutions maintained by the Republic;
VI. democratic administration of public education, pursuant to the law;
VII. guarantee of good quality.
III - as normas de fiscalizasao, avaliafao e controle das despesas com saude nas esferas 
federal, estadual, distrital e municipal;
IV - as normas de calculo do montante a ser aplicado pela Uniao.
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Article 207 [Universities, Autonomy]
Universities enjoy didactic, scientific, administrative, and financial and equity 
management autonomy and shall comply with the principle of indivisibility of 
teaching, research, and extension.
Article 208 [State Duty]
(0) The State's duty concerning education shall be discharged by ensuring the 
following:
I. compulsory and free elementary education, including for those who did not have 
access to school at the proper age;
II. progressive extension of compulsory and free education to secondary school;
III. special classes for the handicapped, preferably in the ordinary school network;
IV. assistance to children of zero to six years of age in day care centres and pre 
schools;
V. access to higher levels of education, research, and artistic creation according to 
individual capacity;
VI. provision of regular night courses adequate to the student's conditions;
VII. assistance to elementary school students through supplementary programs 
providing school supplies and material, transportation, food, and health assistance.
(1) Access to compulsory and free education is a subjective public right.
(2) The proper authority are liable for the Government's failure to provide compulsory 
education or providing it irregularly.
(3) It is incumbent upon the Government to conducts a census of elementary school 
students, to call them for enrolment and see, jointly with their parents or guardians, 
that they attend school.
Article 211 [Education Systems]
(0) The Republic, the States, the Federal District, and the Municipalities cooperate in 
the organization of their educational systems.
(1) The Republic organizes and finances the federal educational system and that o f the 
Territories and renders technical and financial assistance to the States, to the Federal 
District, and to the Municipalities for the development of their education systems and 
provision of compulsory schooling on a priority basis.
(2) Municipalities act on a priority basis in elementary and pre-school education. 
Article 212 [Budget]
(0) The Republic shall each year apply not less than eighteen percent, and the 
States, the Federal District, and the Municipalities at least twenty-five percent of 
the tax revenues, including revenues resulting from transfers, in the maintenance 
and development of education.
(1) The share of tax revenues transferred from the Republic to the States, Federal 
District, and Municipalities or from the States to the respective Municipalities shall 
not be considered, for purposes of the calculation provided for in this article, as 
revenues of the government making such transfers.
(2) For purposes of complying with the main provision of this article, the federal, 
state, and municipal education systems and the funds employed pursuant to Article 
213 shall be taken into consideration.
(3) In the distribution of public funds, priority shall be given to meeting the needs of 
compulsory education pursuant to the national education plan.
(4) The supplementary food and health assistance programs foreseen in Article 208 
VII shall be financed with funds derived from social contributions and other budgetary 
funds.
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(5) An additional source of funds for public elementary education shall be the 
education salary contribution paid, pursuant to the law, by companies, which may 
deduct from it the funds invested in elementary education for their employees and 
dependents.
Article 213 [Public Funds]
(0) Public funds are allocated to public schools, and may be channelled to community, 
religious, or philanthropic schools, as defined in the law, which:
I. prove that they do not seek a profit and invest their surplus funds in education;
II. ensure that their equity is assigned to another community, philanthropic, or 
religious school or to the Government in the event they cease their activities.
(1) The funds referred to in this article may be allocated to elementary and secondary 
school scholarships, pursuant to the law, for those who prove that they do not have 
sufficient funds, whenever there are not vacancies or regular courses in the public 
school system of the place where the student lives, the Government being required to 
invest, on a priority basis, in the expansion of its network in that place.
(2) Research and extension activities at university level may receive financial support 
from the Government.
Article 214 [National Plan]
The law shall lay down the pluriannual national education plan aimed at coordination 
and development o f education at its various levels and at integration of Government 
action leading to:
I. eradication o f illiteracy;
II. universalization of school assistance;
III. improvement o f teaching quality;
IV. professional training;
V. humanistic, scientific and technological development if Brazil.
As it can be seen, the minimum investment requirement in 
education is quite high, at 18% of all federal tax revenues plus 25% of 
all states, federal district and municipalities’ tax revenue, yearly.
It should be noticed, finally, that the 1988 Brazilian Constitution 
does not include specific provisions related to the right to housing or 
food. Those rights figure only indirectly, when the constitution mentions 
policies in the field of agriculture and urbanism, and also as an indirect 
right derived from the right to a minimum wage, recognised in article 7:
“Article 7 [The Rights]
The following are rights o f city and rural workers, notwithstanding any others that 
seek to improve their social condition:
IV. a minimum wage nationwide, established by law, capable of satisfying their 
basic living needs and those of their families with housing, food, education,
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health, leisure, clothing, hygiene, transportation, and social security, with 
periodical adjustments to maintain its purchasing power, it being forbidden to bind it 
for any purpose;”
South Africa
Let us see now how the constitutional provisions recognising 
social rights are worded in the South African constitution. Social and 
economic rights are to be found in Chapter 2 of the 1996 South African 
Constitution, named “Bill of Rights”. It starts with general principles 
such as sections 7 and 8, which define the state duties related to the 
rights included in the constitution and establishes some general rules for 
their application.
Rights
7. (1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone o f democracy in South Africa. It enshrines 
the rights o f all people in our country and affirms the democratic values o f human 
dignity, equality and freedom.
(2) The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights.
(3) The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained or referred 
to in section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill.
Application
8. (1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state.
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of 
any duty imposed by the right.
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in 
terms of subsection (2), a court in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, 
or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give 
effect to that right; and may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, 
provided that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).
(4) A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required
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by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.
It is worth noticing section 7(2), because it makes clear that the 
duties of the state as regards rights in general are not restricted to 
negative duties of respect, but include also positive duties of protection, 
promotion and fulfilment of rights. The Constitution has specific 
provisions on equality (s. 9) and human dignity (s. 10). As regards 
specific social rights, sections 26, 27 and 29 are of interest:
Housing
26. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation o f this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without 
an order o f court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation 
may permit arbitrary evictions.
Health care, food, water and social security
27. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to health care services, including 
reproductive health care; sufficient food and water; and social security, including, if  
they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social 
assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.
Education
29. (1) Everyone has the right to a basic education, including adult basic education; 
and to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make 
progressively available and accessible.
(2) Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of 
their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably 
practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of, this 
right, the state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single 
medium institutions, taking into account equity; practicability; and the need to redress 
the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices.
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(3) Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, 
independent educational institutions that do not discriminate on the basis o f race; are 
registered with the state; and maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at 
comparable public educational institutions.
(4) Subsection (3) does not preclude state subsidies for independent educational 
institutions.
It is interesting to bear in mind, for the purposes of our 
comparative analysis of cases to be carried out later on, the provision 
that limits the duty of the state to the adoption of “reasonable legislative 
and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of each of these rights”, included in the South African 
constitution in regard to the rights to housing, health care, food, water 
and social security, which has no counterpart in the Brazilian 
constitution. This might explain to some extent, as we shall see later, the 
different approaches of each country in the judicial enforcement of 
social rights.
To finish this section, I must highlight another provision that, 
similarly to the Brazilian system, makes clear that social and economic 
rights are fully justiciable in the South African system.
Enforcement of rights
38. Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging 
that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may 
grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may 
approach a court are - 
anyone acting in their own interest;
anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
anyone acting in the public interest; and 
an association acting in the interest of its members.
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Let us turn now, then, to the comparative analysis of cases 
involving social rights that have come before Brazilian and South 
African courts to decide after the adoption of their constitutions. My 
analysis will be mainly focused on the right to health care, given it 
seems to be the right that features most in social rights litigation.
South Africa -  a more restrained role for the courts
Soon after South Africa adopted its new Constitution recognising 
many social and economic rights, a case came before the Constitutional 
Court involving the right to health care: Soobramoney vs. Minister o f
y c o
Health (Kwazulu-Natal). In this case, as we have already seen in 
chapter 7, the South African judiciary was called upon to decide whether 
the right to health care (expressly recognised in the South African 
Constitution in section 27 as we saw above) had been violated by the 
refusal of a local state hospital to provide the plaintiff, Mr Soobramoney, 
with periodical renal dialysis treatment necessary to maintain his life. It 
is needless to say that a country the size of South Africa has many 
people in the same situation as Mr. Soobramoney, that is, in need of 
renal dialysis (palliative or in view of transplantation), and that the 
state’s resources devoted to health care are not sufficient to provide 
everyone with that treatment.
The constitutional provision relied upon by Mr. Soobramoney in 
his claim, as we have seen in the previous section, states that “everyone 
has the right to have access to health care services” (s.27(l), but 
qualifies that provision affirming that “[t]he state must take reasonable
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legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realization of each of these rights.”
That is, the constitution makes clear that the right to have access 
to health care is not a right to be provided by the state with any 
treatment whatsoever, no matter how expensive. On the contrary, it 
establishes a right to have access to health care services which the state, 
acting with reasonableness and within available resources, should 
provide. It also ads the concept of progressive realization, giving the 
idea (inadequate as I claimed in chapter 2), that one day it will be 
possible to provide everyone with all treatment needed. As I claimed in 
chapter 2, resource scarcity is not a passing circumstance, but a 
permanent feature of our world. There will always be insufficient 
resources for all the needs of individuals and society, because the former 
are finite whereas the latter are never so. The concept of progressive 
realization, thus, is better discarded.
It might be better to say, thus, that the right to have access to 
health care recognised in the South African constitution is what is 
sometimes called an abstract, or prima facie right. 259 The distinction 
between abstract (prima facie) and concrete (definitive) rights has been 
explained by one of its proponents, Ronald Dworkin, it in the following 
way:
“An abstract right is a general political aim the statement of which does 
not indicate how the general aim is to be weighed or compromised in 
particular circumstances against other political aims. ... Concrete 
rights, on the other hand, are political aims that are more precisely
defined so as to express more definitely the weight they have against
260other political aims on particular occasions.”
258 Constitutional Court o f South Africa, Case CCT 32/97, 27 November 1997
259 Cf Robert Alexy, op. cit. at 490
260 Taking Rights Seriously, 1977, p 93.
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Dworkin illustrates the distinction with the right to free speech. 
If we simply say that everyone has the right to free speech we do not 
mean that this right is absolute, but neither do we specify how it should 
be balanced against competing interests in specific cases. When we say 
however that “a newspaper has a right to publish defence plans 
classified as secret provided this publication will not create an 
immediate danger to troops ”, this balance has already been done, and 
the right stated is a concrete one. Abstract rights “provide arguments 
for concrete rights, but the claim o f a concrete right is more definitive 
than any claim o f abstract right that supports it. ” 261
Take, now, the social right to health care we are discussing in 
this section. The South African constitution establishes the general 
political aim that South African citizens should have access to health 
care services. This general political aim, then, has to be weighed 
against other competing political aims before it can become a concrete, 
more definite right to a particular kind of health care service. Unlike in 
Dworkin’s free speech example, however, the situation here is 
infinitely more complex, because the balancing exercise is not bilateral, 
i.e. publishing of defence plans versus safety of troops. As I have 
discussed at length in this thesis, we face here a “polycentric” problem. 
That is, given the fact of resource scarcity, to know if renal dialysis 
should be provided to Mr. Soobramoney or not (i.e. to decide if the 
abstract right to health care entails a concrete right to renal dialysis), 
one must balance the need to renal dialysis against all other needs 
competing for the scarce resources of the community. But those needs
261 Op cit, p 94. See also, for the distinction, Law’s Empire, p 293. The same distinction can be 
put as a distinction between two different types of norms: principles and rules. Abstract rights 
are principle norms; concrete rights are rules. For this distinction, see also Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously, and Robert Alexy, op. cit.
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are endless, which makes the enterprise utterly complex. Indeed, this 
balancing judgement will inevitably involve complex matters of public 
policy and resource allocation intimately related to distributive justice 
issues.
It is those difficulties that unconditional supporters of social 
rights’ justiciability tend to overlook when they insist that civil and 
political rights adjudication is similar to that of social and economic 
rights. It seems undeniable to me that it is far easier to balance freedom 
of the press against safety of troops than to decide if Mr. Soobramoney 
should be entitled to renal dialysis.
When one bears in mind those difficulties the heavily criticised 
opinion of the South African Constitutional Court in Soobramoney 
becomes much more understandable:
“[29] The provincial administration which is responsible for health care 
services in Kwazulu-Natal has to make decisions about the funding that 
should be made available for health care and how such funds should be 
spent. These choices involve difficult decisions to be taken at the 
political level in fixing the health budget, and at the functional level in 
deciding upon the priorities to be met. A court will be slow to interfere 
with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and 
medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters.” 
[my emphasis]
The court restricted its role, therefore, to an assessment of the 
“rationality” and the “goodfaith” of political and technical decisions. 
This was due to a combination of legitimacy and institutional capacity 
concerns: the fear to overstep the boundaries imposed by the principle of 
separation of powers, and “the danger o f making any order that the 
resources be used for a particular patient, which might have the effect o f
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denying those resources to other patients to whom they might more 
advantageously be devoted. ”262
One can easily understand the concerns of the South African 
court. But it must be recognised that such an approach runs the risk of 
rendering the highly acclaimed social rights provisions of the South 
African Constitution virtually redundant. Indeed, it is hardly necessary 
to invoke the right to health care at all to demand that governmental 
decisions be rational. The rationality test is a well established limit on 
the discretion of political agents to make decisions. But it is a very 
restricted test, for the very reason that it is applied to areas where the 
political branches are supposed to exert discretion. In the apt phrase of 
Lawrence Sager, it places the courts in the position of a “guard at a door
“j f / ithat only a mad or a runaway legislature would lurch through.”
If the right to have access to health care is to have any meaning as 
a constitutional provision, thus, the Court must be able to review, in 
some degree at least, the correctness of the very political and technical 
decisions which led to the refusal of treatment to Mr Soobramoney.
But can courts legitimately and efficiently tackle those questions, 
or is the South African approach really all we can have?264 It should be
262 Soobramoney, par [30], p 16 .1 do not agree, on this point, with Scott and Alston’s analysis 
of the court’s position. They argue that the court refusal to give Mr. Soobramoney priority was 
grounded on a kind of utilitarian position that sacrifices the individual “to an amorphous 
general good”. See “Adjudicating social priorities in a transnational context: a comment on 
Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootbroom’s promise”, in South African Journal on Human 
Rights, v. 16, 2000, pp 206-268, at 252. I think it is clear from the passage quoted that the 
court, out of a concern of institutional capacity, in fact abstained to make any decision at all 
(utilitarian or not) as to the matter o f priority. Moreover, to say that resources might be more 
advantageously devoted to other patients doesn’t necessarily imply a utilitarian position. 
Indeed, one might well ground such a claim on the principle o f equality, in the sense of equal 
concern we have discussed in this thesis.
263 Plain Clothes, 1993, at 413.
264 See Canotilho, op. cit. p 483, maintaining that “the legislator is not entirely free to comply 
with such impositions [social and economic constitutional norms] but has, however, freedom 
of conformation as to the concrete normative solutions and as to the organisation and 
graduality of concretisation.” O controle judicial e ’ de razoabilidade, para verificar se ha’ uma 
efetiva realizacao gradual e nao ha discriminacao. This is a very week duty, in my view. See
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clear from the discussion I developed in the previous chapters that the 
concerns of the South African Constitutional Court are genuine but 
exaggerated. It underestimates the possibility (which I have defended in 
this thesis) for the courts to perform a more meaningful role without 
unduly interfering in political questions or straining their institutional 
capacity.
As to legitimacy, once social rights are constitutionalised as 
enforceable norms (or even as directive principles), there is a necessary 
reduction on the sphere of discretion of the political branches. Indeed, 
the very idea of a constitutional right entails that some interests are so 
fundamental that they cannot be left to the exclusive discretion of the 
political majorities. The fact that rights to a positive action (or 
entitlements in the wide sense) are dependent on resources is not, in 
itself, a reason to bar judicial interference. It is true that resource 
allocation among competing political aims is primarily a political task, 
that is, one to be performed by the legislature and government. But it is 
not a fully discretionary task, otherwise it would make no sense to talk 
of rights whenever resource allocation is involved, which is the case of 
most rights currently recognised in democratic constitutions. The 
political branches have a non-discretionary duty, therefore, to allocate 
a certain amount of resources for the guarantee of the rights established 
in the constitution. The difficult question is, of course, how to 
determine the correct (i.e. just) amount to be allocated for the 
guarantee of each constitutional right. How much is to go for 
education, health care, housing, food, security etc is an intractable 
distributive justice matter. But here, it is important to emphasise, we 
are already in the realm of institutional capacity, not legitimacy. That
also Cass Sunstein, praising the South African decision Grootboom as the correct way of 
judicial enforcement without usurpation of powers, op. cit., p235.
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is, on the problem of which institution is better suited to make such 
decisions well.
There is no doubt, I submitted in this thesis, that the legislature 
and government are in principle better equipped to make such decisions. 
After all, it is primarily their duty to make them, and to carry out that 
duty they have departments to gather information, carry out analysis, 
develop policies etc which the judiciary obviously lacks. It is not 
surprising, thus, that some courts would prefer to take a deferential 
approach, and interfere only on the safe side of irrationality and good 
faith. But it does so at the high risk of abdicating its fundamental 
constitutional role of protecting rights.
I claimed in this thesis that there is scope for the courts to 
exercise a more meaningful role without risking undue interference 
with political decisions. This can be done through a particular version 
of the minimum threshold approach which I discussed and defended in 
chapters 6, which I call the insurance model. I have already tried to 
show in that chapter how the courts might have decided the South 
African cases Soobramoney, Grootboom and TAC if they used the
265equality approach I suggested.
265 See chapter 7.
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Brazil: health care as an absolute right
The approach in Brazil, where the right to health care has also been 
claimed in the courts, is different to the South African one in three main 
inter-related respects. Firstly, the courts are much less deferential to the 
political branches (if at all), never expressing concerns of legitimacy or 
institutional capacity. Secondly, they pay little regard, in particular, to 
the scarcity of resource defence usually raised by the State, as if it were 
a mere subterfuge to evade their duties. Thirdly, when they find a 
violation of the constitutional provisions, the remedy usually asserts an 
immediately claimable right (i.e. a subjective right) of the individual, 
which cannot be limited by any competing claim (an absolute, or 
concrete right).
I shall take legal suits claiming a constitutional right to HIV 
treatment, which have proliferated throughout South America, to 
illustrate with the right to health care what we might call the South 
American approach to justiciability.
Brazil is internationally recognised as a success story in the fight 
against AIDS due to its state funded drugs distribution programme set up 
by the federal government in the nineties. What is less well-known, 
however, is that many HIV infected Brazilian citizens were given HIV 
drugs due to court orders and not through the federal government 
programme, which is large yet not fully comprehensive. In this section I 
will describe and analyse a Brazilian case involving the right to receive 
HIV drugs from the state that reached the Brazilian Supreme Federal 
Tribunal (the highest tribunal of the country).
Before I proceed it is important to make a few comments on the 
Brazilian judicial system so that one can understand the real significance
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of the decision I will discuss. The Supreme Federal Tribunal is 
composed by eleven judges, appointed by the President of Brazil among 
citizens with “notable legal knowledge” and “immaculate reputation”, 
who are older than 35 years and younger than 65 years. The Senate has 
to approve the President’s nominations. The Supreme Federal Tribunal 
judges usually sit in two fixed groups of five (called “ turmas”) to judge 
the cases. Their main competence of the SFT is to judge cases in third 
instance which have a constitutional question to be solved. That is, when 
a case is heard in first instance by a local judge, and then in appeal by a 
State’s tribunal (Brazil is a federative republic composed of 27 States), it 
can be furthered appealed to the Supreme Federal Tribunal, yet only if it 
involved a constitutional question. As we saw above, social and 
economic rights are expressly recognised in Brazil in the constitution, 
which renders any lawsuit involving one of those rights amenable, in 
principle, to be taken to the Supreme Federal Tribunal.
It is important to note, however, that the decisions of higher 
courts are not binding either on themselves or on other lower courts. It is 
quite common, for instance, that one “turma” of five judges at the SFT 
reach a completely opposite decision to that reached by the other 
“turma” on an identical case. Even the same “turma” might change its 
position through the change of mind of a single judge, or the
0  f \ f \replacement (through retirement) of a single judge. A first instance 
judge, as I said, is also free to take a different decision to that reached in 
the higher courts. That makes it quite common for questions already 
decided by the SFT to keep being brought to justice. There is always a 
chance of a change of position in the SFT. Moreover, not all cases reach 
the SFT. We might have the situation, thus, in which an identical case is
266 For instance, if a position was originally held by a majority of 3 to 2 judges, it takes only 
one turn to change the position o f the whole “turma”.
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judged one way in the SFT and another in the first instance, in a decision 
that becomes definitive through lack of appeal to the SFT.
Those explanations are necessary for one to understand the real 
significance of the case I will now discuss. Although it could be taken, 
today, as the majoritarian position in all courts in Brazil, there is always 
the chance of that position changing, or of a different position to be 
taken in a new case that never reaches the SFT.
The case was brought to the courts by Dina Rosa Vieira against 
the Municipality o f Porto Alegre, which is the capital of the 
southernmost State of Brazil, Rio Grande do Sul. The plaintiff claimed 
that she was entitled to receive free HIV drugs from the local 
government as a corollary of her right to health care established in article 
196 of the Constitution. The local government of Porto Alegre claimed 
that there were no resources in the budget of the municipality to afford 
such treatment. The Supreme Federal Tribunal rejected the defendant’s 
argument and ordered the State to provide all treatment needed by the 
plaintiff on the grounds that failing to do so would indeed constitute a 
violation of the rights to life and health care guaranteed in the Brazilian 
constitution. The grounds of the judgment have been clearly exposed in 
the following passage:
“Between the protection of the inviolable rights to life and health, 
which are subjective inalienable rights guaranteed to everyone by the 
Constitution itself (art. 5, caput and art. 196), and the upholding, against 
this fundamental prerogative, of a financial and secondary interest of 
the State, I believe -  once this dilemma occurs -  that ethical-juridical 
reasons compel the judge to only one possible solution: that which 
furthers the respect of life and human health .. .”267
267 My translation from the original in Portuguese, which reads as follows: “entre proteger a 
inviolabilidade do direito a vida e a saude, que se qualifica como direito subjetivo inalienavel 
assegurado a todos pela propria Constituisao da Republica (art. 5°, caput e art. 196), ou fazer 
prevalecer, contra essa prerrogativa fundamental, um interesse financeiro e secundario do 
Estado, entendo - uma vez configurado esse dilema - que razoes de ordem etico-juridica
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The Brazilian Federal Supreme Tribunal, therefore, sees the case 
as a conflict (or dilemma) between two competing interests. On one side, 
there is an individual’s right to life and health care; on the other side, 
there is an interest of the state to maintain its financial situation in good 
order. It performs then a balancing exercise and concludes that the right 
of the individual must prevail. If the premises of the balancing exercise 
were correct, there would be nothing wrong with the conclusion reached 
by the court. Indeed, as we have already discussed above, the very idea 
of a right entails that it should prevail even against the common interest 
expressed by political majoritarian decisions.
It should be clear by now, however, that the premises of this 
balancing exercise are not correct. Indeed, what the SFT calls a 
“financial and secondary interest of the State” is not an end in itself. The 
State does not seek to spend less with health care in order to have more 
money in its bank account simply to make it look better. As it should be 
obvious for anyone but seems particularly difficult for the judiciary to 
grasp, resources are scarce and, as a consequence, any resource spent on 
one thing (such as HIV treatment), means that there will be less 
resources to spend on other things. The real question to be asked, thus, is 
whether the decision of the State not to spend resources from its budget 
on HIV treatment for the plaintiff is just. That, as we saw, is a complex 
normative polycentric question, since it involves analyzing the whole 
distribution of resources in society from the perspective of justice.
As I claimed in chapter 6, the equality conception of the 
minimum threshold approach might be able to help judges to make those 
decisions. They might try and determine if, given a fair initial
impoem ao julgador uma so e possi'vel op?ao: aquela que privilegia o respeito indeclinavel a 
vida e a saude humana ...” The decision is available in 'Portuguese at the SFT webpage, at
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distribution of resources in society, individuals would insure against the 
risk of being HIV positive. I did not claim that my approach would lead 
to an exact answer in all cases, or that it won’t be dismissed as 
unfeasible by most judges. If that is the case, as I claimed, a better 
solution would be to adopt what Alexy calls “epistemic discretion”. 
That is, judges should defer to the political branches decisions on the 
grounds that, being impossible for an adequate answer to be reached, the 
decisions taken through the political process should prevail.
Some might claim that this is too deferential to the political 
branches and risks devaluing the whole idea of human rights. There is no 
doubt such a risk, but we must weigh it up against the opposite risk of 
courts taking inadequate decisions that in the end create more injustice. 
The Brazilian case is very illustrative of this point. It is simply 
impossible, given the present availability of resources and the 
skyrocketing costs of complex medical procedures and drugs, for any 
country (let alone Brazil) to provide everyone with all health care 
services needed, however costly. The Court’s approach, therefore, runs 
the risk of creating more inequality. In fact, when the courts ignore that 
resources are scarce they privilege some (namely those who have the 
means to access the judiciary, or those who do it first) at the expense of 
others.269This was, as we have seen above, the justified worry of the 
South African Court in Soobramoney: “the danger o f making any order 
that the resources be used for a particular patient, which might have the
www.stf.gov.br. The number of the decision is RE-271286.
268 See chapter 4.
269 According to an article in one of the leading Brazilian broadsheet newspapers, in 2002 80% 
of the budget allocated for AIDS was diverted to individual patients through judicial decisions. 
From 1996 to 2002 this type of decision has grown from 80 a month to over 600 a month, 
achieving 6% of the total health budget in the State of Sao Paulo. Folha de Sao Paulo, 
18.8.2002, “DIREITO A SAUDE - Numero de senten^as que obrigam o Estado a fomecer 
remedios a doentes cresceu seis vezes e meia de 1996 a 2002. Justi^a faz polltica de 
medicamentos em SP”
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effect o f denying those resources to other patients to whom they might 
more advantageously be devoted. ” The prevalent position in the 
Brazilian courts to regard social rights as if they were absolute, thus, is 
to be rejected.
In most South American countries cases involving the right to 
receive free HIV drugs from the State have ended in a similar way, i.e. 
with the courts determining that the State provides such drugs to the 
citizens. The same conclusion was reached, for instance, by the 
Colombian Constitutional Court in Alonso Munoz Ceballos v. Instituto 
de los Seguros Sociales (Sentencia n.o T-484-92) and Diego Serna 
Gomez v. Hospital Universitario del Valle <(Evaristo Garcia ” (Sentencia 
n.o T-505/92); by the El Salvadorian Supreme Court o f Justice 
(Sentencia de la Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de 4 de 
Abril de 2001).
Although the outcome of those decisions is the same, the 
reasoning that grounds them present some differences worth analyzing, 
especially in the way they deal with the issue of resource scarcity raised 
by all defendants. In the Brazilian case, as we saw, the Supreme Federal 
Tribunal simply dismissed, without much discussion, the resource 
scarcity argument.
The same approach was taken in El Salvador:
“The high cost of a medicine cannot be validly raised to justify not 
treating, or treating incompletely a patient. If it is proven that the 
administration of a drug is capable of, if not curing or saving, making 
life better for a while, it should be given.”270
270 Debe entonces entenderse que el alto costo de un medicamento no puede ser arguido 
validamente para justificar una desatencion o una atencion insuficiente en un enfermo. Si se ha 
probado que el suministro de una sustancia es capaz de permitirle sino bien curarse ni salvarse, 
si vivir momentaneamente mejor, debe proporcionarsele. La Sala Constitucional de la Corte
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It is even understandable that Courts in Latin America, where 
corruption is widespread and the political branches have a low reputation 
for diligently carrying out their duties, are sceptical of the resource 
scarcity defence. But this does not release them from carrying out a 
serious scrutiny, in order to avoid, as we saw above, doing injustice to 
other competing and pressing needs that have to be furthered with the 
scarce resources of society. It is simply impossible, it bears repeating, to 
provide all health care treatment available, however expensive, to a 
whole population. Even diligent and honest authorities, therefore, will 
have to make decisions on how to spend scarce resources.
But the outcome of the decisions in the Brazilian and El 
Salvadorian cases could have been more plausibly justified if they used 
the equality conception of the minimum threshold approach I defended 
in this thesis. This seems to be the rationale of the two Colombian 
constitutional cases regarding the same subject (provision of AIDS 
treatment). Indeed, the Colombian Constitutional Court reached the 
same outcome as their Brazilian and El Salvadorian counterparts but 
through a better reasoning. It does not dismiss scarcity of resources as a 
“secondary interest of the State”. On the contrary, it acknowledges it, 
and emphasises the duty of the administration and its doctors to make an 
ethical judgement as to whom should receive priority. Unlike in 
Soobramoney, though, the Colombian Court goes on to assert that the 
criteria to make such allocation are in the Constitution itself and 
therefore is reviewable by the Court. The priority of resources for the
Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica, en la resolucion pronunciada a las dieciocho horas y nueve 
minutos del dia veintitres de septiembre de mil novecientos noventa y siete, en el amparo 
5778-V-97, dejo dicho en un caso semejante a este que “(...) De todos modos si lo que precisa 
es poner el problema en la fria dimension fmanciera, estima la Sala que no seria menos atinado 
preguntamos por los muchos millones de colones que se pierden por el hecho de que los
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treatment of HIV infected poor patients is then justified by the following 
reasons: allocation of scarce resources should prioritise i. minorities 
traditionally discriminated and marginalized from the benefits o f 
society; ii. medical problems which carry a risk o f epidemics; iii. 
medical problems which carry a risk to the life o f the patient. ” 
(Sentencia No. T-505)
This seems to me a much more adequate justification than that 
adopted by the Brazilian and El Salvadorian decisions. The Colombian 
court did not recoil from tackling the difficult issue of resource scarcity. 
Its decision might well be seen, I submit, as in line with the equality 
approach I suggested. In fact, if we take the three criteria put forward by 
the Court to assess the distribution of resources made by government we 
can identify a strong egalitarian verve. To allocate resources to 
“minorities traditionally marginalised from the benefits of society” is a 
clear redistributive measure. Problems which carry a risk of epidemics 
or a threat to life can also be safely assumed as part of an insurance 
chosen by individuals who possess a fair amount of society’s resources. 
The Colombian decisions, thus, although not as precise as one might 
wish judicial decisions involving social rights to be, goes at least in the 
right direction of facing the distributive justice issue usually ignored in 
other South American jurisdictions.
It can still be claimed, of course, that even in the Colombian 
approach there is a high “danger . . .o f  denying those resources to other 
patients to whom they might more advantageously be devoted. ” I do not 
think, unlike many social rights partisans, that these arguments are 
unimportant. But they might be one-sided. By avoiding the risks taken 
by the Colombian Court, the South African Court is taking risks on the
enfermos no puedan tener la posibilidad de reincorporarse a la fuerza laboral y producir su 
parte, por pequena que sea, de la riqueza nacional.
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other side. Mr Soobramoney is dead. And so might be thousands of 
South African children whose condition was declared prioritarious by 
the Constitutional Court, but no immediately claimable right was 
recognised. What if Mr Soobramoney did have a right, based on the 
correct allocation of resources, to receive renal dialysis?
I am not saying, it is worth repeating, that the risks of the 
Colombian approach are negligible. The point I am trying to make is that 
there are risks on the other side as well, and just as important.
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